In Benedict XVI’s reflection on terrorist acts an unequivocally negative attitude towards them appears, regardless of the motives behind the armed actions. In this rather difficult problem for his contemporaries, he studied the premises responsible for the escalation of aggression and violence in various parts of the world, as well as their consequences for individual states and societies. The sources of acts of terror in the current reality were found in ideologies of extreme religious, as well as religious or even anti-religious backgrounds, of which ardent supporters try to impose (by force or propaganda) their dictatorship on certain social communities or office holders. Such an attitude, according to the Pope, is significantly distorted by national or international public order and, more importantly, they severely undermine the common civilisational heritage founded on dignity and freedom of human rights. Benedict XVI, while making a peculiar diagnosis of acts of oppression and lawlessness, at the same time postulated a prudent and ethical response to this type of action. Therefore, he appealed mainly to the ruling elites and supranational organisations to bear in mind the welfare of potentially and actually endangered people in their decisions related to the avoidance of armed acts, as well as to the dissolution of already existing ones. He argued that the elimination of military dangers and the minimisation of the losses incurred as a result can be effectively served by genuine political, economic and technical cooperation on a local and global scale. In a situation when a violent escalation of confrontation took place, the Pope recommended that the various parties respect international standards, especially in the field of humanitarian law, and reminded supranational organisations of their duty to ensure that these principles were strictly observed by the conflicting parties.
In a post-modern, multicultural world, the present head of the Roman Catholic Church, similarly to his predecessor Benedict XVI, consistently promotes natural rights theory as a common, universal, moral heritage which determines and reflects on the individual, social and political orders of life. What underpins the Pope’s view is the philosophical anthropology that reflects the immutability of being in its duration and structures, and that exposes, more distinctly than promoted by his predecessors, the need for related- ness with other human beings. His theory of natural law, not only on a philosophical but also religious level, presupposes recognition of this concept on the basis of faith in revealed truth. For the Pope, this approach translates to recognizing the supremacy of morality over the law that may obtain universal qualities if it accepts its subordination to ethical values. For Pope Francis, such a prospective is a basis for dialogue between differ- ent cultures and religions. Simultaneously, it allows to formulate canons of common law in the public and private dimension, whose sources should be sought in the idea of dig- nity and in immutable human rights that arise from it. However in the context of the in- terpretation of some fundamental rights, it should be noticed that the emphasis present during transmission to the public is slightly different in terms of their contents, which causes numerous ambiguous comments. Undoubtedly, the theory of law proposed by Pope Francis arises out of the need to identify an effective counterbalance to the current culture of so-called subjective and shallow truths which implement individual, selfish projects of social, economic and political existence.
In the social considerations of Benedict XVI, the point of reference was Christian anthropology. It is from its perspective that the Pope analyzed current social and political relations as well as economic relations prevailing in specific countries and in international relations. He recognized that these spheres of human existence must permeate ethics rooted in the personal and transcendent nature of individuals. This humanistic idea of morality gains special significance in the context of now visible atomization of societies, weaknesses of law in individual countries or dominance of soulless business, which ultimately fuel the global economic crisis. The Pope, therefore, saw the need to update this spiritual aspect of human existence in order to strengthen solidarity and subsidiarity in socio-economic relations, and to stimulate proper cooperation of the state with the economy on the local and supranational scale. He also noted that its principles allow people to realize their own potential responsibly, but also sensitize them to the needs of other individuals. In the Pope’s recognition, Christian ethics is in particular in the realities of the crisis to mobilize states, economic enterprises and international organizations to undertake joint activities for the general public good, without – at the same time – suppressing the activity of individuals and communities.
