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PL
W artykule poddano analizie zagadnienie praktycznych implikacji filozofii liberalnej i komunitariańskiej w dziedzinie praw człowieka. Prawa człowieka stanowią podstawowy składnik systemu aksjonormatywnego kultury Zachodu wyrażający ideały moralne o uniwersalnym charakterze, stąd kwestionowanie ich jest szczególnie problematyczne. Komunitarianizm i liberalizm są filozofiami istotnie różniącymi się pod względem metodologicznym, ontologicznym i aksjologicznym, co powoduje konsekwencje w odmiennym podejściu zwłaszcza do praw socjalnych i gospodarczych. Dominujący w ostatnich dekadach XX w. neoliberalizm jest krytycznie nastawiony do praw II generacji, podczas gdy dla komunitarian stanowią one ważny instrument umacniania wspólnoty. Istnieją jednak takie koncepcje liberalne (np. Hobhouse’a czy Rawlsa), z którymi prawa II generacji dają się uzgodnić. Z drugiej zaś strony komunitarianizm (np. Taylor) nie implikuje poświęcenia praw I generacji na rzecz wspólnoty.
EN
The article analyses the issue of the practical implications of liberal and communitarian philosophies in regard to human rights. Since human rights are the basic element of the axio-normative system of Western culture, expressing universal moral ideals, questioning these rights is particularly problematic. Communitarianism and liberalism are two philosophies which differ considerably in terms of methodology, ontology, and axiology, which consequently leads to their different positions, especially on social and economic rights. Neoliberalism, dominant in the last decades of the 20th century, is critical towards first-generation human rights, whereas for communitarians these rights are an important element of strengthening the community. There are, however, such liberal theories (e.g. L. T. Hobhouse’s or J. Rawls’) which can agree with second-generation rights. On the other hand, communitarianism (e.g. Ch. Taylor) does not imply sacrificing first-generation rights for the good of the community.
2
100%
Prakseologia
|
2009
|
issue 149
151-165
EN
The author analyses the notion of lying, and defines a lie as a statement in disagreement with the speaker’s knowledge, spoken with the intent to be understood as the truth. The author considers various ways of lying and discusses lying in business, as well as a justification of its negative ethical evaluation due to a) self-seeking intent, and b) practical economic dysfunctionality. The evaluation is graduated with egoistic, aggressive, active, materialistic and hedonistic lies being morally the worst.
3
100%
EN
The aim of this paper is to search for an answer to the question whether an ethical person should aid others or whether it is a moral duty. The postulate of assistance follows from concern for the good of another person, which is a characteristic of morality. However, not all contemporary ethical conceptions postulate the moral value of assistance. In particular, the ethics of Nietzsche and libertarians question its moral importance. The question of whether assistance has moral value depends on how we understand morality and the compulsoriness of its principles. Providing material assistance is a human act and the value of that act is influenced by its circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, the moral obligation of aid varies from permission to requirement. There are also praxeological conditions of the value of material assistance, connected with a negative evaluation of wastefulness and inefficiency. If people should help, how strong is the obligation to do so? The answer depends on the source of duty; unfortunately, deontological ethics cannot clearly differentiate situations in which material assistance is a duty from situations in which it as supererogatory act. We are therefore left to our own moral sensitivity.
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