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Między wielkością a małością. Polska wobec koncertowej kakofonii mocarstw na przełomie swych dziejów (1914–1945)

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Kuk L.

Kwartalnik Historyczny

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2017

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vol. 124

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issue 1

PL

Sytuacja młodego państwa polskiego powstałego w 1918 r. była bardzo trudna. W atmosferze powojennej niepewności i dezorganizacji wytworzyła się szczególna sytuacja, w której zachodnie granice Polski ustanowione zostały przez aliantów na konferencji wersalskiej, a wschodnie były dziełem Polaków, co stało się dzięki zwycięstwom odniesionym przez Polskę w walkach z Ukraińcami, z Litwą, a zwłaszcza z Rosją radziecką (traktat ryski), z czym postawione wobec faktów dokonanych mocarstwa zachodnie (z najbardziej Polsce przychylną Francją włącznie), pogodziły się z trudem i co Polsce zapamiętały.Jak pokazuje Andrzej Nowak w swej książce (Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement, Kraków 2015), przeciwko projektowi budowy dużego i silnego państwa polskiego od początku gwałtownie oponował premier brytyjski David Lloyd George, zdecydowanie niechętny Polsce. Był on przeciwnikiem istotnego osłabienia Niemiec; nie dążył też do całkowitego wyeliminowania Rosji (nawet w jej komunistycznej formie) z grona państw współdecydujących o losie Europy. Z tego względu z góry godził się na podrzędne stanowisko Polski na arenie międzynarodowej, a nawet zdawał się godzić na pewne formy jej politycznego podporządkowania niedawnemu zaborcy.Zagadnienie odbudowy państwa polskiego należało do najtrudniejszych problemów w życiu politycznym Europy między 1795 a 1945 r., podobnie jak zagadnienie jedności politycznej Niemiec. W efekcie rozwiązania przyjęte po Wielkiej Wojnie musiały zostać znacząco skorygowane po II wojnie światowej. Dokonało się to w zasadzie bez udziału polskiego.Nietrudno zauważyć, że pewne elementy programu politycznego Lloyda George’a z lat 1918–1920 zostały, w całkowicie zmienionej sytuacji politycznej, przeprowadzone arbitralnie przez mocarstwa alianckie w latach 1943–1945. Rosja/ ZSRR, której granice przesunięto daleko na zachód, wróciła do polityki europejskiej, Polska utraciła rozległe obszary wschodnie i została jej podporządkowana. Nowy, jałtańsko-poczdamski, „zimnowojenny” ład europejski okazał się dużo trwalszy, a przy tym bardziej stały i przewidywalny niż ład wersalski. Był też przez jego twórców bardziej respektowany. Between Greatness and Meanness. Poland towards the Cacophony of the Concert of Powers during a Turning Point in its History (1914–1945)The situation of the young Polish State that emerged in 1918 was extremely difficult. In the atmosphere of post-war uncertainty and disorganization a specific situation occurred, when the western frontiers of Poland were decided upon at the Versailles conference by the Allies, and the eastern ones were created by victories of the Poles in their fights against the Ukrainians, Lithuania, and especially Soviet Russia (the Treaty of Riga), with which the Western Powers were able to reconcile themselves only with difficulty (including France, which was the most favourably disposed towards Poland) and which they held against Poland.As demonstrated by Andrzej Nowak in his book (Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement [The First Treachery of the West. 1920 – A Forgotten Appeasement], Kraków 2015), the project to build a large and strong Polish state was opposed from the very beginning by the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, clearly unfavourable to Poland. He was opposed both to the idea of a significant weakening of Germany and to the total elimination of Russia (even in its communist form) from the group of the states jointly deciding the fate of Europe. For this reason he agreed in advance to a minor position of Poland in the international arena, and even seemed to have agreed to some forms of Poland’s subordination to its recent partitioner.The question of the reconstruction of the Polish State was one of the most difficult political problems of Europe between 1795 and 1945, together with the political unity of Germany. As a result, the solution accepted after the Great War had to be substantially revised after the Second World War. This, in fact, was made with no Polish participation.It is easy to perceive that certain elements of Lloyd George’s political programme of 1918–1920 were arbitrarily implemented, in a totally different political reality, by the allied powers in 1943–1945. Russia/USSR, with its frontiers pushed far westward, came back to European politics, while Poland lost its extensive eastern territories and was subjected to Russia. The new, Yalta-Potsdam “Cold War” order turned out to be much more permanent, and at the same time more durable and predictable than the Versailles order. And it was more respected by its creators.

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Polska z bliska i z oddali. Przypadek Daniela Beauvois w świetle jego wspomnień

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Kuk L.

