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1

Metafizyka jako ancilla scientiae (Nauki przyrodnicze: metafizyka – wiara)

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Maryniarczyk A.
Rocznik Teologii Katolickiej
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2012
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vol. 11
57-74
EN
The author attempts to answer three questions: 1) What is metaphysics, with its intention to become the i rst among sciences, also among natural ones; 2) Is there any necessary relations/connection between metaphysics, natural science and theology (which partly means also relations between faith and reason); 3) In what way metaphysics can be used in natural sciences (also in theology) and how do these sciences benei t from it? In reply to the i rst is- sue, the author has stressed that metaphysics is an interpretation of persons, animals, plants and other things. A relationship between metaphysics and natural sciences, which is the problem discussed in the second part of the article, is necessary when a naturalist (and also a theologian) uses the results of his research to built a certain world view. Discussing the third question, the author shows that metaphysics, natural sciences and theology could cooper-ate in constructing an integral image of the world and man, form an adequate terminology to name particular problems, making people aware of the limits of research methods and teaching a principle of freedom in doing research in order to defend science from being ideology-oriented.
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O bałamutnej i nierzetelnej recenzji „O dobru”

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Maryniarczyk A.
Diametros
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2004
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issue 2
222-228
PL
Poniższy tekst jest pełną i niezmienioną odpowiedzią ks. prof. Andrzeja Maryniarczyka na recenzję Mateusza Penczeka: O dobru – dysputy nieco bezładne, która ukazała się w pierwszym numerze ICF Diametros.
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On the Origins of the Word “Substance”

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Maryniarczyk A.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2017
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vol. 8
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issue 1
371-378
EN
The present article discusses the emergence of the term “substance” (ousia). It is shown that while the word obviously has its roots in Greek language and tradition, it presupposes a much broader context. Thus, to comprehend the full meaning of the term one must take into account the whole philosophical tradition in which it occurs and the whole of reality to which it refers. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that from the very beginning ousia (substantia) was linked to that which exists actually and constitutes the internal principle (essence) of being. This causal nature of the substance is frequently overlooked and the sense of the word is very often reduced to an eternal and immutable substrate (i.e., something static and unchanging).
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U źródeł narodzin nowożytnych ontologii

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Maryniarczyk A.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
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2011
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vol. 47
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issue 1
37-50
PL
Ontologia nowożytna, jako oddzielna dyscyplina filozoficzna (obok metafizyki, a właściwie w jej miejsce), powstała na bazie późnej scholastyki i kartezjańskiego racjonalizmu. Pojawienie się nowej nazwy, która początkowo traktowana była jako synonim nazwy metafizyki, nie było zabiegiem czysto werbalnym. Wraz ze zmianą nazwy dokonuje się zmiana przedmiotu, metody i celu poznania metafizycznego. Artykuł pokazuje proces podmiany przedmiotu metafizyki, którym był realnie istniejący byt na pojęcie obiektywne, które jest jego reprezentacją oraz na istotę wewnętrznie niesprzeczną. Przedstawiony został również proces wyrugowania nazwy „metafizyka” i zastąpienia jej nazwą „ontologia” oraz przeniesienia problematyki metafizycznej na płaszczyznę fizyki.
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Mały błąd na początku wielkim jest na końcu. Tomaszowa reinterpretacja rozumienia bytu i istoty podstawą odkrycia Pierwszej Przyczyny jako Ipsum Esse

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Maryniarczyk A.
Rocznik Tomistyczny
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2021
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vol. 10
57-77
EN
In this article, the author notes that Thomas Aquinas, in his brief work entitled De Ente et Essentia, proved that at the base of understanding the world, the human being, and God in particular, there is our understanding of being and its essence. When we make a small mistake at the beginning (parvus error in principio) in our understanding of being and its essence, it will turn to be a big one in the end (magnus in fine). And what is “at the end” of our knowledge is the discovery of the First and Ultimate Cause of all things, known as: Ipsum Esse, God, the Absolute, The Most Perfect Substance, on whom everything depends, and who depends not on anything else. These present inquiries about the proper understanding of being and its essence are aimed at formulating proof of the necessity of existence of a Being that is the First Cause, and which, existing as Ipsum Esse, is the source and reason of existence of all beings. Without these inquiries, the proof itself would be incomprehensible, and more importantly it would be a purely a priori one (i.e., ontological). Furthermore, without the existential conception of being, which Thomas first formulated, one could not discover the First Cause which, as Ipsum Esse, is the source of the existence of every being. This issue seems to have escaped the attention of the author of the book Aquinas’s Way to God. The Proof in “De Ente et Essentia”.
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Analogiczna teoria znaczenia terminów językowych. Elementy metafizyki języka

