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Wolność w prawdzie

100%

STYCZEŃ, SDS T.

Ethos. Kwartalnik Instytutu Jana Pawła II KUL

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2011

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vol. 24

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issue 3 (95)

EN

The drama of Socrates, who rejected the opportunity to escape from prison, thus choosing imprisonment and death in order to witness to the truth he held, was a shock to his student Plato. In the present article, Tadeusz Styczeń puts forward the idea that Plato’s Academy was in fact «born» in Socrates’s prison cell. The drama Socrates experienced is shared by numerous prisoners of conscience, up to the present day. The current article was written in the Poland of the 1980’s, when many Poles (the proverbial Kowalskis) were put in prison due to their opposition to the oppressive government. The Kowalski of that time would be offered freedom if he agreed to sign a declaration of loyalty to the regime. Yet he would realize that he must not accept the freedom he was thus being offered, as the price for it was abandonment of the truth he had himself recognized and for the sake of which he was imprisoned. Moreover, he would realize that if he left prison for that price, he would actually lose his freedom. The only way to save it was to remain faithful to the truth he cherished. He would realize that no other freedom deserved its name. To Styczeń, the Kowalski of the Poland of the 1980’s is a Polish Socrates (no wonder Styczeń puts him in one line with prisoners of conscience such as Thomas More or Card. Stefan Wyszyński), who owing to his steadfastness succeeded in saving the «humanity» in himself, and who, by his rejection to leave prison for the price of his abandonment of truth was striving to save the humanity in those who had imprisoned him. Thus he was a «proof by demonstration,» confirming the existence of the significant, inseparable bond between freedom and truth. Just as centuries ago Socrates’s firm stance inspired Plato’s Academy, today’s Kowalski may well become an inspiration for the modern academia, whose task is service to truth and thus service to human freedom and human subjectivity. Summarized by Cezary Ritter Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

2

Człowieka portret własny. Karola Wojtyły–Jana Pawła II antropologia adekwatna

100%

STYCZEŃ, SDS T.

Ethos. Kwartalnik Instytutu Jana Pawła II KUL

|

2011

|

vol. 24

|

issue 3 (95)

EN

From the beginning of philosophy various thinkers have attempted to answer the question of what man is. The author analyzes the answer proposed by Protagoras, who claimed that man is the measure of all things, and observes that it might have been satisfactory for the subsequent generations were it not for Socrates. The latter did not so much oppose Protagoras’s claim as attempted to point to the sine qua non condition determining its reasonableness, and he established that condition by pointing to the objective criterion of truth. According to Protagoras’s interpretation, man is the measure of all things when he re− lies on himself only, while Socrates holds that man is the measure of all things if he relies on the truth about them, itself independent of him. In this light, the Socratic project, expressed by means of the rule: “Know thyself,” aims at self−knowledge obtained in the light of truth, and as such it ultimately aims at shaping righteous conscience. According to Styczeń, the controversy between Protagoras and Socrates is not merely a controversy between two philosophical positions, but also one about the soul of culture, and it continues throughout the entire human history. In fact, it is a controversy about the identity of man. Styczeń believes that Karol Wojtyła–John Paul II is a thoroughly Socratic thinker. He presents Wojtyła as a philosopher who accepts the Socratic view of man and who simultaneously develops this view, pointing to its rootedness in actual moral experience. Within the scope of moral experience lies the experience of guilt which may be explained only by the existence of an objective (veritative) criterion which either commands or prohibits something (moral duty). Thus the experience of guilt simultaneously opens a theological perspective for the philosophical reflection on man. Styczeń concludes by saying that at this point Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical discourse about the human being is complemented by the theology he advanced as Pope John Paul II. The reason is that a human being, who by him− or herself is capable of choosing what offends truth and doing what he or she must not do, is unable to annul the consequences of such a choice and of such actions. The Christian revelation brings the «good news» about the Redeemer of man (Redemptor hominis), who has the power to free man from the guilt that rests on him. The Redeemer is the Son of God, who in order to redeem man became man himself. Summarized by Cezary Ritter Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

3

Autorytet religijny a wiara osobista i autonomia sumienia

100%

STYCZEŃ, SDS T.

