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1

Wpływ wielkiego kryzysu i zagranicy na polski handel zagraniczny w latach 1929-35 (część II)

100%

Klimiuk Z.

Zeszyty Naukowe PWSZ w Płocku. Nauki Ekonomiczne

|

2017

|

vol. 2(26)

25-41

PL

Przenoszenie zmian w koniunkturze zewnętrznej (światowej) do polskiej gospodarki w okresie międzywojennym dokonywało się zarówno poprzez mechanizm międzynarodowego rozprzestrzeniania się zmian cen, jak i mechanizm międzynarodowego rozprzestrzeniania się zmian dochodu, przy czym znacznie istotniejsze było działanie tego pierwszego. Zmiany cen zewnętrznych pociągały za sobą zmiany poziomu zysków i płac w dziedzinach realizujących część produkcji na rynkach zewnętrznych, a poprzez to zmiany popytu globalnego na rynku wewnętrznym. Zmiany wielkości zatrudnienia i produkcji za granicą wywierały na gospodarkę Polski wpływ generalnie słabszy niż zmiany cen. Reakcje poszczególnych elementów struktury gospodarczej Polski na cykliczne zmiany popytu i cen zewnętrznych były niejednakowe. W przypadku Polski mieliśmy do czynienia zarówno z reakcjami przystosowawczymi typu cenowego i mnożnikowego (dochodowego) to jednak reakcje te nie występowały w czystej postaci. Czynnikiem komplikującym był przede wszystkim sektor na wpół naturalnej gospodarki rolnej. Zmiany koniunktury zewnętrznej nie prowadziły w tym przypadku do zmian poziomu produkcji i zatrudnienia. Z drugiej jednak strony przenoszenie koniunktury poprzez cykliczne zmiany cen zewnętrznych i zmian ich relacji do cen wewnętrznych nie przebiegało w Polsce w sposób całkowicie zgodny z wyjaśnieniem cenowym. Spadek cen zewnętrznych nie pociągnął za sobą w sposób automatyczny i bezpośredni obniżenia się poziomu cen wewnętrznych (krajowych i importowanych). Czynnikiem to powodującym był przede wszystkim wysoki stopień zmonopolizowania kluczowych gałęzi polskiej gospodarki.

EN

In the interwar period the fluctuations in the external (global) business cycle were being transmitted to the Polish economy via both the mechanism of international propagation of price changes and the mechanism of international propagation of income changes, with the former mechanism playing a much more important role. Changes in external prices were leading to changes in the level of profits and wages in the branches placing part of their output on external markets, and consequently to changes in global demand on the internal market. The impact of changes in the size of foreign employment and production on the Polish economy was generally weaker than that of the price developments. The reactions of individual elements of Poland’s economic structure to the cyclical changes in demand and in external prices were uneven. In the case of Poland both prices’ adjustments and adjustments via multiplier (income) effect were observed; however the said adjustments did not occur in their pure form. The agriculture, a sector which possessed the characteristics of semi-natural economy, constituted the main factor complicating the adjustment mechanisms. In the case of the said sector business cycle changes abroad did not translate into changes in output and employment. On the other hand, in case of Poland the transmission of business cycle fluctuation through changes in foreign prices and changes in their relation to internal prices did progress in complete accordance with the price based transmission mechanism. The decline in external prices did not automatically and directly translate into reduction internal prices (on both domestic and imported goods). The reason behind such an outcome was mostly high degree of monopolization of the key branches of the Polish economy.

2

Kształtowanie się polsko-niemieckich stosunków gospodarczych w latach 1929–1939

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Klimiuk Z.