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Maryniarczyk A.
Roczniki Humanistyczne
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2015
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vol. 63
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issue 8: Lingwistyka Korpusowa i Translatoryka
21-36
EN
In realist philosophy, analogy is a basic way of knowing the wealth of the world of persons and things as well as protects human knowledge against reductionism. Analogical knowledge is grounded on the analogical way beings exist, that is, is genetically and structurally combined with things. Analogy allows to cognitively encompass both particular things and the whole of the world of nature and culture, while saving the plurality of beings composing it. A theory of the meaning of linguistic terms, built on analogy, yields a basis for apprehending the deepest structure of a thing in the meaning of a given name, since it points to the necessary internal organization of the content of a denoted thing, which decides for the name that it properly and adequately understands a denoted thing.
PL
Analogia na terenie filozofii realistycznej jest podstawowym sposobem poznania bogactwa świata osób i rzeczy i chroni ludzkie poznanie przed redukcjonizmem. Poznanie analogiczne jest ugruntowane na analogicznym sposobie istnienia bytów, a zatem jest genetycznie i strukturalnie związane z rzeczą. Analogia pozwala ogarnąć poznawczo tak poszczególne jednostkowe rzeczy, jak i całość oraz złożoność świata natury i kultury, nie tracąc równocześnie z pola widzenia zróżnicowania istniejących w nim bytów. Nabudowana na analogii teoria znaczenia terminów językowych daje podstawę ujęcia w znaczeniu danej nazwy najgłębszej struktury rzeczy, gdyż wskazuje na koniecznościowy układ treści znaczonej rzeczy, a co stanowi o właściwym i adekwatnym rozumieniu oznaczanej przez nazwę rzeczy.
FR
En philosophie réaliste, l’analogie est un mode basique de connaissance de la richesse du monde des personnes et des choses. Elle protège la connaissance humaine contre le réductionnisme. La connaissance analogique est enracinée dans le mode analogique de l’existence des êtres. Elle est donc liée aux choses de manière génétique et structurelle. L’analogie permet de réunir cognitivement aussi bien les choses particulières que la totalité et la complexité du monde de la nature et de la culture, tout en préservant la pluralité des êtres qui la composent. La théorie du sens des termes linguistiques, bâtie sur l’analogie, constitue le fondement de la conception de la structure la plus profonde de la chose du sens d’une dénomination, puisqu’elle montre une disposition nécessaire du contenu de la chose dénotée, ce qui est capital pour sa compréhension appropriée.
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Metaphysical Creationism and the Paradoxes of Evolutionary Theism: A Contribution to the Discussion within Contemporary Thomism

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Maryniarczyk A.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2020
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vol. 68
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issue 4
169-198
EN
In this article I argue that metaphysical creationism that we encounter in the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, as opposed to American creationism and theological and biblical creationism, is a theory that stems from a purely philosophical explanation of the beginnings of the world and man. It is not, therefore, a biblical idea transferred to philosophy. Like the theism of the Aristotelian metaphysics, the theism of Aquinas’s metaphysics is not a religious (theological) theism, but a purely philosophical (metaphysical) theism, because it stems from a metaphysical explanation of reality. Metaphysical creationism is the ultimate explanation of the source of the existence of beings that are given to us in experience as both unnecessary in their own existence and changeable. American creationism, on the other hand, is a biological-cosmological interpretation of the biblical truth concerning the creation of the world within a certain time frame (the 7-day paradigm) and-at its starting point-refers to the data of Revelation, which it wants to confirm scientifically. This article is divided into two parts. The first part presents the key elements of the metaphysical theory of ex nihilo creation and the understanding thereof. In the second part, the elements of evolutionary theism are recalled which, from the point of view of metaphysical creationism, are the source of various paradoxes and, at times, even absurdities, and thus demand reconsideration.
PL
Metafizyczny kreacjonizm a paradoksy teizmu ewolucyjnego: przyczynek do dyskusji w ramach współczesnego tomizmu Autor artykułu dowodzi, że metafizyczny kreacjonizm, z którym spotykamy się w filozofii św. Tomasza z Akwinu, w odróżnieniu od kreacjonizmu amerykańskiego oraz teologiczno-‑biblijnego, jest teorią, która wyrasta z czysto filozoficznego wyjaśnianie początków świata i człowieka. Nie jest zatem ideą biblijną przeniesioną na teren filozofii. Podobnie jak teizm metafizyki Arystotelesa, a także teizm metafizyki św. Tomasza z Akwinu nie jest teizmem religijnym (teologicznym), lecz teizmem czysto filozoficznym (metafizycznym), gdyż wyrasta z metafizycznego wyjaśniania rzeczywistości. Kreacjonizm metafizyczny jest ostatecznym wyjaśnieniem źródła istnienia bytów, które dane są nam w doświadczeniu, jako niekonieczne w istnieniu i zmienne. Natomiast kreacjonizm amerykański, jest interpretacja biologiczno-kosmologiczną biblijnej prawdy o stworzeniu świata w określonym przedziale czasowym (paradygmat 7 dni) i w punkcie wyjścia odwołuje się do danych Objawienia, które chce naukowo potwierdzić Artykuł został podzielony na dwie części. W części pierwszej zostały przedstawione węzłowe elementy metafizycznej teorii stworzenia ex nihilo i jej rozumienie. W drugiej zaś części artykułu zostały przywołane elementy teizmu ewolucyjnego, które z punktu metafizycznego kreacjonizmu są źródłem różnych paradoksów, a niekiedy i absurdów oraz domagają się ponownego przemyślenia.
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From Standardization to Abstractionalization of Language: Problems Arising in Translating Realistic Metaphysics Texts