Kwartalnik Historyczny

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2017

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vol. 124

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issue 4

PL

Daniel Beauvois (ur. 1938), wybitny francuski badacz dziejów Polski oraz krajów Europy Wschodniej, związany jest z Polską i jej nauką historyczną od końca lat sześćdziesiątych. W centrum jego badań znajdują się byłe obszary wschodnie dawnego przedrozbiorowego państwa polsko-litewskiego, szczególnie ich południowa ukraińska część. Badania te doprowadziły Beauvois do wniosków i przemyśleń znacznie się różniących od tych dominujących w polskiej historiografii oraz do dekonstrukcji tradycyjnego obrazu obecności polskiej na tym obszarze, co wywołało liczne opory po stronie polskiej. Wydana w Polsce w roku 2015 po francusku autobiografia Beauvois ułatwia zrozumienie ewolucji jego poglądów oraz relacji z polskim środowiskiem historycznym. Daniel Beauvois (b. 1938), an outstanding French researcher in the field of history of Poland and Eastern Europe states, has been tied to Poland and its science of history since the late 1960s. His research is focused on the former eastern territories of the pre-partitioned Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, especially its southern Ukrainian part. His studies led Professor Beauvois to conclusions and reflections quite different from those dominating in the Polish literature on the subject, and to the deconstruction of a traditional image of the Polish presence in this region; this, in fact, provoked resistance of Polish historians. Professor Beauvois’ autobiography, published in 2015 in French, sheds light on the evolution of his views and relationship with Polish historians.

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Profesor Sławomir Kalembka (1936–2009)

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Kuk L.

Zapiski Historyczne

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2012

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vol. 77

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issue 1

119-139

EN

Prof. dr hab. Sławomir Kalembka, outstanding historian specialising in the 19th century, died on 12 October 2009 after a short illness. Throughout all his life he was associated with Toruń, Nicolas Copernicus University (NCU), where he was a professor, prorector, and rector in the years 1990–1993. He was born in Vilnius on 8 June 1936. He came from an educated family with the working class background, which evinced strong patriotic traditions and the negative attitude towards the communist system. After the war, the family moved to Gdańsk, where Professor Kalembka went to school. After passing the secondary school-leaving examinations he studied history in Toruń. He graduated in 1958. On 1 January he started his scientific and didactic work at NCU, where he went on working until his death. It was only in the years 1999–2001 that his main workplace was the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn. He obtained his PhD in Toruń (1964), where he also got his habilitation degree in 1976. As a NCU employee he was appointed associate professor (1988) and full professor (1991). The considerable academic achievements of Sławomir Kalembka refer to a few thematic areas. The first and the basic subject is the history of the Great Emigration, particularly its left, democratic wing. Professor Kalembka dealt with the subject thanks to Professor Witold Łukaszewicz. The second subject was the history of Poland and general history in the 19th century, which includes the history of the Polish and foreign press. The remaining research areas are not so extended and are of secondary importance. Professor dealt with the history of Toruń, Pomerelia, and two Prussian provinces – West Prussia and East Prussia in the 19th century. Other research areas concern the military history of the 19th century, the history of Vilnius, the Vilnius land and the so-called north-eastern Kresy (Borderlands). Professor Kalembka is the author of about 520 works, a dozen of which are books and several dozen of which are scientific articles or extensive chapters in joint publications. Scientifically, the most outstanding works of Professor Kalembka were written in the first quarter of his scientific activity (until 1990); his most eminent research achievement was his PhD thesis (about Polish Democratic Society) and his habilitation thesis (about the press of the democratic wing of the Great Emigration). He was also an experienced academic teacher. He promoted 416 master’s degrees and 15 PhD degrees. Apart from the strictly scientific activity, Professor Kalembka educated Polish society about the problem of Kresy – the Vilnius and Lithuanian Borderlands, understood as the heritage after the Great Duchy of Lithuania. Professor Kalembka was one of the main founders and activists of the Society of Lovers of Vilnius and the Vilnius Land. In the years 1989–1998 he was the President of the Society.

4

Trójmorze – czyja inicjatywa?

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Kuk L.