Społeczeństwo i Polityka

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2019

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issue 4(61)

191-209

PL

Lata międzywojenne były okresem ścisłej zależności gospodarki Polski od gospodarki niemieckiej. Pozycja obu państw pod względem poziomu rozwoju potencjału gospodarczego była diametralnie różna. Polska jako dostawca surowców i jako rynek zbytu dla gotowych towarów znajdowała się w okresie międzywojennym w strefi e zainteresowań handlowych Niemiec. Istniały przesłanki dla korzystnej wymiany handlowej z Polską. Rynek polski i rynek niemiecki były w większym stopniu rynkami kompensacyjnymi niż konkurencyjnymi. Niemcy posiadały dodatni bilans w handlu produktami gotowymi, ujemny we wszystkich innych grupach. Polska przeciwnie, miała ujemny bilans w handlu wyrobami gotowymi, dodatni w zakresie artykułów spożywczych, surowców i półfabrykatów. Na przeszkodzie szerokiemu rozwojowi stosunków gospodarczych polsko-niemieckich stały dążenia obydwu państw do zmiany struktury gospodarczej. Od 1937 r. Polska osiągała wyraźną przewagę importu nad eksportem w stosunkach z Niemcami. Począwszy już jednak od 1934 r. topniała nadwyżka wywozu nad przywozem. Świadczyło to o skuteczności niemieckich działań mających na celu uzyskanie dodatniego bilansu handlowego z Polską osiągniętych w trakcie rokowań nad umowami i porozumieniami gospodarczymi. Po zajęciu całej Czechosłowacji w marcu 1939 r. udział Niemiec w polskim handlu zagranicznym zwiększył się do 30%. Państwo polskie nie stało generalnie na mocnej pozycji przetargowej w trakcie rokowań gospodarczych z zachodnim partnerem. Polska mogła handlować głównie surowcami i płodami rolnymi. Dlatego też w kierunku ustalenia maksymalnych kwot wywozowych tych właśnie towarów nakierowane były działania polskich negocjatorów.

EN

The years between World Wars I and II saw close dependence of the Polish economy on the German economy. The positions of the two countries in terms of economic potential development differed widely. As a supplier of raw materials and a market for fi nished products, in the inter-war period Poland was in Germany’s trade interest zone. There were conditions for favourable trade with Poland. The Polish and German markets were compensating rather than competitive to each other. Germany had a positive balance of trade in fi nished products, negative in all other groups. In contrast, Poland had a trade defi cit in the case of fi nished goods, a surplus in food, raw materials and semi-fi nished products. Both countries aspired to change their economic structures, which hampered broader development of Poland–Germany economic relations. From 1937, Poland noted a clear advantage of imports over exports in relations with Germany. However, the export surplus had started to diminish from 1934. It refl ected the effectiveness of German measures aimed at obtaining a positive trade balance with Poland, taken during negotiations regarding economic contracts and agreements. After the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Germany’s share in Polish foreign trade increased to 30%. In general, Poland did not enjoy a very strong bargaining position during economic negotiations with its Western partner. Poland could mainly trade in raw materials and agricultural produce. Therefore, the Polish negotiators endeavoured to set maximum export quotas for those goods.

3

Ewolucja tradycyjnych koncepcji handlu zagranicznego w teorii ekonomii

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Klimiuk Z.

Zeszyty Naukowe PWSZ w Płocku. Nauki Ekonomiczne

|

2016

|

vol. 2(24)

7 - 25

EN

The classical economic theory assumed full employment, with the foreign trade links between countries based predominately on the price mechanism. In the post-keynesian theory the relationships between national economies were primarily based on changes in the levels of income and employment, with the relationships based on prices being almost completely abstracted away from. Therefore under the “income-based” concept, the mechanism of the business cycle’s transmission assumed prices as given (fixed), with the national income, employment, exports and imports having variable character. On the other hand, the price-based mechanism assumed the levels of production, employment and income as fixed, with prices (costs, wages and interest rate) being variable parameters. It can be generally assumed that the mechanism of transmission of a business cycle from one country to another one is presented in the economic literature as a mechanism of relationships between the main elements and parameters of each country’s economic system, such as employment, national product and prices. The functions of the said mechanism are performed by widely understood foreign turnover. Basic differences between individual explanations stem from the fact, that under the first approach (income-based one) the variable parameters include employment and income, and consequently volume of foreign trade, while prices are assumed to be given (fixed), while the second explanation involves the reverse order – with employment and incomes considered as given (fixed), and with prices being variable parameter.

