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1

„Antypolska akcja”. Ludobójcza czystka etniczna przeprowadzona przez OUN-B i UPA w latach 1943–1945

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Motyka G.

Studia nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem

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2013

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vol. 35

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issue 4

27 - 39

EN

The mass extermination of the Polish population of Volyn and Eastern Galicia undertaken during the 1943–1945 period by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-B (OUN-B) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) were among the bloodiest episodes of the Second World War involving Polish people. The platform of the OUN before 1939 officially announced planned expulsion from future independent Ukrainian state of all landowners and colonizers settled after 1918 on disputable lands. It also did not hide the fact that this process will be accompanied by peasant lynching. At least some OUN’s activists wished that the cleansing would encompass the whole Polish population. J. Stecko’s government, established by Bandera’s supporters in 1941, wanted, in all probability, to lead a policy towards the Polish population modelled on German actions undertaken on lands incorporated in 1939 to the Reich, i.e. to exterminate Polish intelligentsia, to forcibly assimilate peasant population and to expel the rest of Poles. At the end of 1942, the activists of the OUN-B decided, at the moment of insurgency’s breakout, to start the expulsion of the Polish population, under a threat of death, from all lands deemed to be Ukrainian. In Volyn, this conception, probably on the initiative of local commandants of the OUN-B and the UPA, was implemented as a planned exterminatory action against Poles. This so-called anti-Polish action started on the 9th of February, 1943, and gradually spread to the whole Volyn. The biggest wave of attacks took place on the 11th of July, 1943, when around one hundred Polish settlements were destroyed and their inhabitants murdered. In the summer of 1943, the leaders of OUN-B, after a stormy conference, accepted anti-Polish actions undertaken by Volynian troops of the UPA. They also decided to conduct an anti-Polish cleansing in Eastern Galicia but in this case they adopted a policy of return to the previous conception of the expulsion of Poles under a threat of death. In the second half of 1943, Bandera’s supporters in Galicia began the slaughter of the so-called Polish activists (priests, teachers, foresters). During the second stage of the operation selected Polish villages were attacked, particularly those where the strong Polish self-defense existed. In April of 1944, mass action focused on Poles’ expulsion started; during many attacks — contrary to official instructions permitting to kill “only” males — the UPA’s troops were murdering every person of Polish descent. Only the front’s oncoming and the entry of the Red Army prompted the OUN-B and the UPA to slowly cease further anti-Polish cleansing. Polish losses resulting from the UPA’s actions probably amounted to one hundred thousand killed (the majority of them in Volyn where, according to determinations made by Władysław and Ewa Siemaszko, between forty to even sixty thousands of Poles were killed in 1943 alone). As a result of Polish retaliatory actions, up to 1947, over a dozen thousands of Ukrainians were in turn killed. Mass murder of Polish civilian population was a priori assumed in the OUN-B’s and the UPA’s strategies. For this reason the majority of Polish historians consider their policies to, at the very least, bear the characteristics of genocide. According to the author of this article, the “anti-Polish action” of the OUN-B and the UPA should be regarded as a genocidal ethnic cleansing.

2

Dywizja SS „Galizien” („Hałyczyna”)

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Motyka G.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2002

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issue 1

109-119

3

Nie tylko likwidacja prowidnyka „Stiaha”. Działania grupy operacyjnej „Lubaczów” w 1947 r.

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Motyka G.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2021

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vol. 37

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issue 1

523-540

PL

Artykuł przedstawia działalność Grupy Operacyjnej KBW „Lubaczów”, która w 1947 r., po zakończeniu akcji „Wisła”, prowadziła działania przeciwpartyzanckie przeciwko OUN i UPA. W wyniku intensywnych poszukiwań oddziałom KBW udało się w ciągu nieco ponad trzech miesięcy wykryć i zlikwidować ośrodek kierowniczy OUN w Polsce, na czele z krajowym prowidnykiem Jarosławem Staruchem „Stiahem”, jak również wszystkie większe grupy partyzanckie na terenie pow. lubaczowskiego. W ten sposób faktycznie położono kres istnieniu zorganizowanego podziemia ukraińskiego. W oparciu o analizę mało znanych dokumentów archiwalnych autor pokazuje, iż celem KBW nie była jedynie likwidacja podziemia ukraińskiego. Równolegle bowiem prowadzono aresztowania członków polskiego podziemia niepodległościowego, a także czystki personalne w szeregach partii politycznych i organizacji społecznych regionu. Pod egidą KBW stworzono liczne placówki ORMO i wzmocniono powiatowe struktury PPR. Podstawowym celem GO „Lubaczów” było więc umocnienie władzy komunistów w powiecie lubaczowskim.

