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Wojciech Jaruzelski, Kim Il Sung i zbliżenie na linii PRL-KRLD w latach osiemdziesiątych XX wieku

100%
Hańderek M.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
|
2023
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vol. 41
|
issue 1
184-207
EN
The article’s author shows how Wojciech Jaruzelski’s direct contacts with Kim Il Sung affected the state of relations between communist Poland and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Jaruzelski first travelled to North Korea in 1977 and it seems that his positive attitude towards the country began to take shape after this visit. Indeed, in the conclusion of his report, he recommended deepening multifaceted cooperation with North Korea. In the 1980s, as the PRL leader, he was already shaping national policy towards Pyongyang. In 1984, he received Kim Il Sung in Poland, and in 1986 he travelled to North Korea as the only First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party in the history of communist Poland to do so. He was highly feted there and signed a friendship and cooperation treaty, formally raising relations with the DPRK to the highest possible level. Under his leadership, Poland responded positively to almost all initiatives from the North Korean authorities, resulting in very intensive bilateral contacts in the second half of the 1980s. These contacts were only curtailed as a result of the democratic changes initiated in Poland in 1989.
PL
Autor artykułu pokazuje, jak bezpośrednie kontakty Wojciecha Jaruzelskiego z Kim Il Sungiem przełożyły się na stan stosunków między komunistyczną Polską i Koreańską Republiką Ludowo-Demokratyczną. Jaruzelski po raz pierwszy pojechał do Korei Północnej w 1977 r. i wydaje się, że po tej wizycie zaczął się kształtować jego pozytywny stosunek do tego kraju. W konkluzji swojego sprawozdania rekomendował bowiem pogłębianie wielopłaszczyznowej współpracy z Koreą Północną. W latach osiemdziesiątych, jako przywódca PRL, kształtował już politykę państwa wobec Pjongjangu. W 1984 r. przyjął w Polsce Kim Il Sunga, w roku 1986 zaś udał się do Korei Północnej jako jedyny w historii komunistycznej Polski I sekretarz KC PZPR. Był tam bardzo fetowany i podpisał układ o przyjaźni i współpracy, formalnie podnoszący stosunki z KRLD na najwyższy możliwy poziom. Polska pod jego kierownictwem odpowiadała pozytywnie na niemal wszystkie inicjatywy ze strony władz północnokoreańskich, co skutkowało bardzo intensywnymi kontaktami bilateralnymi w drugiej połowie lat osiemdziesiątych. Kontakty te zostały ograniczone dopiero wskutek przemian demokratycznych, zapoczątkowanych w Polsce w 1989 r.
2
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Problem niepodległościowych aspiracji Ukraińców
w publicystyce polskich mesjanistów lat 30. XX wieku

100%
Hańderek M.
Krakowskie Pismo Kresowe
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2010
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vol. 2
103-118
EN
Most of the Polish interwar messianists was centered around Jerzy Braun and the journal „Zet” which was edited by him. One of the frequent topics raised by messianists was the independence aspirations of the Ukrainians. Braun and his colleagues didn’t deny Ukrainians’ rights to hold their own country, however, they insisted that they must refrain from undermining the borders of Second Polish Republic. In return, they offered help in winning independence for territories situated at the east side of Zbrucz River, while assuming that the only solution to release Ukraine from Soviet domination was by forcing it through war. They also deprived of hope those Ukrainian communities that were counting on German assistance in the implementation of the aspirations for independence, stressing that Germany treat Ukrainians instrumentally and will not allow to build a fully sovereign state. It was also emphasized that Germany, unlike the Poles, have no emotional ties with the Ukrainians, which could make them act in accordance with their interests. The cooperation didn’t finally take place due to hostility of the majority of the Ukrainian elite of the Polish country and the lack of strong communities who were ready to give up claims to ownership of Eastern Galicia. In addition, actions made by neighboring powerful countries, particularly Nazi Germany, made countries and nations of Central and Eastern Europe having to adapt to dynamically changing international situation. At the end of the 30s, opportunities for Poland to create a reality in this part of Europe became increasingly smaller.
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Zapomniana czy przejęta wojna? Uwagi wokół książki Davida Cheng Changa The Hijacked War. The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War

100%
Hańderek M.
Gdańskie Studia Azji Wschodniej
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2022
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issue 22
183-194
EN
The paper discusses the book entitled The Hijacked War. The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War by David Cheng Chang (Stanford University Press, Stanford 2020, pp. 476). The critical analysis of Cheng Chang’s work situates the book in a new trend seen among western historians interested in the Korean War, which is the tendency to focus on prisoners of war instead of focusing only on the political and military issues of the conflict. Cheng Chang claims that a few thousand Chinese non-communist POWs forced many fellow prisoners held in captivity by United Nations Command to oppose repatriation to the People’s Republic of China and, in the aftermath, those determined POWs “hijacked” the war. This was possible because their stance encouraged the Americans to propose voluntary repatriation. To the Americans’ surprise, the Communists refused to accept it, and the war waged on for more than one year longer. The paper underlines the main thesis by Cheng Chang and points out the most valuable information provided by the historian that contributes to a deepening of our knowledge and understanding of the Korean War. Moreover, the paper indicates that there are a few minor disadvantages in Cheng Chang’s study, such as the short description of the so-called explanations and interviews conducted under the supervision of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission between October 1953 and January 1954. This is a gap that could be filled, for example, after studying Polish and Czech archival diplomatic and intelligence documents.
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