PL

W klasycznej teorii ekonomii przyjmowano stan pełnego zatrudnienia na rynku pracy, a powiązania między krajami za pośrednictwem handlu zagranicznego były przede wszystkim związkami dokonujacymi się poprzez mechanizm cen. W teorii postkeynesowskiej natomiast relacje między gospodarkami były przede wszystkim oddziaływaniami poprzez zmiany poziomu dochodu i zatrudnienia podczas, gdy od związków cenowych całkowicie lub prawie całkowicie abstrahowano. Stad też w mechanizmie przenoszenia koniunktury w koncepcji „dochodowej” ceny przyjmowano za dane (stała) podczas, gdy zmiennymi byli dochód narodowy, zatrudnienie, eksport i import. Natomiast w mechanizmie „cenowym” stałymi były poziom produkcji, zatrudnienia i dochodu, a parametrami zmiennymi ceny (koszty, płace, stopa procentowa). Można generalnie przyjąć, iż mechanizm przenoszenia koniunktury z jednego kraju do drugiego przedstawiony jest w literaturze ekonomicznej jako mechanizm zależności, które występują między głównymi elementami i wielkościami układu gospodarczego każdego z nich: zatrudnienie, dochód narodowy i ceny. Funkcje tego mechanizmu spełniają szeroko rozumiane obroty zagraniczne. Podstawowe różnice występujące między poszczególnymi wyjaśnieniami polegają na tym, że o ile w wyjaśnianiu pierwszym (dochodowym) wielkościami zmiennymi są poziom zatrudnienia i dochodu (a w związku z tym wielkość obrotów zagranicznych) podczas, gdy ceny przyjmowane są za wielkość daną (stałą), to w wyjaśnieniu drugim jest odwrotnie. Tutaj danymi (stałymi) są zatrudnienie i dochód, natomiast wielkością zmienną są ceny.

4

Ewolucja gospodarki Włoch po II wojnie światowej - od "cudu" do kryzysu gospodarczego

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Klimiuk Z.

Zeszyty Naukowe PWSZ w Płocku. Nauki Ekonomiczne

|

2015

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vol. 2(22)

377-392

EN

At the time of unification, in 1861, Italy was relatively backward country compared to the more advanced western European nations. Agriculture was the main productive sector and 60 per cent of the labour force was still toiling on the land. From then on the Italian economy underwent deep changes, both in its productive capacity abd structure. Italy caught up with the level of output per head of the most advanced economies and today shares a similar economic structure and a low rate of growth. Italy is the fourth-largest national economy in Europe, the eight-largest by nominal GDP in the world. Despite these important achievements, the country's economy today suffers from many and relevant problems. After a strong GDP growth in 1945-1990, the last two decades's average annual growth rates lagged below the EU average; moreover, Italy was hit particulary hard by the late-2000s recession. The stagnation in economic growth, and the political efforts to revive it with massive government spending from the 1980s onwards, eventually produced a severe rise in public debt.

5

Dlaczego Hiszpania nie radzi sobie w strefie euro? Analiza polityki pieniężnej banku Hiszpanii w latach 1990-1998

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Klimiuk Z.

Zeszyty Naukowe PWSZ w Płocku. Nauki Ekonomiczne

|

2016

|

vol. 1(23)

385 - 404

EN

The period of 1990-1998 was a transitional stage in the Spanish economic policy. The main objective pursued in that period was to meet the convergence criteria of the country’s entry into the Economic and Monetary Union. This approach had a significant impact on the monetary policy of the Bank of Spain in the 1990s. In the first half of the 1990s the most important factors behind the growth of prices in Spain were wage pressures and repeated devaluations. The central bank in view of loose fiscal policy had to conduct a restrictive monetary policy to prevent a further increase in inflation.

PL

Okres 1990-1998 był etapem przejściowym w polityce gospodarczej Hiszpanii. Głównym celem, do którego dążono w tym okresie, było spełnienie warunków konwergencji, które umożliwiłby Hiszpanii wejście do Unii Gospodarczo-Walutowej. Osiągnięcie tego założenia wywarło znaczny wpływ na politykę pieniężną Banku Hiszpanii w latach 90. Najważniejszymi czynnikami wywołującymi wzrost cen w Hiszpanii w pierwszej połowie lat 90. były: presja płacowa oraz kilkakrotne dewaluacje. Bank centralny wobec luźnej polityki fiskalnej musiał prowadzić restrykcyjną politykę monetarną, aby nie dopuścić do dalszego zwiększania inflacji.

