The main aim of the paper is an attempt to characterize two different approaches to refute skepticism, namely, that of George Berkeley and Thomas Reid. The reason to choose these thinkers is twofold. First, the Berkeley's system (among other systems labeled by Reid as 'theory of ideas') was an object of a very serious and even fierce critique by T. Reid. That critique was meant as a first step for creating his own system known as the Scottish School of Common Sense. Second, despite of that critique, in many respects the philosophical views of Reid strikingly resemble these of Berkeley. And among the resemblances, the opinions of the two about the nature of perception of external objects play a very important role. Both philosophers take presentationalism as their own position. Both of them maintain that the other possible view, representationalism, leads inevitably to skepticism. And, last but not least, one should remember that for G. Berkeley and equally T. Reid the refutation of skepticism was one of the most important reasons for building their own systems. However, the similarities mentioned above prove to be rather superficial. It is common knowledge how much differ the outcomes of the attempts taken by Berkeley and Reid to refute skepticism. So similar assumptions and goals do not bring similar answers at all. The paper attempts to show how Berkeley and Reid dealt with the problem of skepticism. Namely, what they meant by skepticism, how they understood an object of perception, and how they defined the reality of an object. And what solution against skepticism they offered. As we know Berkeley came to the conclusion that immaterialism is the best remedy against skeptical doubts about perceiving the real world. The concept of material substance and the mediate perception of things were the main sources of skepticism. Reid, however, defended the material nature of objects of perception - that belief was an intrinsic part of common sense. He maintained that any discussion with that sort of beliefs is impossible, they lay the foundations of any other knowledge. Consequently Reid builds such a philosophical system that would justify and prove right the beliefs of common sense.
One of the main challenges for 17th-century natural philosophers was to find an answer to the question of what makes matter active at all? The legacy of 'prime matter' and its pure potentiality was still alive, and the adoption of corpuscular or atomistic theories did not change much here, the conviction about the total passivity of bodies was still dominant. Their actions demanded some explanation that would be the equivalent of an Aristotelian, non-material and active form. It seems that one of the philosophical traditions that were sought for such an explanation was the emanational metaphysics of Plotinus. In seventeenth-century systems it underwent various modifications, but its main idea, indicating the active role of certain 'principles' or 'spirits' responsible for initiating any changes in matter and managing them in accordance with the Creator's intention, remained the foundation of the theories of matter. An example of such solutions are the systems of Henry More and his good acquaintance from Cambridge, Isaac Newton. In the first case there is no doubt about the fundamental influence of Neoplatonism, but in the second case historians' opinions are divided. Newton reaches in search of 'active principles' for alchemical research, with the hope of finding these principles not only when referring to philosophical speculations, but also to experimental methods. This difference, however, does not change the fact that both philosophers try to discover the mode of action of 'active spirits', hesitating between placing in the particles of matter a number of separate principles and pointing to only one acting universally principle that was just an extension of God's arm – More calls it the Spirit of Nature (Vicarious Power of God), and Newton sees that principle ultimately in Christ (Viceroy of God).
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Jednym z głównych wyzwań stojących przed filozofami przyrody XVII wieku było znalezienie odpowiedzi na pytanie, co sprawia, że materia w ogóle działa? Dziedzictwo ‘materii pierwszej’ i jej czystej potencjalności było wciąż żywe, a przyjęcie teorii korpuskularnej czy atomistycznej niewiele tu zmieniało, dominowało wciąż przekonanie o całkowitej bierności ciał. Ich działanie domagało się jakiegoś wyjaśnienia, które stanowiłoby odpowiednik arystotelesowskiej, niematerialnej i aktywnej, formy. Wydaje się, że jedną z tradycji filozoficznych, do których sięgano w poszukiwaniu takiego wyjaśnienia, była emanacyjna metafizyka Plotyna. W systemach XVII-wiecznych ulegała ona różnorodnym modyfikacjom, ale jej główna idea, wskazująca na aktywną rolę pewnych ‘zasad’, czy ‘duchów’ odpowiedzialnych za inicjowanie wszelkich zmian w materii i kierowanie nimi zgodnie z zamysłem Stwórcy, pozostawała fundamentem ówczesnych teorii działania materii. Przykładem takich rozwiązań są systemy Henry’ego More’a i jego dobrego znajomego z Cambridge, Izaaka Newtona. W pierwszym przypadku nie ma wątpliwości co do zasadniczego wpływu neoplatonizmu, w drugim jednak zdania historyków są podzielone. Newton sięga bowiem w poszukiwaniu ‘aktywnych zasad’ do badań alchemicznych, z nadzieją odnalezienia owych zasad nie tylko przy odwołaniu się do filozoficznych spekulacji, ale także do metod eksperymentalnych. Różnica ta jednak nie zmienia faktu, że obaj filozofowie starają się odkryć sposób działania ‘duchów aktywnych’, wahając się między umieszczeniem w cząstkach materii wielu odrębnych zasad a wskazaniem na zasadę jedną, działającą uniwersalnie i będącą niejako przedłużeniem Bożego ramienia – More nazywa ją Duchem Natury (Vicarious Power of God), a Newton upatruje jej ostatecznie w Chrystusie (Viceroy of God).
