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EN
The problem of origins of the analytic philosophy is a subject of a profound intrinsic consideration among such contemporary thinkers as R. Monk. His key standpoint is that interpretative clue protracted by M. Dummett made it possible to discover a historic impetus for the whole 'linguistic movement' in Frege's thought. Monk's objection points out that the analytic philosophy was full-methodologically structured movement already defined in its strategies since the beginning. The crucial opposition between those analysts who declared logic as a vehicle for a metaphilosophical position and those who considered it were the final aim of its development was exposed in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Although the patterns of reconsidering the method-validity problem became the point of self-identification for analysts, which then established two traditions - logical and linguistic analysis - instead of the former one, the real core within this tradition was not 'the linguistic turn' but, namely, the variety of possibilities of the analysis. The author's opinion is that a devising of any kind of tradition is a way to sum up and outline its perspectives; hereby it needs such a rewriting which would productively include each of alternatives into assessment of its own historic self-reflections.
EN
The author analyzes the problem of solipsism from the viewpoint of grammatical criticism of this notion. He shows that self-consciousness is a result of self-description by consciousness of its own structure and does not precede it as the initial cause. The consideration of Cartesian and Kant’s approaches to the nature of subjectivity in solipsism proves that they took no heed to communicative peculiarity of “I”. Basing on the conception which is usually called impersonal or anonymous theory of consciousness the author shows that the disclosure of the solipsistic model requires to give up the identity of self-consciousness and the first person.
UK
Ринок інтелектуальної продукції дедалі частіше змушує читача задовольнятися позицією пересиченого сноба. Хоча, як знаємо, так було не завжди. Ще десять років тому вихід у світ праці, що містила у назві слова «філософія мови», був революційною подією, надихав і, здається, наближав українську наукову спільноту до сучасного рівня. І якщо це був рівень ще не новаторства, то щонайменше синхронної долученості до актуальних дискусій. На жаль або на щастя, уявити зараз появу такої революційної за наслідками книжки важко. І справа тут не у вичерпаності наснаги, а радше у циркулярності тем, якими живе інтелектуал ХХI сторіччя. Мимоволі постає питання: що спонукає філософів відмовлятися від претензій на універсальність власних поглядів, поволі позбуватися глухоти до критичного слова та відмовлятися від позиції остаточного мірила майбутнього філософування?
EN
The article deals with the coordination of thinking and language, logic and grammar within transcendental idealism. The author argues that Kant’s treatment of grammar as a general form of thinking extends the boundaries of his objectivity tenet. In the project of the Critiques linguistic aspects of the synthetic acts are based on the ground of judgment rules. It presupposes that grammar is a component of synthesis of empirical notions. Grammatical rules contain preconditions of the objective significance which is a connection between a category and its corresponding word. The self-consciousness thesis which unifies all the rules for synthetic acts thereby explicates a process of following the rule through its grammar usage. However, the lack of criteria for distinguishing rigorous and unrigorous rules both in Kant’s and in the philosophy of grammar would imply a revision of their theories of meaning.
EN
The article examines the problems with moral interaction raised where systematic state violence substitutes the institutions of law. It is argued that practical deeds, because of presupposed unity of subjective willing and objective moral aim, need some publicity principles of normativity which can be realized in social and political institutions. If, therefore, regulative rules could not be based upon unity of the will of a community of possible moral actors, the core of categorical imperative would be deprived of its universal positive lawmaking power. The author issues the challenge, what if Kant himself could follow his ethical prescriptions having no rights and sufficient trust between him and his participants in a moral deal, i.e. in the realm of total unpublicity. A kind of such possibility was entirely fulfilled in conditions of concentration camps. The camp world, the so called death-world, existed as absolute privacy without structures of solidarity and criteria of human dignity. A world like this ruins institutions for self-realization of a rational human moral nature, as reason itself. It is suggested that Kant’s idea of anthroponomy may involve, albeit not worked-out enough, a good ground to connect subjective freedom with both (a) the metaphysics of morality and (b) nonremovability of political struggle.
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