Civil society is the term being in the interest of many branches of science. Through centuries in different legal and social systems the above-mentioned term has been named as: koinōnia politīke, societas civilis, civil society or bürgerliche Gesellschaft. The idea of civil society was and still is a basic condition for the democracy model and for the organization of community life in contemporary societies. In many modern perspectives on the civil society there is a common denominator unrelated to the legal capacity of the state. From that background the crucial question to be posed is about the place of an individual in the functioning of civil society and it should be related to communitarian and liberal conceptions of an individual which takes part in an ontological foundation of society. According to the normative analysis, the idea of the civil society is present in the legal systems of democratic states including developing democracies of the Central and Eastern Europe. The subject matter theory finds that the idea of civil society entirely gains in value only when related to the principle of subsidiarity. It assumes primacy, independence and autonomy of an individual in meeting his needs before the needs of social communities, especially before the needs of the state as the “highest being”. Thus in an active democracy a great importance is placed on the development of the so-called third sector, right to associate, non-discrimination, political pluralism, functioning of associations supporting activities of an individual in the public space.
The aim of the article is to establish whether the continuity between the Second and Third Polish Republics officially declared by the Polish elites is based on facts. The authors analyse the question with regard to three areas: symbolic events (handing over of the presidential insignia in 1990 and the 1998 resolution of the Senate of the Republic of Poland on legal continuity), judgements of ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court as well as legal scholarship. In their conclusion they point out that the rhetoric of continuity between the Second and the Third Polish Republics on the legal level hides real continuity between the communist regime and the normative system in force in Poland since 1989.
The establishment of the communist regime in Poland in 1944 is a current subject of reflection in the doctrine and practice of legislation and judiciary. There has been no uniform position on these events, which means that the then sanctioned political and normative order continues to produce controversial assessments and, above all, certain legal effects. This results from the fact that the new people’s power, empowered by force, and not by legal or social basis, has given itself the competence to establish a normative order. The lack of legitimacy for the rightful rule and legislative activity, in principle – from the point of view of the idea of the rule of law – undermines the political and legal status of the people’s authorities. This is all the more so because the system of unified power and sources of law created at that time was evidence of building a totalitarian state modelled on the Soviet Union. The events and legal behaviours of that time led to numerous, often radical changes in many areas of private and public life. They caused certain social and material effects, difficult to reverse today, which Polish society still faces. Therefore, modern standards of the rule of law require that public authorities undertake comprehensive and effective activity. They require that the principles of just and fair compensation for material damage and compensation for moral losses resulting from the rule of this system be implemented. This seems all the more important because some regulations of the people’s power, especially those concerning changes in the ownership structure, are still in force and form the basis of court and Constitutional Tribunal decisions.
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Ustanowienie reżimu komunistycznego w 1944 r. w Polsce stanowi w doktrynie oraz w praktyce legislacyjnej i orzeczniczej aktualny przedmiot refleksji. Nie wypracowano bowiem jednolitego stanowiska wobec tych wydarzeń, co powoduje, że usankcjonowany wówczas porządek polityczno-normatywny nadal skłania do kontrowersyjnych ocen i przede wszystkim wywołuje określone skutki prawne. Wynika to z faktu, że nowa ludowa władza, umocowana siłową, a nie prawną czy społeczną podstawą działania, sama nadała sobie kompetencje do stanowienia porządku normatywnego. Brak legitymacji do prawowitego panowania i działalności legislacyjnej w zasadzie – z punktu widzenia idei państwa prawa – podważa status ustrojowo-prawny organów władzy ludowej, tym bardziej że stworzony wówczas system jednolitej władzy i źródeł prawa świadczyły o budowaniu wzorowanego na Związku Radzieckim państwa totalitarnego. Ówczesne zdarzenia i zachowania prawne doprowadziły do licznych, często radykalnych zmian w wielu płaszczyznach życia prywatnego i publicznego. Ponadto wywołały określone, trudne dziś do odwrócenia skutki społeczne i materialne, z którymi wciąż mierzy się polskie społeczeństwo. Współczesne standardy państwa prawa stawiają zatem wymóg podjęcia kompleksowej i skutecznej aktywności przez władzę publiczną w zakresie słusznego i sprawiedliwego naprawienia szkód materialnych oraz zadośćuczynienia strat moralnych powstałych w wyniku panowania tego ustroju. Wydaje się to tym bardziej istotne, że niektóre regulacje władzy ludowej, zwłaszcza dotyczące zmian struktury własnościowej, nadal obowiązują oraz stanowią podstawę orzeczeń sądowych i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego.
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