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1

Czechoslovakia and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956

100%
Janek I.
West Bohemian Historical Review
|
2017
|
vol. 7
|
issue 1
181-213
EN
In 1956, the Czechoslovak authorities successfully suppressed all traces of a potential uprising. It can be stated that peace was not seriously disturbed in both the Czech and the Slovak territories, and no significant movement took place. The Czechoslovak society was not yet prepared for a political turn-over in the 50’s. The cautious change of direction in 1953 and the economic reforms had borne their fruits by 1956, which prevented the spread of the revolution to Czechoslovakia. The pull and let go tactic of the authorities worked. Czechoslovakia pulled through the critical year of 1956 and she got stronger. Slovak Hungarians could choose between their survival as a minority and an uprising in autumn 1956. A sober deliberation excluded all steps leading to a Hungarian revolution. The Slovak Hungarians still had vivid memories of suffering, which they experienced after 1945. Worries of being accused of irredentism were strong and any support of Hungarian revolution was unthinkable.
2
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The Issue o f Hungarian ‑Slovak Diplomatic Connections in the Hungarian Parliament in 1939–1940

100%
Janek I.
Prague Papers on the History of International Relations
|
2014
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issue 2
128-140
EN
This article focus on Slovak‑Hungarian relations. The study aims to draft a more differentiate and precise picture on Hungarian and Slovak revision efforts and the bilateral relations as one may find in any professional literature till now, in particular in non‑Slavic works. The author has used new archive documents and materials. The political climate between Bratislava and Budapest in the first half of 1939 was strongly influenced by mutual territorial claims. Diplomatic relations between Slovakia and Hungary were characterised by three main problems since 1939 and in 1940: the affiliation of the territories in the Upper Hungary and national minorities living there; gaining Germany as an ally at the expense of the other party, and the principle of reciprocity. Ratification of the Slovak State was the most important goal of the Slovak foreign policy in 1939, both within the regional and European context. The Slovak policy also strived to find new and influential allies and believed that Germany and the Soviet Union could play that role. Slovak leaders wanted revision in respect to Hungary and wanted also to reach the revision of the 1st Vienna Award. In July 1939 the Slovak propaganda clearly presented the idea that Slovaks could not accept the borders of their homeland. The speeches in the Hungarian parliament called the attention of the public in both countries to the problems, especially after they published in the press. In practice, they limited the transgressions of officials and police on both sides to some extent. We can say the biggest mistake in the given period was that the governments were not able to rise above the issue of reciprocity and territories, what hindered their possible cooperation against Germans in the future.
3
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The Development of Slovak-Hungarian Relations in 1939–1940 from a Soviet Aspect

100%
Janek I.
Central European Papers
|
2014
|
vol. 2
|
issue 1
53-73
EN
After concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the Soviet Union unexpectedly became an ally of the Slovaks. Slovak political decision-makers evaluated this act as a “historic turnaround”, which then enabled the realization of mutual solidarity between Germany and Russia. Soviet diplomats characterized Slovakia in their reports as a “gate facing the Balkans” and as an “eye” into the Western half of Europe. Slovak politicians saw in their relationship with the Soviet Union the possibility to seek a counterbalance against the German influence that was encumbering the country. Slovakia’s foreign policy was hoping that the Soviet Union as a Slavic brother state would support Slovakia in the Hungarian-Slovak conflict. The rivalry between Hungary and Slovakia, when both states had been attempting to gain Hitler’s favour since 1939, eventually led to their attempting to win points to military domain. Thus, both of the states became ensnared in the war against the Soviet Union, an effort which other satellite states also joined. According to Jozef Tiso, Slovakia needed to enter the war against the Soviet Union because it could thus gain a basis from which to regain her territories that had been annexed to Hungary. The relationship between both states was important from the point of view of the Soviet Union foreign policy because the Soviet Union was thus able to gain information about Germany, or as the case may be, it was able to restrain them from declaring war. In the fall of 1939 full diplomatic relations between Hungary and the Soviet Union were renewed, in which the German-Soviet rapprochement also played a role. Soviet diplomats attempted to keep their government informed in as much detail as possible about the Slovak-Hungarian relationships.
4

The Mediating Activity of János Esterházy between the Governments of Slovakia and Hungary in 1939–1942 with Specific Regard to the Jewish Question

100%
Janek I.
West Bohemian Historical Review
|
2015
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vol. 5
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issue 1
71-99
EN
The purpose of this study is the introduction of the mediation of János Esterházy in the bilateral relations of Slovakia and Hungary mentioning only a few examples due to limitations in length. In the second part of the study, the activity of Esterházy in the Jewish question is discussed; the reasons behind his voting against the Jewish law. János Esterházy considered it his main goal to forge the Hungarian minority in Slovakia together, and he imagined the life of the community in the form of a great family. The person of Esterházy is interpreted in different ways in the Slovak and Hungarian history writing. This study wishes to present these interpretations based on facts and to get them closer to each other.
5
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Hungarian Attempts at the Annexation of Slovakia in 1938 (Part I)

