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1

ODPUSTENIE V POLITIKE: REALITA ALEBO ILÚZIA?

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Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 7
596 – 611
EN
There are opposing views on the question of whether forgiveness makes sense as a political act. The main focus of the study is the debate about forgiveness among francophone philosophers. Some authors agree with the idea of transferring forgiveness to the domain of politics, while others have a hesitant or even negative attitude. The aim of the article is to examine the main arguments for and against each position and to find out which of the opposing views provides stronger arguments, or whether there is another defensible alternative. A key point in the dispute over forgiveness in politics is the question whether forgiveness can be used as a strategic political tool. At the same time, maintain its meaning, its moral value. With regard to the resolution of this dispute, the author of the article questions the possibility of mixing two different levels: the political-legal level (to which “the politics of forgiveness” is linked) and the ethical level, which is the actual domain of forgiveness as a non-political and non-legal relationship. According to the author, thinking about forgiveness as a political tool is based on wrong reasoning. It presupposes the possibility of playing on two tables at the same time: pursuing the collective, political purpose of forgiveness, and at the same time wanting to preserve its character as a personal relationship between the offended and the offender, the victim, and the perpetrator. The author defends the view that forgiveness cannot be politically institutionalized or confused with terms belonging to the political-legal domain (such as political reconciliation or amnesty) unless its meaning is devalued.
2

K OTÁZKE KOLEKTÍVNEJ MORÁLNEJ ZODPOVEDNOSTI NEŠTRUKTÚROVANÝCH ZOSKUPENÍ

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Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 8
608 – 621
EN
The hypothesis of the article is the idea that the collective moral responsibility is meaningful also at the level of unstructured groups, which do not have a stable identity capable of persisting over time. According to the author, such a grouping does not necessarily have to fulfil the conditions specific to a structured group in order to have the status of an agent and be able to bear moral responsibility (for example to avert evil in situations requiring collective action); nor does it need to possess the qualities that are usually a prerequisite to classify an agent as responsible for its actions - such as autonomy of will, cognitive ability, intention, and control over its actions. Regarding the question of collective moral responsibility for the consequences of a collective action (or collective inactivity), the author suggests: a) to use Ricoeur's concept of responsibility in its specific moral dimension involving the relationship with others; b) to modify the archaic “all for oneˮ principle so that, instead of solidarity with the transgressor, it implies solidarity with those in distress or with those who are experiencing injustice.
3

NÁSILIE A JEHO KAŽDODENNÉ PODOBY (J.-P. SARTRE AKO TEORETIK NÁSILIA)

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Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 2
87-106
EN
A great, though not exclusive subject of Sartre's 'Books on Morals', published posthumously, is violence including the crucial question how to resist the situations, in which violence is involved. The first objective of the article is to unveil the everyday forms of violence. This leads the author to approach Sartre as a theoretician of violence, to show him in a role which in the reception of Sartre in Slovak cultural and ideological contexts was fully marginalized. The author focuses on different, although interconnected levels of Sartre's understanding of violence. On one side it is the theoretical level concerning the very fundaments of violence. Here Sartre systematically starts with etymology of the word and goes further to unveil the essence and objectives of violence, its fundamental principle, as well as its moral principles, by which the violence tries to justify itself. On the other hand, it is the practical level. Here the world of violence is no more isolated as an abstract entity. Sartre is oriented on identification and examination of this phenomenon in everyday situations, in specific human relationships, such as asking a favor, request, threat, and refusal. His interpretation wants to show the logic of violence which, so Sartre, is present in everyday relationships, trying to destruct the freedom of the other.
4

KDE ZAČÍNA A KDE KONČÍ SVET ODPUSTENIA?

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Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 8
696-703
EN
The paper aims at a closer view at the most important aspects of somewhat radical, but enlightening response of J. Derrida (1930-2004) to V. Jankelevich's (1903-1985) approach to the problem of forgiveness, articulated as related to the exemption from the statue of limitations, concerning the crimes against humanity. The authoress focuses on two topics in the core of this polemics, the first one being the relationship between the exemption from the statue of limitations and the unforgivable, the second one being the roles of the conditioned and the unconditioned in the idea of forgiveness. Through the analysis of the fundamental assertions in Derrida's 'Pardonner: l'impardonnable et l'imprescriptible' and by confronting them with the ideas in Jankelevich's 'L'imprescriptible' the authoress comes to the following conclusion: The acceptance of forgiveness in its original meaning of a generous, but a rare gesture, independent of ulterior motives, should not hide the incurable evil present behind this gesture. Thus the evil can not turn banal and the moral duty of memory is still preserved.
5

K OTÁZKE MORÁLNEJ ZODPOVEDNOSTI KOLEKTÍVNYCH ENTÍT

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Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 4
283 – 297
EN
The objective of this article is to answer the question: On what basis, or under what conditions can moral responsibility be attributed to a collective? The author assumes that the moral world is not only populated by individuals, but it also includes groups. The goal of the paper is to show that raising the question of collective responsibility in its moral dimension depends on the ontological recognition of the collective as a new entity with its own intentions, which is different from the entities of individuals who make it up. First, the author presents some solutions based on the methodological individualism, which derive the existence of collective moral responsibility from the internal rules of group decision-making and from collectively shared goals. The author sees the problem of the examined views in the fact that the combination of the methodological individualism with a certain collectivist vision does not guarantee the recognition of collective entities in their real existence. Based on the holistically oriented research of V. Descombes, the study subsequently focuses on defining the ontological status of the collective. Using his arguments, the paper concludes that applying the idea of moral responsibility at the collective level presupposes recognition of the collective as a supra-individual entity sui generis and as a subject of collective intentionality.
6