6

Metody finansowania koniunktury gospodarczej w Niemczech. Polityka pieniężno-walutowa Banku Rzeszy w latach 1929–1939 (część I)

100%

Klimiuk Z.

Społeczeństwo i Polityka

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2020

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issue 1(62)

23-40

PL

Artykuł zawiera analizę polityki pieniężno-walutowej Banku Rzeszy w latach 1929–39 ze zwróceniem szczególnej uwagi na jego podwójną rolę w tym okresie: było to źródło pieniądza, z którego finansowano potrzeby Skarbu Państwa oraz najskuteczniejszy czynnik oddziaływania na rynek pieniężny i skarbowy. Głównym zadaniem polityki pieniężnej i walutowej Banku Rzeszy było przywrócenie zaufania do marki niemieckiej i utrzymanie jej kursu na poziomie parytetu. Chodziło przede wszystkim o zaufanie zagranicznych sfer finansowych, bowiem krajowe nie odgrywały żadnej roli na skutek dewastacji kapitalizacyjnej dokonanej przez hiperinflację. Plan Dewesa stworzył możliwości napływu zagranicznych kapitałów, które dostarczały dewiz będących prawnym zabezpieczeniem emisji not Banku Rzeszy. 15 czerwca 1939 r. kanclerz Rzeszy podpisał nową ustawę o „niemieckim Banku Rzeszy”. Ustawa ta była wyrazem zmian, jakie nastąpiły w ostatnich latach w Niemczech w poglądach na rolę banku centralnego.

EN

The article analyzes the monetary and foreign exchange policy of the Reichsbank in the period 1929–1939 with particular attention given to the bank’s dual role in this period: as a source of money used to finance the state treasury’s needs and as the most effective actor affecting the money market and treasuries’ market. The main task of the Reichsbank’s monetary and exchange rate policy was to restore confidence in the German currency (the Reichsmark) to maintain its exchange rate at the level of parity. The main objective of such a policy was to gain and maintain the trust of foreign financial circles, since domestic ones did not play any role because of the devastation of capital caused by hyperinflation. Dewes’ plan created the possibility of an inflow of foreign capital, which provided foreign exchange serving as legal collateral for the issuance of the Reichsbank’s notes. On June 15, 1939, the Reich’s Chancellor signed a new act on the Germany’s Reichsbank. This act was an expression of changes that have taken place in the previous years in Germany concerning the views on the central bank’s role.

7

Metody finansowania koniunktury gospodarczej w Niemczech. Polityka pieniężno-walutowa Banku Rzeszy w latach 1929–1939 (część II )

100%

Klimiuk Z.

Społeczeństwo i Polityka

|

2020

|

issue 3(64)

63-78

PL

W artykule przeanalizowano politykę pieniężno-walutową Banku Rzeszy w latach 1929–1939 ze zwróceniem szczególnej uwagi na jego podwójną rolę w tym okresie: jako źródło pieniądza, z którego finansowano potrzeby skarbu oraz najskuteczniejszy czynnik oddziaływania na rynek pieniężny i skarbowy. Głównym zadaniem polityki pieniężnej i walutowej Banku Rzeszy było przywrócenie zaufania do marki niemieckiej (Reichsmrek, RM) i utrzymanie jej kursu na poziomie parytetu. Chodziło przede wszystkim o zaufanie zagranicznych sfer finansowych, bowiem krajowe nie odgrywały żadnej roli na skutek dewastacji kapitalizacyjnej dokonanej przez hiperinflację. Plan Dewesa stworzył możliwości napływu zagranicznych kapitałów, które dostarczały dewiz będących prawnym zabezpieczeniem emisji not Banku Rzeszy. W dniu 15.06.1939 r. kanclerz Rzeszy podpisał nową ustawę o niemieckim Banku Rzeszy. Akt ten był wyrazem zmian, jakie nastąpiły w ostatnich latach w Niemczech w poglądach na rolę banku centralnego.