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Maryniarczyk A.
Roczniki Humanistyczne
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2020
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vol. 68
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issue 8
47-58
FR
Dans le processus de traduction des textes philosophiques, en particulier ceux concernant la métaphysique réaliste, en d’autres langues, apparaît une complication, qui finalement détermine le sens des mots et des phrases entières. Nous nous trouvons devant une triade concernant différents problèmes, à savoir : la standardisation du vocabulaire, l’abstractionnalisation des termes et la parcellarisation des fonctions du langage. La normalisation du langage se manifeste par le fait qu'au lieu de synonymes riches et diversifiés, apparaît un seul terme, avec lequel on veut exprimer divers processus et actions. A son tour, l’abstractionnalisation du langage consiste à fixer notre attention cognitive par le langage sur les termes et sur les concepts, et nous oriente à les analyser. Par contre, la parcellarisation des fonctions langagières revient à rompre l'unité de sa triple fonction (sémantique, syntaxique et pragmatique) et à se focaliser sur une seule d’entre elles: soit sémantique (concernant le sens), soit syntaxique (concernant la structure), soit pragmatique (concernant l’utilité). La triade entière est directement liée à la traduction du texte métaphysique original en langues étrangères, et les problèmes qui en résultent ont été discutés dans l'article ci-dessus. Bien entendu, ce sont des tendances linguistiques générales que nous rencontrons dans divers domaines. Cependant, dans le domaine des traductions du langage de la philosophie réaliste – c’est-à-dire de la métaphysique, qui a pour objet les choses réelles – le langage devrait guider la «vision» cognitive de ces choses réellement existantes.
EN
In the process of translation of philosophical texts, especially those concerning realistic metaphysics, a complication arises, which ultimately determines the meaning of words and whole sentences. This gives rise to the problem-related triad, namely: standardization of vocabulary, abstractionalization of terms, and fragmentation of the functions of language. Standardization of language manifests itself in the fact that, instead of rich and diverse synonyms a single term appears, with which diverse processes and actions are named. Abstractionalization of language, in turn, is that language arrests our cognitive attention at terms and concepts, and compels us to analyze them. Fragmentation of the language functions consists in the breaking up of their threefold unity: semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic, and focusing instead on a single one of them: either semantic (concerning sense), or syntactic (concerning structure), or pragmatic (concerning usefulness). This triad is directly linked to the processes of translation of original metaphysical texts into foreign languages, and the resulting issues are discussed in this article. Of course, this triad represents current language trends encountered in various areas. However, in the field of translating the language of realistic philosophy, i.e. metaphysics that has real things as its object, the cognitive “seeing” of that object should be guided by language.
PL
Od standaryzacji do abstrakcjonalizacji języka: problemy językowe przy przekładach tekstów metafizyki realistycznej W ramach przekładów tekstów filozoficznych, a szczególnie tych z metafizyki realistycznej, na inne języki, pojawia się komplikacja, która w ostateczności rozstrzyga o znaczeniu słów, jak i o sensie całych zdań. Pojawia się triada, która nazwiemy problemową, a mianowicie: standaryzacja słownika, abstrakcjonalizacja terminów oraz parcelaryzacja funkcji języka. Standaryzacja języka przejawia się w tym, że w miejsce bogatych i różnorodnych synonimów pojawia się jeden termin, którym chce się oddać różnorodność procesów czy działań. Abstrakcjonalizacja języka z kolei polega na tym, że język zatrzymuje naszą uwagę poznawczą na terminach i pojęciach i nakierowuje nas na analizę tych terminów czy pojęć. Natomiast parcelaryzacja funkcji języka sprowadza się do rozbicia jedności jego potrójnej funkcji: semantycznej, syntaktycznej i pragmatycznej oraz koncentrowaniu się na jednej z nich: albo tylko semantycznej (znaczeniowej), albo tylko syntaktycznej (składniowej), albo tylko pragmatycznej (użytecznościowej). Cała ta triada jest związana bezpośrednio z przekładami oryginalnego tekstu metafizycznego na języki obce, a problemy z tego wynikające zostały omówione w powyższym artykule. Oczywiście są to ogólne tendencje językowe, z którymi spotykamy się w rożnych dziedzinach. W dziedzinie jednak przekładów języka filozofii realistycznej – czyli metafizyki, która ma za przedmiot rzeczy realne – na „widzenie” poznawcze tychże realnie istniejących rzeczy powinien naprowadzać język. De la normalisation à l’abstractionnalisation de la langue: problèmes survenant dans la traduction de textes de métaphysique réaliste Dans le processus de traduction des textes philosophiques, en particulier ceux concernant la métaphysique réaliste, en d’autres langues, apparaît une complication, qui finalement détermine le sens des mots et des phrases entières. Nous nous trouvons devant une triade concernant différents problèmes, à savoir : la standardisation du vocabulaire, l’abstractionnalisation des termes et la parcellarisation des fonctions du langage. La normalisation du langage se manifeste par le fait qu'au lieu de synonymes riches et diversifiés, apparaît un seul terme, avec lequel on veut exprimer divers processus et actions. A son tour, l’abstractionnalisation du langage consiste à fixer notre attention cognitive par le langage sur les termes et sur les concepts, et nous oriente à les analyser. Par contre, la parcellarisation des fonctions langagières revient à rompre l'unité de sa triple fonction (sémantique, syntaxique et pragmatique) et à se focaliser sur une seule d’entre elles: soit sémantique (concernant le sens), soit syntaxique (concernant la structure), soit pragmatique (concernant l’utilité). La triade entière est directement liée à la traduction du texte métaphysique original en langues étrangères, et les problèmes qui en résultent ont été discutés dans l'article ci-dessus. Bien entendu, ce sont des tendances linguistiques générales que nous rencontrons dans divers domaines. Cependant, dans le domaine des traductions du langage de la philosophie réaliste – c’est-à-dire de la métaphysique, qui a pour objet les choses réelles – le langage devrait guider la «vision» cognitive de ces choses réellement existantes.
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Philosophical Creationism: Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Creatio ex Nihilo