The seventeenth century witnessed the transition from the qualitative physics to quantitative. The very process was not easy and obvious, it consisted of discussions in many fields. One of them was the question about the nature of chemistry which was undergoing then some changes towards the form we know now. The main argument concerned the explanatory principles one should invoke to understand properly certain outcomes of chemical experiments. The present paper is a presentation of such an (indirect) argument between R. Boyle, a prominent proponent of corpuscular, quantitative principles and S. Duclos, an al-chymist and a proponent of paracelsian, qualitative ones. What is interesting Duclos knew The Sceptical Chymist, Boyle’s main work which contained a severe critique of paracelsian chymistry, and attempted to point out some weaknesses of Boyle’s own position. Duclos scrutinized Boyle’s experiments described in his Certain Physiological Essays and other works and argued for certain shortcomings of Boyle’s laboratory skills, his failure to indicate some literature sources and, first of all, insufficiency of Boyle’s arguments for the corpuscular thesis. According to Duclos, Boyle did not follow in laboratory certain procedures recommended by himself, using unclear notions and applying the corpuscular principles without proper justification. What is more, Duclos argued also in favor of paracelsian chymistry presenting some qualitative explanations in experiments in which Boyle failed to give quantitative ones. Knowing the further development of natural philosophy, it seems interesting to realize how complex it was. The present paper shows also how much irremovable from scientific research is the theoretical component.
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W XVII wieku rozpoczął się proces przechodzenia od nauki uprawianej w aspekcie jakościowym do nauki uprawianej w aspekcie ilościowym. Był on złożony i pociągał za sobą dyskusje na wielu polach. Jedna z nich odnosiła się do natury rodzącej się nowoczesnej chemii. Główna linia sporu dotyczyła rodzaju zasad wyjaśniających (jakościowych czy ilościowych), do których należy się odwołać przy wyjaśnianiu wyników eksperymentów. Obecny artykuł opisuje szczegóły (pośredniej) dyskusji między R. Boyle’em, jednym z głównych zwolenników zasad korpuskularnych, ilościowych, i S. Duclosem, al-‘chemikiem’ i zwolennikiem teorii paracelsjańskich i zasad jakościowych. Co ciekawe, Duclos znał The Sceptical Chymist, główne dzieło Boyle’a, w którym zawarł on surową krytykę ‘chemii’ paracelsjańskiej, i podjął próbę wskazania słabych punktów stanowiska Boyle’owskiego. Duclos zanalizował eksperymenty, jakie Boyle opisał w "Certain Physiological Essays" i innych dziełach i wskazał na popełnione błędy – jego zdaniem Boyle nie zna dobrze praktyki laboratoryjnej; pomija źródła, z jakich korzysta opisując niektóre eksperymenty; przede wszystkim jednak nie potrafi przekonująco argumentować na rzecz tezy korpuskularnej. Zdaniem Duclosa, Boyle nie przestrzega procedur, które sam zaleca – posługuje się niejasnym językiem i arbitralnie odwołuje się do wyjaśnień korpuskularnych. Co więcej, Duclos argumentuje na rzecz paracelsjańskiej koncepcji ‘chemii’, przedstawiając jakościowe wyjaśnienia w eksperymentach, w których Boyle nie zdołał podać wyjaśnień ilościowych. Przedstawiona krytyka poglądów Boyle’a pokazuje jak złożony był proces wyłaniania się ilościowego podejścia do filozofii naturalnej, pokazuje również istotną rolę, jaką w badaniach naukowych odgrywa składnik teoretyczny.
The 17th century faced some deep changes within the scope of the philosophy of nature. Having discarded hylemorphism, modern philosophers had to find new ways of gaining knowledge of and explaining natural phenomena. One of the new currents was the experimental philosophy that had a famous proponent – Robert Boyle. Nevertheless the new method also had its opponents, Thomas Hobbes being one of the most prominent of them. The present paper is an attempt to show the most fundamental reasons why the two philosophers took radically opposite positions towards the experimental method. The discussion started with T. Hobbes’s work Dialogus physicus de natura aeris which was a severe critique of Boyle’s New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, touching the Spring of the Air. The paper is not any examination of the detailed discussion of the two, rather it focuses on differences concerning the concepts of knowledge (philosophy) accepted by them and some theoretical problems interwoven with the way of experiment. It seems that Boyle accepted to some extent the probabilistic and temporal concept of knowledge, whereas Hobbes defended the traditional ideal of universal and certain one, and maintained that experiments cannot be any source of it. Hobbes was in favor of the deductive concept of natural philosophy. What is more, Hobbes pointed out that experimentalists’ attempts to secure some degree of certainty fail because they are built on some conventional presumptions. According to Hobbes, any outcome of an experiment must be strongly influenced by those assumed assumptions. Further development of sciences and also the philosophy of sciences proved the deductive concept of natural philosophy ineffective, on the other hand, however, Hobbes was right in pointing out the inevitable theoretical context of any pursuit after ‘matters of fact’.
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