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United States policy on the Oder-Neisse question in the 1960s as viewed by Zbigniew Brzezinski

100%
Siwek K.
Przegląd Zachodni
|
2023
|
issue Special Issue 2023
139-160
EN
This article presents the political ideas of Zbigniew Brzezinski as they relate to his position on United States policy over the question of Poland’s western border in the 1960s. The main goal is to show to what extent Brzezinski’s advocacy of formal US recognition of the Oder–Neisse border was linked to his aim of overcoming the Cold War division of Europe and the problem of national borders. Brzezinski’s position on the border issue is also examined in relation to his views on Polish–German and Polish–Soviet relations, as well as Polish nationalism and communist ideology. Accordingly, the question of the Oder–Neisse Line is addressed here with reference to Brzezinski’s comments on US policies towards West Germany, the Soviet Union, and Europe as a whole. The main sources are Brzezinski’s political commentaries, publications and archival material from the 1960s concerning Poland’s western border. However this study extends beyond the purely diplomatic history of the Polish border question, examining the relationship between Brzezinski’s views on the Oder–Neisse Line and his internationalist concept of European political and economic relations. It is demonstrated that Brzezinski’s support for formal US recognition of the Oder–Neisse border in the 1960s developed within the framework of American political, geopolitical and economic designs for Germany, the Soviet Union and Europe as a whole, against the background of the Cold War. Although his arguments regarding Poland’s western border contributed to a desirable increase in US political interest in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe, Brzezinski favoured a kind of European interdependence of states and the “Europeanisation” of Poland, rather than the restitution of its full sovereignty based on anti-Soviet nationalism. This distinctive universalist vision of Central and Eastern Europe, coupled with socio-economic determinism, appears to have profoundly affected Brzezinski’s position on the Polish border question, which was based on the assumption that both the Cold War division of Europe and national borders would eventually diminish in political significance as a result of Western recognition.
2
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Anthony J. Drexel Biddle wobec sytuacji międzynarodowej Polski w latach 1937-1939

100%
Siwek K.
Przegląd Zachodni
|
2018
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issue 3(368)
97-126
EN
The purpose of this article is to present the views of Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, the United States' Ambassador in Warsaw, concerning the international situation of the Second Republic of Poland from 1937 to 1939. This subject, scarcely represented in Polish historiography,shows the perspective of the American Ambassador on the role of Poland in Europe and reveales his assessment of the "balance of power" policy conducted by minister Józef Beck in the period preceding the outbreak of the Second World War. It appears that Biddle basically shared the Polish perspective on the threat posed by Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union while emphasizing the crucial role of Poland in further political-military developments in Europe. Accordingly, he supported the Polish will to resist the imminen tGerman aggression since Warsaw's attitude was in his eyes a peculiar "barometer" of British and French readiness to contain German expansion. Although Biddle's position in late 1930s could not influence the policies of the U.S. and European powers toward Poland, it sheds an interesting light on Polish foreign policy and its reception by Western powers,contributing to better understanding of this decisive period of Poland's history. This article was based on analysis of diplomatic papers and the correspondence of Ambassador Biddle from1937 to 1939.
3
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Granica polsko-niemiecka w stosunkach Polski ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi w latach 1956-1970

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Siwek K.
Przegląd Zachodni
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2016
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issue 4(361)
153-180
EN
The purpose of this article is to present the role of the Polish-German frontier in relations between Poland and the United States from 1956 to 1970. Due to Poland's dependence upon the Soviet Union the issue of the Oder- Neisse Line was a subject of East-West relations with the primary role of the German question. In the Cold War conditions that obliged the U.S. to maintain allied loyalty to the FRG, Washington refused to accept the Polish-German border officially, since it was perceived more like the western boundary of Soviet influence than like Poland's western frontier. However the U.S. support for the Oder-Neisse Line would contribute to the American objective of weakening Soviet control over Central-Eastern Europe. For that reason since 1956 Polish diplomacy tried to convince the United States not only to confirm the border but also to recognize the legality of the GDR, a measure that would be equivalent to the security of the Oder-Neisse Line. The Polish demands corresponded with the U.S. efforts to improve relations with the Communist Bloc states since early 1960s which also prevented the West German-Soviet alliance. The beginning of détente in East-West relationships allowed the U.S. to come to terms with a division of Europe along the river Elbe while the German question lost its priority in favour of the dialogue of the U.S. with Central-Eastern European states. Despite a continued U.S. refusal to accept the Oder-Neisse Line, Poland was able to conclude a treaty with West Germany in 1970 recognizing the Polish western frontier with the result that it was no longer a subject of the Cold War dispute.
4
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Amerykański projekt umiędzynarodowienia Śląska i granicy polsko-niemieckiej w latach 1945-1949