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Służba Bezpeky OUN-B (Służba Bezpieczeństwa OUN-B). Z warsztatów badawczych

100%

Motyka G.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2006

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issue 1(9)

255-264

EN

The Ukrainian resistance security police established in 1940 by S. Bandera and S. Łenkawskyj performed the role of a secret service and counter intelligence agency within Bandera’s faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The first security police was commander was M. ¸ebed. From March 1941 he was replaced by M.Arsenych. The hierarchy of the service was closely connected with the hierarchy of OUN. Besides the leadership centre, there were also local departments consisting of two sections: information gathering and investigations. Fighting squads of the security police, which among others arrested people and executed death penalty were reporting to the department empoloyees of each level. Security police members were the most reliable members of OUN. The investigation conducted by OUN security police was merciless. What are known as third degree methods, i.e. torture, was used. In the case of minor offences, security police members thrashed suspects with beech sticks. People sentenced to death were shot or hanged. There were also cases of brutal murders. Between 1943 and 1945 OUN security police took an active part in the slaughter of Polish people. In the years 1945–1948, those Poles who collaborated with the communist government or were actively opposed to the Ukrainian resistance were executed. In practice, executions of Poles were not just limited to those two groups. OUN security police applied the principle of collective responsibility (i.e. killing entire families). At the same time, Ukrainians suspected of collaboration with the communists were also executed. The orders to apply solely the principle of personal responsibility were not given until May 1945. However, entire families were massacred beyond that date. Local OUN security police department employees were entitled to order the execution of a person. They enjoyed practically unlimited prerogatives. As a result, investigations were often brief and resistance members were executed in spite of unsubstantiated charges. The Soviets took advantage of the situation by staging numerous provocations, the result of which was the death of many OUN members wrongly accused of cooperation with the communist security police. OUN security police was law unto itself. The power of the OUN security police chief M. Arsenych (until his death in January 1947) was almost equal to the power of the leader of the Ukrainian National Insurgent Army (UPA). Separate departments of OUN security police survived until 1951 when most of the remaining members of this organisation took over positions as leaders of the OUN underground. The activities of OUN security police stirred a lot of controversy among Ukrainian researchers. On the one hand, they emphasize that the collective responsibility used by the OUN security police OUN discouraged local people from supporting the underground, but on the other they regard the liquidation of communist agents as legitimate.

5

Kolaboracja na Kresachm Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej 1941–1944

100%

Motyka G.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2008

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issue 1(12)

183-197

EN

Collaboration is a topic arousing many debates and controversies and therefore rather avoided by historians. The assessment of the collaboration in Eastern and Central Europe is hampered by the fact that the inhabitants of those territories lived in between two totalitarian regimes and on numerous occasions they had to chose the lesser evil. That is why many communities deciding to co-operate with the Third Reich fi rst did it because of patriotic motives and only then possibly ideological ones. Poles for the whole period of the WWII considered Germans their main enemy and that is why the Polish underground always opted against any military co-operation with the Third Reich, even local one in the face of the threat posed by Soviets. In turn, the national Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Belorussian communities perceived the USSR as their main enemy, and treated Germans as a potential ally and even a guarantor of gaining – or regaining – their independence. That is why when the Germany attacked the USSR in Lithuania and the socalled Western Ukraine the anti-Soviet insurrections broke out. Both the Ukrainian and Lithuanian nationalists created their own governments but they were not recognized by the Germans. The most vivid example of the collaboration in the eastern Borderlands was the service in the German police formations and SS. Among others the Waffen SS ‘Galizien’ division created in 1943 was composed of Ukrainians. Although such formations were perceived by many people as a substitute for national army, they were a very important element of the German military system. They relieved the Nazi of many duties connected with the participation in anti-partisan or pacification operations. The Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belorussian auxiliary police also participated in the extermination of Jews organized by Germans. In turn, Polish units of the police in Volhynia participated in different operations against Ukrainians, but also protected Polish citizens against UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army). However, the decision whether someone was or was not a collaborator cannot be based solely on the membership in one formation or the other but in what way he or she fulfi lled the orders issued by the German authorities. Murdering civilians cannot be justifi ed in any way. That is why whether a given formation committed such murders or not is a decisive factor of its assessment. That is why, among others, the disputes concerning the participation of Ukrainians in suppressing the Warsaw Uprising or pacifi cation of the village of Huta Pieniacka take on so emotional overtones.

6

Grupa Operacyjna „Puchaczów” – mechanizm komunistycznej pacyfikacji na przykładzie zapoznanego epizodu akcji „Wisła 1947 roku”

100%

Motyka G.

