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1

TUGENDHATOV PROBLÉM „PRAVDY“ V KONFRONTÁCII S HEIDEGGEROM

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 10
790 – 803
EN
The aim of the study is to provide a critical commentary on the position held by E. Tugendhat in his work Egocentricity and Mysticism (published in 2003) in terms of his own criteria of the hermeneutic concept of truth. The article presents this concept of truth in its original negative-critical form, and explores two lines of inquiry in an attempt to explicitly grasp the implicitly understood „world as a whole“ in Wittgenstein's perspective of the impossibility of reflecting the boundaries of the language. The second, parallel theme is an attempt to investigate the „universe“ (understood as a whole) as the basis of his theory of mysticism. The first thesis of this study is that both of these levels, on the one hand the enlightenment worldview and on the other hand the existential concept of mysticism, have to be separated and thematized as a relationship between the condition of a possibility and the conditioned. The second thesis is that as a result of his theory of mysticism Tugendhat introduced the concept of „egocentricity“ in two mutually contradictory meanings. The third is that by his essentialism in the concept of „anthropology“ Tugendhat allowed the return of Heidegger's problem of the historical picture of the world to the place of universal truth, and also the return of the problem of authentic and no authentic existence beyond the sphere of ethics.
2

ERNST TUGENDHAT O HEIDEGGEROVOM PROBLÉME „PRAVDY“

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 8
675 – 688
EN
The paper departs from actual critical reception of Tugendhat’s critique of Heidegger’s notion of truth (Wrathall/Malpas), according to which the failure of Tugendhat consist in his reduction of twofold character of truth (unconcealment / proposition) on the level of propositional stance. The main thesis of the paper is that Tugendhat accepts this basic hermeneutical contribution of Heidegger, but he radically changes the relationship of both levels in the favour of propositional truth. This is possible only due to his analytical interpretation of the principle of non-contradiction – in the Heideggerian area of a relationship of yourself-to-yourself. The loss of critical dimension in the notion of truth as “unconcealment” doesn’t primarily deal with the possibility of propositional truth in Being and Time – also as answer to Tugendhat’s critique, but has to do with the loss of critical responsibility in Heidegger’s concept of consciences. Tugendhat’s critique remains relevant because of hermeneutical situation, in which every “understanding of being” can be uncritically “uncovered” as truth “for itself”.
3

NERIEŠITEĽNÝ PROBLÉM UNIVERZALIZMU V TUGENDHATOVEJ ANTROPOLÓGII

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 10
800 – 812
EN
The article draws on Tugendhat’s idea of the twofold character of truth resulting from the twofold structure of self-conciousness. When asking the question Who is a person?, there is always our implicit self-evidence present. And from Kant on we also ask explicit questions, such as How do we want to understand ourselves? And What is better for us? This articulation of the problem – a product of Enlightenment – involves a rejection of the traditionally shared truth about a person. Therefore, Tugendhat’s project includes the transformation of an implicitly valid universe of meaning into explicitly justified positions. Wittgenstein’s arguing that when thematising the limits of language we cannot transcend these limits is used to show that Tugendhat’s efforts to explicitly articulate the universal structure of understanding of the concept of a human being as a whole does have its implicitly shared cultural determinations, too.
4

O SLOBODE UVIDIEŤ SVET INAK

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 10
869 – 880
EN
Pulp fiction offers two philosophically relevant stories about the radical transformation of a person, which, in accordance with late Kant, could be called „revolutions of the mind“. In both cases we deal with freedom to understand ourselves and our world – in confrontation with irrationality of life lived in fear and violence – differently. From this nihilistic perspective everything works out without words, based on blind loyalty and brutality of violence. While in the first case the calculus of fear is broken by the honour of the warrior which in Nietzschean sense emancipates the person making him/her a winner and a master, in the second case a radical change in understanding one’s self casts doubt on the principle of violence itself and at the same time reveals the fundamental Heideggerian dimension of the power of the others over the sphere of one’s actions which are always his/her own, i.e. its transpersonal anonymity, which is generally accepted as a valid conviction concerning the status quo of the world.
5