Ethos. Kwartalnik Instytutu Jana Pawła II KUL

|

2011

|

vol. 24

|

issue 3 (95)

EN

The author refers to the Biblical narrative of the drama of Abraham, whom God commands to sacrifice his son Isaac. Abraham’s dilemma was already philosophically explored by Kierkegaard in his Fear and Trembling. In the present considerations the author gives an analysis of the relation between authority (in particular religious authority) and the autonomy of conscience. Why does Abraham consent to obey God’s cruel command if God’s reasons are hidden from him? The only justifiable answer is that God’s reasons God had earlier revealed to Abraham were sufficiently strong so that now he does not need to ask any further questions. While the reasons of this particular command are still hidden from him, the authority of God has a sufficiently strong foundation in his eyes so that he can accept, by virtue of the authority of God, the command he cannot comprehend. Therefore, in this particular situation, all Abraham wants is to protect his son, Isaac, from losing faith in God’s love. The author poses the question of what determines the moral nature of duty. On the one hand, he points that a reference to the law−giving authority, external to the acting subject, is present not only in religious ethical systems (it can be found, for instance, in M. Schlick’s proposal of ethics). On the other hand, he observes that one can hardly conceive of a moral duty that does not involve the acting subject’s inner conviction about the rightness of his action. Thus, he says, one may conclude that the moral duty to perform a given action is determined by the combination of an external, transsubjective element (the command of the authority) and an internal, intrasubjective one (the subject’s recognition of the command and the decision to consider it as binding on the basis of this recognition). However, the command of the authority and the subject’s personal conviction are frequently in conflict. Thus the author continues to explore whether in such situations the subject should give priority to the authority or to his or her personal conviction. He also investigates the possibility that the realm of morality is inherently torn apart and incoherent already at its roots. Yet the author stresses that if Abraham’s inner struggle is perceived merely in terms of the conflict between his conscience and the authority of the command−giver, we will fail to grasp the essence of the dilemma he experiences. The «reasons of the heart,» to which Abraham gives prioroty over the «reasons of the reason» and in the name of which he has «suspended» the latter, do not stop being his own reasons. He does not perceive them directly, but he is convinced about their existence and about them being morally significant to him, because he believes that they must be morally significant to the One who has so far sufficiently proven himself to him as «expert» in issues of morality and whom he (Abraham) has for this reason absolutely trusted and absolutely believed. Therefore Abraham now considers as morally binding the reasons unknown to him, provided they are sufficient for God to make this strange command. According to a «secular» interpretation, the drama of Abraham can be perceived as a dilemma between the view in favor of total autonomy of conscience in issues of morality and the one that the source of moral duty lies in an authority which is external to the acting subject. Yet we must not fail to see that also the first position involves a reference to authority, even if it is the authority of conscience itself (as, for instance, in Kantian ethics). In his discussion of Kant’s position the author points that a moral judgment, which is simultaneously a cognitive act, appears as a result of the coincidence of an act of the subject and the duty generating object, which is external to the acting subject. A moral controversy presupposes that its sides are rational subjects capable of formulating arguments which support their respective positions and that they are open to the criterion of truth which is external to both of them. Without such a criterion of truth a moral controversy might turn into an irresolvable tragedy. Summarized by Cezary Ritter Translated by Dorota Chabrajska

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3 Ethos. Kwartalnik Instytutu Jana Pawła II KUL

3 STYCZEŃ, SDS T.

3 2011

Wolność w prawdzie

Człowieka portret własny. Karola Wojtyły–Jana Pawła II antropologia adekwatna

Autorytet religijny a wiara osobista i autonomia sumienia