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1

METÓDY ABSTRAKCIE, IDEALIZÁCIE A KONKRETIZÁCIE V LOGIKE: PRÍPAD POSUNUTÉHO ČASU VO FAKTUÁLNÝCH KONDICIONÁLOCH

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 8
660 – 676
EN
The article deals with methods of abstraction, idealization and concretization in logic with a focus on the dimension of time in case of factual conditionals(in which an antecedent is stated as true and often introduced to by a conjunction „since“) with a time-shifted consequent in relation to the antecedent. We claim that the idealization of the time parameter in logic has led to its successful application to timeless mathematics, but without re-concretization it provides a crude tool for the analysis of linguistic communication in natural language. When concretizing the time parameter in conditional predictions, some authors even question the rules of classical logic. We reject the paradoxical character of classical logic as well as the pragmatic solution to this problem, because - as we show on the example of the rule of strengthening the antecedent - it would lead to boundless enthymematicity of predictions. We propose a solution according to which conditionals are masked abbreviations of arguments, in which a producer assumes the validity of a set of necessary conditions (albeit unspecified) and the principle of ceteris paribus.
2

MILLOVA MYLNÁ VÝHRADA PETITIO PRINCIPII VOČI DEDUKTÍVNEJ LOGIKE

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 9
721 – 734
EN
The critique of logic, as it was taught on the British Isles, intensified at the beginning of the 19th century. A systematic critique of Aristotelian (syllogistic) logic was undertaken from the standpoint of common sense philosophy chiefly by Scottish philosophers, followers of T. Reid. E. Copleston of Oxford came to logic’s defence. His student, R. Whately, later wrote the textbook Elements of Logic (1826), in which he replied to the objections of Scottish philosophers. The textbook correctly explains that systems of deductive logic need not suffer from the petitio principii fallacy. J. S. Mill at first wrote a positive review of the textbook, but later published his System of Logic. In it, he puts forward the contrary view when evaluating the role of Aristotelian (deductive logic), objecting to the supposedly irredeemable fallacy of petitio principii. The fallacy can be avoided, he argues, in an inductive logic proposed by him. Mill’s objection to the Aristotelian syllogism was based on a misunderstanding of the analytic novelty of the knowledge contained in the conclusion of a valid argument. Mill’s explication of logic is contradictory, based on an associative psychologism and sensualism. The objection against deductive logic is simply mistaken. Mill’s logic and his positions were very critically appraised already by S. Jevons and the standard overviews of the history of logic fail to mention it.
3

JE MILL NAOZAJ PREDCHODCA ZNÁMEHO VYSVETLENIA KONTRAFAKTUÁLOV?

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 4
259 – 277
EN
In the discussion on counterfactuals Ramsey invoked Mill's opinion, when he defended the explanation that counterfactuals are elliptical deductive arguments. Similarly, Ramsey's followers did so. However, a more in-depth investigation reveals that Mill's view that conditionals (implications) express inferences is neither set within some theory of deduction, nor within propositional logic, which he could not adequately grasp due to his extreme inductivism. Mill's view of conditionals was simply inspired by Whately. Therefore, Ramsay's designation of Mill as the forerunner of the explanation of counterfactuals in his line is hasty and unjustified. On the other hand, while Whately, unlike Mill, adequately explains the role of deduction in categorical syllogism and partly also in propositional logic, we do not find in his work sufficient support for the explanation of counterfactuals as elliptical expressions of deductive arguments. That is simply because Whately in case of compound statements, including conditionals, unambiguously prefers content-based, nonlogic inference to logical inference.
4

SPÄTNÉ KONTRAFAKTUÁLY

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 5
400 – 407
EN
The article discusses the enigmatic backtracking counterfactuals. It offers an explanation according to which in the case of the latter the negative time direction is due to their being abductive retrodictions, i.e. explanations of unreal effects by introducing possible causes while the conditions remain tacit or unexpressed. The counterfactual abductive retrodictions´ backtracking time direction is in accordance with the postulating the positive time direction from cause to effect. Thus we demonstrate that in order to explain backtracking counterfactuals there is no need to consider the backtracking impact of the present on the past. Further, there is no need to violate natural laws or to have a special logic. What we need is to take into account the third parameter, i.e. a set of tacit or unexpressed additional propositions, as well as the principle of ceteris paribus as our background. When the power of logic is not overestimated, there is no need to change the direction of causality. And a correct analysis does not require any special logic. Last, but not least, we showed, how to correctly make the abductive retrodiction by the contraposition of the deductive retrodiction.
5