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Siwek K.
Przegląd Zachodni
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2015
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issue 2(355)
131-148
EN
The objective of the United States regarding internationalisation of Silesia and the Polish-German border established in 1945 was based on the needs of European economic reconstruction which included international access to Silesian coal and foodstuffs. Despite US-USSR tensions American diplomacy still emphasized the all-European dimension of the Silesian issue in particular during the Council of Foreign Ministers’ sessions in Moscow and London in 1947. Accordingly, it was not the opposition to Poland’s westward move which determined the U.S.’s critical attitude towards the Oder-Neisse question but the resolve to prevent isolation of Silesian industry behind the Iron Curtain. Nevertheless U.S. plans concerning Silesia were suspended because of the political division of Germany and Europe in 1949.
5
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Polityka USA wobec problemu Odry i Nysy Łużyckiej w poglądach Zbigniewa Brzezińskiego w tatach 60. XX wieku

100%
Siwek K.
Przegląd Zachodni
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2021
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issue 1 (378)
137-155
PL
The objective of this article is to present the political ideas of Zbigniew Brzeziński behind his position on the U.S. policy toward the question of Poland’s western frontier in the 1960s. The main task is focused on the extent of connection between Brzeziński's argument for the final recognition of the Oder- Neisse Line by the United States and his aim to overcome theCold War division of Europe and the problem of national borders. Brzeziński's views on the frontier is worth explaining also in relation to his opinion on Polish-German and Polish- Soviet relations as well as on Polish nationalism and communist ideology. Accordingly, the question of the Oder- Neisse Line is addressed here in the context of Brzeziński's comments on U.S. policies toward the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union and Europe as a whole. The main sources for the study were Brzeziński's political commentaries, publications and archival material concerning Poland's western border in the 1960s. However, this study extends beyond the purely diplomatic history of the Polish frontier question by combining Brzeziński's views on the Oder-Neisse Line with his internationalist concept of European political-economic relations. As this paper demonstrates, Brzeziński's claim for the formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line by the United States in the 1960s developed within the framework of American political, geopolitical and economic designs for Germany, Soviet Union and for Europe as a whole in the context of the Cold War. Although his argument regarding Poland's western border contributed to the desirable increase of U.S. political interest in Poland and Central-Eastern Europe, nonetheless Brzeziński favored a kind of European interdependence of states and "Europeanization of Poland" over the restitution of its full sovereignty based on anti-Soviet nationalism. This peculiar universalist vision of Central-Eastern Europe coupled with socio-economic determinism appear to have profoundly affected Brzezinski's Polish frontier claim based on an assumption that both the Cold War division of Europe and national borders would eventually diminish in political significance as a result of Western recognition.
6
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Sprawa granic Polski w latach 1939-1941 w świetle dokumentów ambasadora Anthony`ego J. Drexel Biddle’a

100%
Siwek K.
Przegląd Zachodni
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2019
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issue 3 (327)
191-220
EN
The purpose of the article is to present the question of Poland’s borders in the years 1939-1941 from the perspective of Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, the U.S. Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile, based on his diplomatic papers stored in American archives. Biddle’s continued service with the government of Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski since 1939 implied the U.S. recognition of Poland’s political existence despite the American neutrality towards the occupation of Polish territory by Germany and the USSR. The author proposes the thesis that this unique “ambassador of the oppressed nations” dedicated his special attention to Poland, perceived as a “political barometer” of Europe with an impact on the German-Soviet relations. Therefore, Biddle’s wartime papers indicate that the problem of Poland’s borders constituted a considerable obstacle to the U.S. wartime policy that envisaged engaging the Soviet Union as an ally against Germany. These papers show that the Polish government’s dependence upon Western allies, who since 1939 challenged Poland’s prewar eastern border, negatively influenced the content and political consequences of the Polish-Soviet pact of 1941. Contrary to Sikorski’s hopes for the U.S. support in territorial dispute with the Soviets, ambassador Biddle was critical of Polish efforts to obtain American and British guarantees of borders. He shared the British claim for restitution of Poland only within the so called “ethnographic borders” represented by the Curzon Line in the east that would be “compensated” by the annexation of still undefined German territories. Sikorski’s political ideas regarding Poland’s security against both Germany and Soviet Russia were thus met with suspicion by Biddle, who acted on behalf of American diplomacy which apparently feared the separate German-Soviet peace on the one hand, and Poland’s turning away from the Western allies on the other. It appears from Biddle’s diplomatic correspondence that the United States did not intend to guarantee any territorial designs of Sikorski’s government, since Polish claims contradicted the objectives of the foreign policy of the Anglo-Saxon powers, which assigned a crucial role in Central-Eastern Europe to Soviet Russia, not Poland. The author used abundant diplomatic correspondence gathered at The National Archives and Records Administration, at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and in the collections of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania in the USA.
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