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Maryniarczyk A.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2016
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vol. 5
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issue 1
217-268
EN
All philosophers, beginning with the pre-Socratics, through Plato and Aristotle, and up to Thomas Aquinas, accepted as a certain that the world as a whole existed eternally. The foundation for the eternity of the world was the indestructible and eternal primal building material of the world, a material that existed in the form of primordial material elements (the Ionians), in the form of ideas (Plato), or in the form of matter, eternal motion, and the first heavens (Aristotle). The article outlines the main structure of the philosophical theory of creation ex nihilo developed by St. Thomas Aquinas and indebted to his metaphysical thought. It shows the wisdom-based and ratiocinative foundation of the rational cognition of reality—reality that comes from the personal creative act of God. It concludes that the perception that the beings called to existence by the personal act of God the Creator are intelligible is the ultimate rational justification for the fact that our human cognition, love, and spiritual creativity are rational.
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BONUM SEQUITUR ESSE

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Maryniarczyk A.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2014
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vol. 3
335-345
EN
The article discusses the connection of the good with being along three steps. First, it briefly considers the history of the word “good” to see what is hidden behind it and to what one should direct his or her thoughts and searches. Second, it looks at the beginning of inquiries on the nature and sources of the good. Three, it analyzes the originality of one of the most interesting solutions in this controversy surrounding the good, which appeared in the thirteenth century and which was contained in the short sentence, “bonum sequitur esse rei”—the good is a consequence of the existence of a thing.
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The Discovery of the Existence of the Absolute in Existential Metaphysics

