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Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2020
|
vol. 48
|
issue 1-2
127-155
EN
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, I am going to sketch Ginsberg's arguments against a specific understanding of the terms “inseparability” (untrennbar/inseparable)/“separability” (trennbar/separable), rooted in Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology, where they are defined in relation to the content of consciousness (I call this approach intentional or “psychologistic”). Twardowski (Stumpf, Höfler) and, in a way, Husserl took this line. However, Husserl, in his whole/parts analysis, goes beyond the context of imaginative presentation. The secondary aim of the following investigations is to clarify and support Ginsberg's position on these issues through a reference to the terms introduced into ontological discourse by Ingarden. Unfortunately, neither Husserl's (semi-formal) whole-parts theory, nor Ginsberg's work on inseparability/separability, despite their undeniable merits, have so far attracted strong interest among philosophers. Yet possibilities are many: one could, for instance, investigate whether their detailed analyses of whole-part theory, inseparability/separability, different kinds of relations, forms of dependence, have something of value to offer in the current discussions within continental philosophy, or even within analytic philosophy of modern ontology. According to Husserl, these subjects are fundamental for ontology, which makes them continually relevant; there is still much to learn from those painstaking investigations of ontological relations.
EN
The paper is a presentation and analysis of negation and negative states of affairs, with particular emphasis on the ontological aspects of negation and negative states of affairs. It consists of three parts and has an introductory character. In the first two parts, I presents the views of Ingarden and Stróżewski on negation and negative states of affairs. The third part is polemical and is an attempt to answer analytic philosophers' criticisms of phenomenology.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2019
|
vol. 47
|
issue 2
25 - 42
EN
The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Ginsberg's critique of Husserl's (semi-formal) whole and part theory. In order to clarify Ginsberg's position I refer to the terms introduced into ontological discourse by Roman Ingarden. Unfortunately, neither Husserl's whole-parts theory, nor Ginsberg's work on inseparability/separability, despite their undeniable merits, has attracted strong interest among many philosophers. But one could, for instance, fruitfully investigate whether their detailed analyses of whole-part theory, inseparability/separability, different kinds of relations, and forms of dependence, have something of value to offer in the current discussions in continental philosophy, or even in analytic philosophy of modern ontology. According to Husserl's intuition, these topics are fundamental to ontology and therefore they are still relevant; there is still much to learn from those painstaking investigations of ontological relations. In this article, I do not discuss Ginsberg's criticism of the intentional or “psychologistic” approach to the question of inseparability/separability, because it is worth discussing in a separate paper.
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