JANKÉLÉVITCH A RICŒUR O POVINNOSTI PAMÄTI

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Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 4
267 – 280
EN
This article deals with a specific dimension of collective memory – the duty of memory. It focuses on two philosophical approaches concerning the question of the duty of memory, as represented, on the one hand, by occasional texts of V. Jankélévitch published in the works Imprescriptible (1986), or in Lʼesprit de résistance (2015), and, on the other hand, the monumental work of P. Ricœur Mémoire, histoire, oubli (2000). In the current discourse on memory and the duty of memory, the work of Ricœur is considered to be a point of reference, while Jankélévitch’s views on this question have remained on the fringes of interest – which is, according to the author, unjustified. The article analyses the main philosophical arguments in favour of the idea of the duty of memory, and also justified doubts and reservations. The aim of the article is to show that both of the examined approaches – despite being different from each other - the duty of memory retains its relevance and meaning, regardless of the criticism that considers this concept a possible tool of memory abuse. The author finds a strong argument for categorically rejecting the tendency to forget the Holocaust and defends the duty of memory in Jankélévitch’s philosophical analysis of the nature of Holocaust (as a “counter-natural”, “metaphysical” crime, based on the denial of the principle of ontological equality of all people). According to the author, the question of the duty of memory is a question of the struggle to protect fundamental human rights and values of European civilization.
7

MORÁLKA V ZNAMENÍ AMBIGUITY

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Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
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issue 6
509-519
EN
S. de Beauvoir's philosophical essay titled 'The ethics of ambiguity' (1947) has been always overshadowed by her most famous book 'The second sex', a seminal work from feminist point of view. This was unfair (so the author's argumentation), since the essay marks the way to understanding of the key thesis of the ambiguous condition of women from 'The second sex'. The paper aims at explaining the standpoint of ambiguity and the sort of ethics implicated by it. The analysis in its first part shows S. de Beauvoir's rejecting the ethics of virtue, happiness and obligation and her trying to rethink the content of ethics on the basis of the ambiguous concept of failure, which on her opinion leads to an authentic existence. The second part focuses on the description of inauthentic attitudes, which are unveiled by S. de Beauvoir as illusionary forms of justification. The third part suggests, that compared with Sartre and his idea of man as a futile passion (passion inutile) S. de Beauvoir does not defend the idea of groundless existence. She, however, insists on avoiding all preliminary justifications based on civilization, age, or culture.
8

ÚSKALIA EUTÉLIE. K PRÁCI L. BITÓA KNIHA O DOBREJ SMRTI. EUTÉLIA – EUTANÁZIA

100%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
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issue 9
798-803
EN
The contribution deals with L. Bito's concept of 'euthelia', which was suggested by him as a counterpart to 'euthanasia'. 'Euthelia', contrary to 'euthanasia', puts stress on good, meaningful end of life, free of death fear and anxiety. The originality of Bito's approach is in his trying to see the reflections on good death in the context of the reflections on good life. However, the authoress rejects to include optics of Bito's economical calculus concerning duties into these reflections. In her view the principles of human solidarity and human dignity make it impossible to prefer the concern for the offspring to the concern for the dying person. She argues that it is important to make the concept of the quality of life wide enough to encompass not only healthy and effective persons, but also those in terminal stages of their lives.
9

SARTROV POJEM INTENCIONALITY OPTIKOU AKTUÁLNYCH SKÚMANÍ

100%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 5
457-467
EN
The paper deals with those current Sartrean researches, which are concerned with Sartre's early phenomenological writings. The researchers involved see the latter as important as Sartre's later fundamental works. Their interpretations go beyond the view traditional of those works. Beside Sartre as a philosopher of subjectivity they try to emphasize the 'other' Sartre, who is concerned with the power 'of things' and the potential abilities of the consciousness deprived of ego as the uniting centre of experience. Adopting this perspective requires to resort to his conception of intentionality. It is necessary to comprehend, how the world oriented consciousness with its typical compulsory self-transcendence becomes also self-consciousness due to the experience of the sense of the given. The issue under question is not only the profit brought by this process, but also the loss involved in such approach to consciousness.
10

ČO ZNAMENÁ PREVZIAŤ ZODPOVEDNOSŤ? K POJMU IMPUTÁCIE V SÚČASNEJ ETIKE

100%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
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vol. 65
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issue 9
893-906
EN
The conceptual basis of the paper is the difference between two types of responsibility: (a) the agent's responsibility for his own acts and their effects; (b) a responsibility which is primarily oriented to the Other, about whom one is concerned and for whom one guarantees. The paper deals with this second meaning of responsibility: an imputation of a deed to somebody as its agent. The authoress explores the origins of the modern concept of imputation, its specific character and effectiveness, as well as its limitations. She focuses on three approaches: those of M. Weber, A. Giuliani and P. Ricoeur. Weber's responsibility means a causal imputation. But it was not Weber, who introduced this way of defining the act's ethical value. Giuliani shows, how the theological concept of imputation is related to its later laicization in the theory of natural law. Ricoeur argues that the real history of responsibility began after responsibility has been separated from the theological context. In conclusion it is showed, that although responsibility rooted in one's realizing the vulnerability of the Other differs from the responsibility of the agent for his own deeds, these are neither historically, nor theoretically two independent realms.
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