Nowa Polityka Wschodnia

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2021

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vol. 3(30)

50-75

RU

Проект «Триморья» и деятельность Инициативы трех морей, т.е. углубленное сотрудничество 12 государств Центральной Европы ЕС, появились в 2015 г., быстро приобретая значительную популярность в Польше. Инициатива была даже признана флагманским проектом польского правого крыла, сгруппированного вокруг партии Право и справедливость, которая пришла к власти в том же 2015 г. «Триморье» являлось иной формой воплощения идеи так наз. Междуморья, которая присутствует в польской политической традиции по крайней мере c 1918 г. Между тем, проект «Трех морей» был подготовлен осенью 2014 г. в США влиятельным тинк-танком Атлантический совет (Atlantic Council) и включен в комплексный документ, озаглавленный «Завершение Европы. От Северо-Южного коридора до энергетики, транспортировки и Телекоммуникационного союза, завершающие Европу». Однако, реализация его основных положений не будет ограничиваться модернизацией и укреплением инфраструктурных связей между вышеупомянутыми 12 государствами, расположенными в севере-южном поясе - от Эстонии до Хорватии и Болгарии, которые, как планировалось, должны были принять участие в проекте. Это также означало бы укрепление их экономических связей с США, с далеко идущим ослаблением их экономических контактов с Россией, и, главное, их «независимость» в отношениях с сильными государствами «старого Евросоюза» во главе с Германией. Роль посредника в получении поддержки Центрально-европейских стран была предвидена для нового (с февраля 2015 г.) президента Хорватии Колинды Грабар-Китарович - хорошо известной в высших кругах США, НАТО и ЕС. Проект быстро поддержал новый президент Польши Анджей Дуда, который представлял крупнейшуую и проамериканскую страну среди государств Триморья. Эти мероприятия позволили создать «организацию» 29 сентября 2015 г. во время встречи в Нью-Йорке, на которой присутствовали 11 из 12 «лидеров» Центральноевропейских стран и 3 представителя управления Атлантического совета. Инициатива трех морей, которая определяется как «президентская платформа», постоянно расширяет сферы своей деятельности, но все еще рассматривается как относительно слабая структура с неопределенным будущим. Источники ее внутренней слабости - это, во-первых, большие различия в потенциалах, политических позициях и геополитических ориентациях отдельных государствчленов инициативы, а, во-вторых - противоположное влияние внешних факторов. Стремление США, чтоб инициатива обрела «трансатлантический» характер, стали с 2018 г. осторожно противоречить действиям ЕС и немецких властей, направленных на ее «европеизацию», т.е. гармонизацию ее деятельности с позицией ЕС.

EN

The “Three-Seas area” project and the activities of the Three-Seas Initiative, i.e. the deepened cooperation of 12 Central European Member States of the European Union, which appeared in 2015, quickly gained considerable popularity in Poland. It has even been recognized as the flagship project of the Polish right wing grouped around the Law and Justice party, which took power in that same year 2015. In the “Three Seas” was seen another emanation of the idea of the so-called Intermarium, present in Polish political tradition since at least 1918. Meanwhile, the “Three Seas” project was prepared in the autumn of 2014 in the United States by the influential Atlantic Council think tank and included in a comprehensive document entitled “Completing Europe. From the North-South Corridor to Energy, Transportation, and Telecommunications Union Completing Europe”. The implementation of its assumptions would not, however, be limited to the modernization and strengthening of infrastructure connections between the aforementioned 12 states located in the NorthSouth belt from Estonia to Croatia and Bulgaria, which were planned to participate in the project. It would also mean the strengthening of their economic ties with the United States, a far-reaching weakening of their economic ties with Russia, and, most importantly, their “independence” in relation to the strong states of the “former Union” with Germany at the fore. The role of an intermediary in gaining the support of the Central European states was assigned to the new (since February 2015) president of Croatia, Kolinda GrabarKitarović, well known in the decision-making circles of the USA, NATO, and the European Union. It quickly recruited the new Polish president, Andrzej Duda, who represents the largest and most pro-American state of the Three Seas countries. These activities made it possible to establish an “organization” on September 29, 2015, during a meeting in New York, attended by 11/12 “leaders” of Central European states and 3 representatives of the Atlantic Council management. The Three Seas Initiative, defined as the “presidential platform”, is constantly expanding the fields of its activity, but it is still regarded as a relatively weak structure with an uncertain future. The sources of its relative internal weakness include, firstly, large differences in the potentials, political positions, and geopolitical orientations of the individual member states of the Initiative, and secondly - the opposing influence of external factors. The United States’ aspirations to make the Initiative “transatlantic” have been discreetly opposed since 2018 by the actions of the EU and the German authorities directed towards its “Europeanization”, that is, towards the harmonization of its activities with the position of the Union.

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4 Kuk L.

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Między wielkością a małością. Polska wobec koncertowej kakofonii mocarstw na przełomie swych dziejów (1914–1945)

Polska z bliska i z oddali. Przypadek Daniela Beauvois w świetle jego wspomnień

Profesor Sławomir Kalembka (1936–2009)

Trójmorze – czyja inicjatywa?