DEDUKTÍVNE A ABDUKTÍVNE RETRODIKCIE A PREDIKCIE

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 8
616 – 631
EN
Differentiating between formal positions condition and the conditioned (i.e. if-vector) as well as between the content’s exemplars (occurring in these positions, i.e. vector of relevance) and a direction of grammatical tenses (i.e. time vector) enables us to de-fine two types of reasoning, based on the cause/effect relationship: deductive prediction and retrodiction (positive time direction) and abductive prediction and retrodiction (negative time direction). Although these predictions and retrodictions are formulated in form of conditionals, they are in fact elided expressions for reasons. A producer of deductive predictions and retrodictions picks up from a complex set of effects producing conditions one main condition, which, as a cause, is indicated in the antecedent. At the same time it is supposed that the effect indicated in the consequent is implied deductively. However, this holds only if the ceteris paribus principle (other things being equal), as well as the tacit set of true statements (the majority of which the producer need not know) are true.
6

OTVORENÁ TEXTÚRA POJMU – PÔVODNÝ ZMYSEL A KRITIKA

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 8
620 – 635
EN
The aim of this article is to analyse and explain in more detail Waismann’s idea of the open texture of concept (Die Porosität der Begriffe) as a means for criticizing the principle of verifiability and to point out its distorted understanding as an open text. The open texture or porosity of a concept should relate to its potential, intensional indeterminacy – to signal the doubts that may arise in its application under unforeseen circumstances. Extensional essentialism is present in the background of this view. Against this view, Tichý presented his approach of intensional essentialism. On the basis of this approach we have enriched the critique of the open texture of concepts by the distinction between distinctive and scientific concepts and their correlations of various strengths. Furthermore, we have explained Waismann’s examples of a “giant cat” and “radioactive gold” as a replacement of one distinctive concept by another, both of them closely related in terms of their content, they have the same name and they are correlated with the same scientific concept with an unchanged essence.
7

NAOZAJ FREGE PLAGIZOVAL STOIKOV?

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 7
499 – 520
EN
The similarity between logic and semantics of the Stoics and Frege has long been known, and it can be explained in various ways. In 2021, Susane Bobzien published a work in which she explains this similarity rather surprisingly: she hypothesizes that Frege helped himself generously with the foundations of Stoic logic as it was published in the first volume of History of Logic in the West by Carl Prantl. However, this hypothesis encounters various problems. The key point of the whole accusation is founded on the formulation of a general proposition in language using implication and anaphora, which Frege took supposedly from the Stoics, although in Prantl’s text there is only one example of a sentence with this structure. On the contrary, there are many examples of such sentences in contemporary professional (e.g. legal) texts. Many examples of semantic similarities that Bobzien presents are based only on the similarities between isolated concepts; however, that is regularly the case for such concepts with the same conceptual basis. Bobzien presents a significant number of matches only on the basis of results that could be inferred allegedly from the texts. However, this cannot be considered as a proof of plagiarism. Bobzien does not consider many sources for the continuity of interpretation such as the so-called hypothetical syllogism found in available textbooks of logic. Last but not least, her claims do not consider many differences between Stoic and Frege’s logic. All this leads us to the conclusion that Bobzien does not present sufficient facts and connections between them that would confirm her hypothesis about Frege’s plagiarism of the Stoic logic: Frege simply was not a plagiarist.
8