EN

The article analyzes the monetary and foreign exchange policy of the Reichsbank in the period 1929–1939 with particular attention given to the bank’s dual role in this period: as a source of money used to finance the state treasury’s needs and as the most effective actor affecting the money market and treasuries’ market. The main task of the Reichsbank’s monetary and exchange rate policy was to restore confidence in the German currency (the Reichsmark) to maintain its exchange rate at the level of parity. The main objective of such a policy was to gain and maintain the trust of foreign financial circles, since domestic ones did not play any role because of the devastation of capital caused by hyperinflation. Dewes’ plan created the possibility of an inflow of foreign capital, which provided foreign exchange serving as legal collateral for the issuance of the Reichsbank’s notes. On June 15, 1939, the Reich’s Chancellor signed a new act on the Germany’s Reichsbank. This act was an expression of changes that have taken place in the previous years in Germany concerning the views on the central bank’s role.

8

Wpływ wielkiego kryzysu i zagranicy na polski handel zagraniczny w latach 1929-35 (część I)

100%

Klimiuk Z.

Zeszyty Naukowe PWSZ w Płocku. Nauki Ekonomiczne

|

2017

|

vol. 1(25)

27-48

PL

Przenoszenie zmian w koniunkturze zewnętrznej (światowej) do polskiej gospodarki w okresie międzywojennym dokonywało się zarówno poprzez mechanizm międzynarodowego rozprzestrzeniania się zmian cen, jak i mechanizm międzynarodowego rozprzestrzeniania się zmian dochodu, przy czym znacznie istotniejsze było działanie tego pierwszego. Zmiany cen zewnętrznych pociągały za sobą zmiany poziomu zysków i płac w dziedzinach realizujących część produkcji na rynkach zewnętrznych, a poprzez to zmiany popytu globalnego na rynku wewnętrznym. Zmiany wielkości zatrudnienia i produkcji za granicą wywierały na gospodarkę Polski wpływ generalnie słabszy niż zmiany cen. Reakcje poszczególnych elementów struktury gospodarczej Polski na cykliczne zmiany popytu i cen zewnętrznych były niejednakowe. W przypadku Polski mieliśmy do czynienia zarówno z reakcjami przystosowawczymi typu cenowego i mnożnikowego (dochodowego) to jednak reakcje te nie występowały w czystej postaci. Czynnikiem komplikującym był przede wszystkim sektor na wpół naturalnej gospodarki rolnej. Zmiany koniunktury zewnętrznej nie prowadziły w tym przypadku do zmian poziomu produkcji i zatrudnienia. Z drugiej jednak strony przenoszenie koniunktury poprzez cykliczne zmiany cen zewnętrznych i zmian ich relacji do cen wewnętrznych nie przebiegało w Polsce w sposób całkowicie zgodny z wyjaśnieniem cenowym. Spadek cen zewnętrznych nie pociągnął za sobą w sposób automatyczny i bezpośredni obniżenia się poziomu cen wewnętrznych (krajowych i importowanych). Czynnikiem to powodującym był przede wszystkim wysoki stopień zmonopolizowania kluczowych gałęzi polskiej gospodarki.

EN

In the interwar period the fluctuations in the external (global) business cycle were being transmitted to the Polish economy via both the mechanism of international propagation of price changes and the mechanism of international propagation of income changes, with the former mechanism playing a much more important role. Changes in external prices were leading to changes in the level of profits and wages in the branches placing part of their output on external markets, and consequently to changes in global demand on the internal market. The impact of changes in the size of foreign employment and production on the Polish economy was generally weaker than that of the price developments. The reactions of individual elements of Poland’s economic structure to the cyclical changes in demand and in external prices were uneven. In the case of Poland both prices’ adjustments and adjustments via multiplier (income) effect were observed; however the said adjustments did not occur in their pure form. The agriculture, a sector which possessed the characteristics of semi-natural economy, constituted the main factor complicating the adjustment mechanisms. In the case of the said sector business cycle changes abroad did not translate into changes in output and employment. On the other hand, in case of Poland the transmission of business cycle fluctuation through changes in foreign prices and changes in their relation to internal prices did progress in complete accordance with the price based transmission mechanism. The decline in external prices did not automatically and directly translate into reduction internal prices (on both domestic and imported goods). The reason behind such an outcome was mostly high degree of monopolization of the key branches of the Polish economy.