100%
Janek I.
Central European Papers
|
2013
|
vol. 1
|
issue 1
27-40
EN
Hungarian society and the government never approved of the loss of the northern region populated by Hungarians and Slovaks, just as they never accepted the loss of other territories of the former Kingdom of Hungary. They endeavoured to regain those territories during the interbellum years. The annexation of Slovakia was in the focus of Hungarian revisionary thought, cherished by both political and military circles. Hungarian politicians especially resented the loss of Upper Hungary, second only to the loss of Transylvania, because this region had played an essential role in the economy of the Kingdom of Hungary. Hungarian propaganda implied that since Czechoslovakia had no historical traditions as a state, it would be the easiest target to break up in order to regain the lost territories. In their view, Czechoslovakia was an artificial construction which could thank the great powers for its existence, and therefore could be defeated relatively easily in an appropriate moment. After the Anschluss in 1938, the Hungarian diplomacy tried to negotiate a potential incorporation of Slovakia to Hungary based on autonomy with Slovak political representatives. Polish foreign policy representatives acted as mediators in these talks. On the other hand, Josef Tiso and his political mates wanted to achieve that the Polish, German and perhaps the Hungarian leadership support the recognition of the Slovaks as political nation, possibly their autonomy or directly their independence. Also Slovak politicians held secret negotiations with the Hungarians. From the Slovak party, the negotiations with the Hungarians could be regarded simply as tactics, but they rejected it indeed, thus these talks ended without success.
6
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Sovětská diplomacie o vytváření slovensko-maďarských vztahů v letech 1939–1940

100%
Janek I.
Slovanský přehled: historická revue pro dějiny střední, východní a jihovýchodní Evropy (Slavonic Review: Review for Central, Eastern and Southeastern European history)
|
2013
|
vol. 99
|
issue 1-2
79-99
EN
The subject introduced herein is not well known in Slovak and Hungarian historiography, and has been inquired into on the basis of new documents. In their reports from the years 1939–1941 until the very end, Soviet diplomats dealt with Slovak and Hungarian relations, and therefore this material serves as an interesting contribution toward understanding the relations between these two states. Slovakia’s foreign policy was hoping that the Soviet Union as a Slavic brother state would support Slovakia in the Hungarian-Slovak conflict. The rivalry between Hungary and Slovakia, when both states since 1939 were attempting to gain Hitler’s favor, eventually led to them even attempting to win points to military domain. Thus, both of the states became ensnared in the war against the Soviet Union, an effort which other satellite states also joined. According to Jozef Tiso, Slovakia needed to enter the war against the Soviet Union because it could thus gain a basis from which to regain its territories that had been annexed to Hungary. The relationship between both states was from the point of view of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union important because it was able to thus gain information about Germany, or as the case may be, it was able to restrain them from declaring war.
7
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Hungarian Attempts at the Annexation of Slovakia in 1938 (Part II)

100%
Janek I.
Central European Papers
|
2013
|
vol. 1
|
issue 2
51-63
EN
Hungarian society and the government never approved of the loss of the northern region populated by Hungarians and Slovaks, just as they never accepted the loss of other territories of the former Kingdom of Hungary. They endeavoured to regain those territories during the interbellum years. The annexation of Slovakia was in the focus of Hungarian revisionary thought, cherished by both political and military circles. Hungarian politicians especially resented the loss of Upper Hungary, second only to the loss of Transylvania, because this region had played an essential role in the economy of the Kingdom of Hungary. Hungarian propaganda implied that since Czechoslovakia had no historical traditions as a state, it would be the easiest target to break up in order to regain the lost territories. In their view, Czechoslovakia was an artificial construction which could thank the great powers for its existence, and therefore could be defeated relatively easily in an appropriate moment. After the Anschluss in 1938, the Hungarian diplomacy tried to negotiate a potential incorporation of Slovakia to Hungary based on autonomy with Slovak political representatives. Polish foreign policy representatives acted as mediators in these talks. On the other hand, Josef Tiso and his political mates wanted to achieve that the Polish, German and perhaps the Hungarian leadership support the recognition of the Slovaks as political nation, possibly their autonomy or directly their independence. Also Slovak politicians held secret negotiations with the Hungarians. From the Slovak party, the negotiations with the Hungarians could be regarded simply as tactics, but they rejected it indeed, thus these talks ended without success.
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