K FILOZOFICKO-EKONOMICKÝM VÝCHODISKÁM SOCIÁLNYCH ĽUDSKÝCH PRÁV U KARLA POLANYIHO A ERNSTA TUGENDHATA

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 7
569 – 583
EN
The key theses of the study emphasizes the finiteness of meaning in contrast to economic determinism as a normative starting point of K. Polanyi’s and E. Tugendhat’s vision of democratic society, controlled by its citizens. This egalitarian point of departure of defence of social human rights is at the same time the answer to their common dilemma, hidden in conflicting relationship of primacy of right to own to right to life. Taking into account Tugendhat’s critique of libertarian concept of “free” social contract as the will to power in connection with Polanyi’s unmasking of automaton of libertarian spontaneous equilibrium as political construct and self-destructing illusion, the study shows that the drop out of social rights in this concept is based on the nominalist grasp of reality, in relation to which any form of collective self-determination seems to be the enemy of freedom. The second presupposition of this drop out is to be found in the libertarian idea of the natural order of free market connected with the ideal of negative freedom and trickle down economy, based on the illusion of reality consisting of unlimited resources and the cooperation of already self-sufficient, healthy and adult owners of the sources of subsistence.
6

LIBERALIZMUS, OBČIANSKE PRÁVA A EKONOMICKÁ NESLOBODA (K TUGENDHATOVEJ KONCEPCII ĽUDSKÝCH PRÁV V KONTEXTE ĽUDÍ SO ZDRAVOTNÝM ZNEVÝHODNENÍM)

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 8
593 – 607
EN
The aim of the paper is to explain the normative ambivalent interconnection between civil rights and economic rights based on the example of people with disabilities. The article starts with the reference to two competing ideals of freedom in the human rights agenda, and the two meanings of the lack of freedom: while the libertarian normative ideal of lack of freedom means coercion by man (F. W. Hayek), the egalitarian liberal understanding of lack of freedom is extended to the lack of public capacity to acquire the personal ability to lead autonomous life and to the lack of opportunities to put these abilities into practice. In this case the original meaning of freedom is based on the interpretation of egalitarian dignity as formulated by Kant for the first time. Based on this normative ideal, the study further extends it to Tugendhatʼs concept of practical autonomy as a socially acquired ability and opportunity to lead an independent life, in the contrast to the one-sided dependency on impersonal, structurally given conditions of life. What practical autonomy in the case of disabled persons demonstrates is the connection between practical autonomy, human dignity and equal rights, which implies redistribution of public resources for help to self-help. This redistribution does not seem to be in conflict with the rest of human rights, with the serious exception of the right of property. The fate of the human rights agenda, democracy generally, depends on the resolvability of the fundamental conflict between the right of property and the right to live in dignity.
7

EXISTUJE ABSOLÚTNA POVINNOSŤ VOČI ETIKE? (PROBLÉM SLOBODY V KANTOVSKEJ TRADÍCII)

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2008
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vol. 63
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issue 7
562-572
EN
The aim of the study is to analyze two basic stories of human freedom, that of Kant and that of Kierkegaard. In its first part the author tries to uncover the basic motives of both philosophical stories using the film 'Minority report' as the background of his discussion. While according to Kant ethics is the basic manner of true self-understanding, Kierkegaard on the other hand suggests to suspend ethics in order to achieve authentic identity of the Self. Does a universal commitment to oneself exist at all, or is this commitment the basic problem in the search for an authentic freedom?
8

KONIEC SUBJEKTU? OTÁZKY A OTÁZNIKY VO FENOMENOLOGICKEJ KONCEPCII MORÁLNEJ ZRELOSTI HUBERTA L. DREYFUSA

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 9
714-725
EN
The aim of the paper is to analyze Dreyfus' phenomenological conception of moral maturity in a critical relation to the Kantian tradition of the ethics. A special attention is paid to the refutation of the Cartesian subject and a radical elimination of the subject-object relationship. These two points make the starting point of Dreyfus' philosophical reflection on the ideal of moral behavior, as well as on its implications for the ethics of the everyday life. The main objective of the paper is to show the problem of the freedom and choice as a crucial challenge of the Dreyfus primordial understanding of the ethical ways of the being.
9

NA CESTE K VECIAM SAMÝM (K HEIDEGGEROVEJ INTERPRETÁCII HUSSERLOVEJ FENOMENOLÓGIE )

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Muránsky M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 1
12-26
EN
Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's 'Logical investigations' as presented in his lectures 'History of the concept of time: Prolegomena' (1925) was a remarkable contribution to the development of phenomenology: First, Heidegger starts with the interpretation of intentionality and his considerations become thus methodologically transparent (contrary to the language of 'Being and time', in which the term is missing). Second, Heidegger managed to answer the question: Why is Husserl's phenomenology the philosophically decisive alternative when compared to the domination of reflexive consciousness and logical judgment in modern philosophy? It is because concepts are not the representations of things any more; as the 'states of things' they are explicit expressions ('parts') of an implicitly given meaning ('whole'). Third, Heidegger's interpretation includes the fundamental question of being in its three meanings (copula, the sentence about existence, the sentence about identity), due to which the status of the explanation of 'reality' (which is more than the 'reality' of single things) changes as well.
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