KONTRAMOŽNÉ KONDICIONÁLY A NEINTUITÍVNE ÚSUDKY

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 7
545 – 557
EN
Counterpossible conditionals are a special kind of conditionals whose antecedents are necessarily false (impossible). There has been a long-standing debate about their nature. According to the supporters of the orthodox view (Lewis, Stalnaker, Williamson and others), they are only trivially or vacuously true. Opponents of the orthodox view (Berto, Jago, Sendłak, Kocurek and others) do not agree with such a position, and according to them, some counterposible conditionals are true (and informative) also in a specific sense. We analysed some “non-intuitive” arguments of classical logic as precursors to counterpossible conditionals. We demonstrated that these arguments are correct in propositional and predicate logic. Their non-intuitiveness becomes evident only when we accept the tacit assumptions that are imposed by the content of the premises and conclusions. The components of the premises and conclusions of such arguments are enthymemes of other “sub-arguments”, and their non-intuitiveness is based on the factual falsity of the disjunctively connected components of the conclusions as abbreviations of two incorrect arguments. In order to explain the truth of counterfactuals and the validity of the rules of classical logic in this context, it is necessary to assume the validity of the comparative and eliminative principle of ceteris paribus. We used the same methodology for counterpossible conditionals and explained why some conceptual or mathematical counterposesible conditionals are non-trivially true and others are not. It is decided by the acceptance of tacit assumptions that are in accordance with the explicit assumptions, and the validity of the comparative and eliminative principle of ceteris paribus. Finally, we showed why logically counterpossible conditionals cannot be non-trivially true: we cannot support them with other tacit logical truths in order to make them true.
9

LOGICKÁ (NE)KONZISTENTNOSŤ NORMATÍVNEHO SYSTÉMU A JEJ METODOLOGICKÉ KOREKCIE

63%
Gahér F., Števček M.
Právny obzor. Teoretický časopis pre otázky štátu a práva (Juridical Review. Theoretical journal for the questions of state and law)
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2016
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vol. 99
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issue 3
186 – 203
EN
The article is a part of a discussion about the meaning of logic in the area of law. The authors treating in a polemic way some common ideas and connotation of the term „legal logic“ – according to them there is a difference between a logic in a formal meaning, dealing with the structure of the nature language and methodology. In a situations, where formal logic seems to be insufficient to provide a solution of problems with the interpretation and/or application, correct methodology is only able to solve such problem. The authors of the outlined purposes briefly explicate core concepts, such as the normative system (as a set of relatively closed binding rules as defined segment of social relations), paying particular attention to the law system, further interpretative rules and methods (with interpretation, in general, is explaining the connection between the facts (actions) or the interpretation or clarification of the meaning of a particular text), logical consistency and inconsistency (a condition where the set of rules may or may not also draw the assertion and also a negation of this assertion). Inconsistency of normative texts can be either a logical inconsistency or methodological inconsistency. In addressing challenging legal matters, it is necessary to pass from the logic to the methodology, which, of course, logic and logical semantics remains necessary armature of reasoning.
10

OTVORENÁ TEXTÚRA POJMOV A PRAVIDIEL – VODA NA MLYN PRE SUBJEKTIVIZMUS V APLIKOVANEJ SÉMANTIKE?

51%
Gahér F., Mrva M., Števček M., Turčan M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 4
309 – 323
EN
When using natural language in a domain of a special discipline, which is fundamentally based on its use (for example, language of law), we are led on the one hand by the need for precision and unambiguity and on the other hand by the need for brevity and efficiency. A specific semantic problem for texts expressing a system of normative rules for the regulation of actions is the question of their efficient applicability in new situations. Herbert Hart came up with a suggestion on how to solve these dilemmas in the field of law and was loosely inspired by the theory of open texture of concepts. He saw the solution in an inevitable defeasibility of a rule, which, in his view, is caused by the open texture of the goal pursued by the rule. However, extensive use of the instrument of open texture of a concept or a rule can be fuel for the fire of subjectivism in semantic practice. It is necessary to distinguish the phenomenon of open texture of concepts from the polysemy of natural language expressions and the phenomenon of so-called privative modification. Applicative flexibility and effectiveness of normative theory is aided by a more appropriate generality of concepts, which is achieved, for example, by recodification of law, rather than by artificially extending the scope of concepts on the basis of their fuzziness.
11

O DEFINÍCIÁCH A DEFINOVANÍ

51%
Bielik L., Gahér F., Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 8
719-737
EN
The paper deals with some logical, semantic and methodological aspects of defining and definitions. First of all, basic features of the background semantic theory are specified. Next, three different kinds of definitions are distinguished: codifying definitions, objectual analytic definitions and meaning analytic definitions. It is shown that the relationships between the definiendum and the definiens in a given definition differ with respect to these different kinds of definition. Furthermore, it is argued that definitions and defining are intrinsically connected with so called conceptual systems. Finally, definitions are distinguished from explications.
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