9

Ekonomista z Podola. Jerzy Zdziechowski – życiorys, poglądy oraz działalność publiczna

100%

Klimiuk Z.

Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski

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2022

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vol. 2

81-94

EN

Zdziechowski Jerzy (1880–1975) was a politician, economist and economic activist. In the years 1917–1918 he was a member of the Polish Council of the Inter-Party Union in Russia and a co-organizer of the Polish Corps in Russia. In 1919, he was one of the main participants in the failed coup d’etat attempting to overthrow the government of Jędrzej Moraczewski. In the years 1922–1927, he was a member of the Sejm from the Popular National Union. In the years 1925–1926, he was the Minister of the Treasury in the government of A. Skrzyński. He developed the economic and financial program for stabilizing the Polish zloty, which caused such side effects as, i.a.: reduced employment, lowered wages, and reduced exports of agricultural products, as well as significant increases in taxes and prices. However, the program allowed for achieving a balanced budget. The program’s implementation resulted in the withdrawal of the Polish Socialist Party from the ruling coalition and led to the fall of the government. In the years 1926–1933, he was a member of the Council of the Camp of Great Poland, which was founded and led by Roman Dmowski. Until 1939, he was an activist of economic organizations. From September 1939, Jerzy Zdziechowski resided abroad. After World War II, he was the chairman of the Executive Department of the Political Council in London on behalf of the National Party. Jerzy Zdziechowski was characterized by theoretical eradication and the ability to achieve macroeconomic goals within the framework of economic policy, which he proved by managing financial matters in the years 1925-26 as well as by his creative criticism of the politics in 1926-39.

10

Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 1)

100%

Klimiuk Z.

Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski

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2018

|

vol. 1

49-64

EN

The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germanyand the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations withGermany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany beforeWorld War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed specialconditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normalexchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based from the very beginningon a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission to Berlin under which the Soviet Union wasgranted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with Soviet Union, promotedby the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached itshighest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as regime assertedpower and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versaillesdecreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s ascent to powerincreased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Unionmade repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chieflysought to repay, with raw materials, the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, whileGermany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. The saidagreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937, the loans amountingto 200 million Reichsmarks, to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle,liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss inmid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new periodin the development of Soviet–German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–MolotovAgreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.

11

Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 2)

100%

Klimiuk Z.

Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski

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2018

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vol. 2

27-39

EN

The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations with Germany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany before World War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed special conditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normal exchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based, from the very beginning, on a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin under which the Soviet Union was granted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with the Soviet Union, promoted by the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached its highest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as the regime asserted power and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versailles decreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s rise to power increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chiefly sought to repay, with raw materials the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, while Germany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. That agreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937 the loans amounting to 200 million Reichsmarks which were to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used 183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle, liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss in the mid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new period in the development of Soviet-German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–Molotov Agreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.

12

Ekonomista ze Lwowa. Dorobek naukowy, poglądy i działalność publiczna Stanisława Głąbińskiego

100%

Klimiuk Z.

Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski

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2020

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vol. 1

163-178

EN

The article contains an analysis of the scientific achievements and views of the economist Stanisław Głąbiński, associated with Lviv. Polish economic thought in the interwar period developed in two opposite directions: theoretical and historical. The first of them dominated in the Krakow, Poznań and Warsaw centers, while the second was represented by economists associated with the Lviv and Warsaw centers. Głąbiński was the leading representative of the historical course at the University of Lviv. His economic views as well as political, social and economic activities deserve attention. Głąbiński’s socio-economic concepts were a reflection of his political views. His most important works from the period of the Second Polish Republic, ie two volumes of National Economics (Theory of National Economics – 1927 and National Economic Policy – 1928) and History of Economics – 1939 (volumes 1 and 2) are the best proof of this. Głąbiński has always tried to look at the essence of economic phenomena from the national point of view. Throughout his scientific activity he also proclaimed the creation of a new school in the science of economics – a national school whose theoretical basis would be the nation and the national idea. He left the individualism of the liberal school and examined the economic reality through the prism of national interest. He claimed that an abstract analysis of a personal interest that omits the national interest is only a hypothesis that does not explain the economic reality. Therefore, he proposed to supplement abstract research with research on the whole socio-economic reality: historical analyzes and comparison of the personal interest of economic entities with the general interest.