Dzieje Najnowsze

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2020

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vol. 52

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issue 1

EN

During the Vistula Operation, an operational group was established to prosecute the Freedom and Independence groups, who at night on 2 to 3 July 1947 at Puchaczów killed 21 people accused of supporting the official authorities. The Puchaczów Operational Group during round-ups in the Włodawa, Chełm, and Lubartów districts, killed several people and detained several hundred more. Some of the families associated with the underground were forcibly displaced to the so-called Western Lands. The activities of the Puchaczów OG show that the basic aim of the Vistula Operation was to strengthen power of the Polish Workers’ Party in post-war Poland.

PL

W czasie akcji „Wisła” powołano grupę operacyjną do ścigania grup WiN, które nocą 2/3 VII 1947 r. w Puchaczowie zabiły 21 osób oskarżonych o popieranie władzy. GO „Puchaczów” w czasie obław w powiatach Włodawa, Chełm i Lubartów zabiła kilkanaście osób i zatrzymała kilkaset kolejnych. Kilka rodzin powiązanych z podziemiem wysiedlono przymusowo na Ziemie Zachodnie. Działania GO „Puchaczów” pokazują, że podstawowym celem akcji „Wisła” było umocnienie władzy PPR w powojennej Polsce.

7

Zbrodnia wołyńska 1943 roku i mit buntu ludowego

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Motyka G.

Dzieje Najnowsze

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2016

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vol. 48

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issue 1

PL

The Volhynian Massacre of 1943 and the Myth of a Peasant RevoltThe discussion about the events, which took place in Volhynia in 1943, includes a hypothesis presenting the anti–Polish outbreaks as an expression of a spontaneous revenge of the local Ukrainian peasants for the discrimination experienced at the time of the Second Republic. The author of the article based himself on unknown documents to demonstrate that in reality the mass–scale massacre of the Poles was organized by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists–Bandera (OUN–B) Underground and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) partisan units it commanded. The peasants participating in the events were mobilised (at least partly by force) to special auxiliary detachments, ordered by the Bandera–led superiors to set fire to Polish settlements and to kill their inhabitants. Both in Volhynia and in Galicia peasants were incorporated into groups attacking localities inhabited by the Poles, despite the fact that partisan forces sufficed to destroy them. The victims were cruelly murdered with axes and other tools so as to produce the impression among the observers that they were dealing with a local Jacquerie while in reality the massacre was a planned ethnic cleansing campaign. The idea to resolve the Polish–Ukrainian territorial controversy with the assistance of an ethnic purge had been devised by the OUN already prior to 1939. Initially, it was assumed that the future Ukrainian state would be devoid of all landowners and colonists who settled down in the conflict–ridden terrains after 1918, but in time the opinion calling for ”ejecting” the entire Polish population became increasingly popular. The population in question was to be murdered at least partly by the incited local peasants. At the beginning of 1943 UPA detachments commenced a battle against the Germans and Soviet partisans while simultaneously initiating the so–called anti–Polish campaign. The organised de–Polonisation operation, inaugurated on 9 February 1943 by attacking the village of Parośle in Volhynia, lasted until 18 May 1945 and claimed the lives of about 100 000 victims.

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Jeszcze o stosunku Polaków do sowieckich partyzantów – byłych jeńców

50%

Motyka G.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2007

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issue 1(11)

462-467

9

[Dyskusja] Problemy narodowościowe na ziemiach polskich w latach 1939–1989

45%

Madajczyk P., Motyka G., Musiał B., Szaynok B., Mironowicz E.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2004

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issue 2(6)

57-81

10

[Recenzja] W odpowiedzi Frankowi Grelce

38%

Machcewicz P., Motyka G.

Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość

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2004

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issue 2(6)

398-401

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„Antypolska akcja”. Ludobójcza czystka etniczna przeprowadzona przez OUN-B i UPA w latach 1943–1945

Dywizja SS „Galizien” („Hałyczyna”)

Nie tylko likwidacja prowidnyka „Stiaha”. Działania grupy operacyjnej „Lubaczów” w 1947 r.

Służba Bezpeky OUN-B (Służba Bezpieczeństwa OUN-B). Z warsztatów badawczych

Kolaboracja na Kresachm Wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej 1941–1944

Grupa Operacyjna „Puchaczów” – mechanizm komunistycznej pacyfikacji na przykładzie zapoznanego epizodu akcji „Wisła 1947 roku”

Zbrodnia wołyńska 1943 roku i mit buntu ludowego

Jeszcze o stosunku Polaków do sowieckich partyzantów – byłych jeńców

[Dyskusja] Problemy narodowościowe na ziemiach polskich w latach 1939–1989

[Recenzja] W odpowiedzi Frankowi Grelce