13

Ekonomista z Wilna - dorobek naukowy Władysława Mariana Zawadzkiego

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Klimiuk Z.

Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski

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2017

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vol. 1

141-157

EN

Wladysław Marian Zawadzki (1885–1939), was born in Vilno, Polish economist, Minister of Treasure (1932–1935), pioneered mathematical economics in Poland (the Walrasian mathematical economist). The conservative professor of economics at the School of Commerce (SGH) in Warsaw and the Stefan Batory University of Wilno (1919–1931). The SGH had at this time the stronger team of theoreticians. It was led by Wladyslaw Zawadzki. He was a very thorough exposition of J.M. Keynes’s monetary analisis, contrasting it with his earlier ideas in the Treatise on Money and the Tract on Monetary Reform. Zawadzki regretted Keynes’s etatism but comforted himself and his readers that Keynes had changed his mind at least twice before The General Theory.

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Gospodarczo-militarne problemy i dylematy Związku Radzieckiego w latach 30. XX wieku

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Klimiuk Z.

Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski

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2019

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vol. 1

163-186

EN

In December of 1927, the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Unionapproved the guidelines for the elaboration of a five-year plan of the economic development of the country. According to J. Stalin, “the basic task of the five-year plan was to set […] a technologically backward country – on the tracks of a new modern technology”. The idea entailed make the Soviet Union an industrial state, strong one as well as completely self-sufficient and independent of the capitalist world. At the same time, the task of transforming the country into an industrial state was combined with a different objective, namely to completely rid the economy of capitalist elements, which in turn was to lead directly to the creation of a socialist society. At the same time the creation of a modern industry was to serve as a basis for the retooling and reorganization of not only the industrial sector, but also of transport and agriculture in accordance with the precepts of socialism. In the case of the agricultural sector, the objective was defined as the transformation of agricultural holdings into large collective farms, which was supposed to lead to the creation of a socialist economic base in the countryside (with peasants being perceived as an obstacle for this effort), with the ultimate objective of preventing the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. The five-year plan was also aimed at creating necessary economic and technical foundations which would allow to overtake the leading capitalist economies (United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan) in the perspective of a few years (5–6 years). This objective was to be energetically pursued in order to be achieved at the turn of the first and second five year plan. However, the economic reality turned out to be more complicated and the strategy of “catching up and overtaking” was systematically delayed, which – unavoidably – stirred up irritation and rage in the circles of Joseph Stalin. The leap from the “kingdom of coercion” to the “kingdom of freedom” turned out to be a spectacular flop. Purges and terror (addressed also at the party-state apparatus, army and security organs) in the 1930s, which caused millions of victims, did not bring the expected economic effects. The engulfing atmosphere of threat and fear led to paralysis, which in turn resulted in declining PRZEGLĄD WSCHODNIOEUROPEJSKI X/1 2019: 163–186 164 Zbigniew Klimiuk economic efficiency. At that time, a distinctive barrier to economic growth surfaced in the Soviet economy, namely the impossibility of achieving an increase in production on the basis of existing assets, which was due to the quality of management and the inefficiency of the economic system. Economic growth was thus possible only through new investments – the phenomenon (known as the so-called investment pressure) which was besetting the socialist economies until their very end. The existence of such a barrier was also confirmed by the course of the implementation of the third (unfinished) five-year plan (for the period 1938–1942).

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Uwarunkowania rozwoju gospodarczego i handlu zagranicznego krajów Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w okresie międzywojennym (1918-1939)

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Klimiuk Z.

Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski

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2021

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vol. 1

75-88

EN

The economic development of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the interwar period did not remove essential structural defects in foreign trade, such as: regionalism, compliance of export and import directions, too much concentration on several markets, low assortment diversity and typically raw material and agricultural export structure. Mutual exchange took place on a small scale and was often unilateral, and its size did not generally exceed 10% of the total turnover of this zone. In addition, it was also characterized by a significant degree of concentration and occurred mainly between neighboring countries and in a narrow range. One of the fundamental reasons explaining the low level of mutual trade was the far-reaching mutual competitiveness of the economies of these countries. The high similarity of export structures and assortments as well as the identity of import needs at a weak level, with a similar export expansion rate, have created significant elements of competition between the economies of the region. In the interwar period, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were not strongly involved in foreign trade, with the exception of Czechoslovakia. They were generally poorly developed raw material and agricultural countries, exporting mainly raw materials and food to developed countries of Western Europe, and in particular to Germany. Their total share in world trade was at the level of approx. 3% at that time. The low level of involvement of these countries in world trade was indicated in particular by small export volumes per one inhabitant.

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Stany Zjednoczone a integracja polityczna, militarna i gospodarcza Europy Zachodniej w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej (do 1950 r.). Ameryka nadaje ton i dyktuje warunki (Część I)

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Klimiuk Z.

Historia i Polityka

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2019

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issue 27 (34)

95-114

EN

The influence of the US on the forms and course of the integration processes in Western Europe was very strong, especially in the first post-war years. It was the influence of an external force which, being free of the internal contradictions stemming from Western Europe’s interests, had at its disposal real capabilities to impose integration concepts beneficial to itself. Such integration was in line with both the economic and military interests of the United States during this period. The main reasons prompting Western European countries in the first post-war years to accept the solutions suggested by the United States were: the said countries’ difficult economic situation, fear of the communist parties’ coming to power, and the reluctant (hostile) attitude towards the USSR and the communist bloc. The combination of these causes served to temporarily neutralize the centrifugal tendencies and muted the divergence of interests between the individual countries of Western Europe. Such motives of integration also influenced the character of the emerging Western European political, military and economic organizations. The economic development of Western European countries, whose sources, in addition to the Marshall Plan, should be seen also in other factors, later led to a shift of integration initiatives from the American side to the European one. From a formal point of view, the effects of US policy in the period up to 1950 entailed: the establishment of NATO, the creation of the OEEC and the signing of the agreement on the EUP.

17

Stany Zjednoczone a integracja polityczna, militarna i gospodarcza Europy Zachodniej w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej (do 1950 r.). Ameryka nadaje ton i dyktuje warunki (Część II)

100%

Klimiuk Z.

Historia i Polityka

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2019

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issue 29 (36)

27-42

EN

The influence of the US on the forms and course of the integration processes in Western Europe was very strong, especially in the first post-war years. It was the influence of an external force which, being free of the internal contradictions stemming from Western Europe’s interests, had at its disposal real capabilities to impose integration concepts beneficial to itself. Such integration was in line with both the economic and military interests of the United States during this period. The main reasons prompting Western European countries in the first post-war years to accept the solutions suggested by the United States were: the said countries’ difficult economic situation, fear of the communist parties’ coming to power, and the reluctant (hostile) attitude towards the USSR and the communist bloc. The combination of these causes served to temporarily neutralize the centrifugal tendencies and muted the divergence of interests between the individual countries of Western Europe. Such motives of integration also influenced the character of the emerging Western European political, military and economic organizations. The economic development of Western European countries, whose sources, in addition to the Marshall Plan, should be seen also in other factors, later led to a shift of integration initiatives from the American side to the European one. From a formal point of view, the effects of US policy in the period up to 1950 entailed: the establishment of NATO, the creation of the OEEC and the signing of the agreement on the EUP.

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Stany Zjednoczone a integracja polityczna, militarna i gospodarcza Europy Zachodniej w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej (do 1950 r.). Ameryka nadaje ton i dyktuje warunki (Część I)

Stany Zjednoczone a integracja polityczna, militarna i gospodarcza Europy Zachodniej w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej (do 1950 r.). Ameryka nadaje ton i dyktuje warunki (Część II)