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Maryniarczyk A.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2016
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vol. 5
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issue 4
649-672
EN
The article shows the way in which the discovery of the existence of the Absolute is made in existential metaphysics. This existential metaphysics provides us with knowledge about reality. It shows the content of the experience of being, the content given to us in the transcendentals. It also unveils the foundation of the rational order, which is given to us in the discovery of the first principles of the existence of being and of cognition. Metaphysics provides us also with knowledge concerning the structure of being. It shows us being as composite and plural; being which is “insufficient” in its structure and calls for an explanation. That being—that is problematized in existence, given to us in experience, and incompletely intelligible in itself—lifts us toward its ultimate “complement” and understanding, to the Absolute.
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On the Transcendental Properties of Real Beings

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Maryniarczyk A., McDonald H.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2016
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vol. 5
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issue 2
429-444
EN
The article analyzes the metaphysical approach to the rational cognition of the world of persons and things. It shows the way in which metaphysicians reveal the essential and universal properties of the world and the laws that govern their being. Among these properties, the most important are as follows: to be a thing (that is, to have a concretely determined essence), to be one (that is, to be non-contradictory in itself), to be separate or distinct (that is, to be sovereign in being), and also to be a vehicle of truth, good, and beauty. Among the laws of being, in turn, the article indicates the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, the law of the reason of being, the law of finality, and the law of perfection. These laws primarily show the source and foundation of the rational order.
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Compositions of Being: Metaphysical and Non-Metaphysical Ways of Understanding and Discerning Them

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Maryniarczyk A.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2017
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vol. 6
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issue 2
269-286
EN
This article discusses different ways of understanding compositions of being, and different methods for discerning them. It considers non-metaphysical (physical, scientistic, phenomenological, abstractionist) interpretations in order to decide whether metaphysics can use them to discover and gain knowledge of the elements that determine the deepest structure of beings, and which set their mode of being. The paper also shows how much the metaphysical method for discerning the compositions of being is different from non-metaphysical methods.
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Participation: A Descending Road of the Metaphysical Cognition of Being

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Maryniarczyk A.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2016
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vol. 5
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issue 4
673-688
EN
When we see in the world the fact that there are many beings, and we indicate that the particular beings exist in a compositional way, we face the task of learning about a new problem: how can we define and determine the relations between beings and between the elements within a being? Although the theory of participation has roots that go back to Plato, and so to a philosophy in which the pluralism of being was rejected and which accepted an identity-based conception of being, participation finds its ontological rational justification only (and ultimately) in the pluralistic and compositional conception of being. With the description of participation as a “descending road” in the cognition of being, we are restricting ourselves to the presentation of how participation is understood in realistic metaphysics (while we shall leave aside the history of the question). We will show the aspects of participation that provide a foundation for wisdom-oriented cognition, and we will show the specific character of participation-oriented cognition as a “descending road.”
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The Lublin Philosophical School: Achievements, Identity and Prospects

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Krąpiec M. A., Maryniarczyk A., McDonald H.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2015
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vol. 4
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issue 4
423-441
EN
The article is concentrated on the Lublin Philosophical School which came into being in the institutional framework of the Department of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland; it describes its achievements, which took place at different stages of the School’s development, as well as the School’s new initiatives and challenges. The development of the School was connected with the involvement of new people and successive generations of new students who joined in the cultivation of realistic philosophy. One can regard the years 1950–1966 as the first stage of the School’s development, in which the School’s program was formulated. The following stages are the years 1967–1980, and 1981–2004, and the years that follow, in which new generations of students who take up inquiries in the spirit of the School’s program arrive. The article also explains the reasons why today the Lublin Philosophical School cannot be identified with the Department of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin, but rather with a special style of cultivating philosophy.
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Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School

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Krąpiec M. A., Maryniarczyk A., McDonald H.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2016
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vol. 5
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issue 2
391-427
EN
The article is aimed at presenting the way in which metaphysics is understood and cultivated in the Lublin Philosophical School, Poland. It includes such topics as: the definition of metaphysics, metaphysical cognition (its object and the method for singling it out), ways of metaphysical demonstration and rational justification, and the relation of metaphysics to other domains of philosophy. In the light of the information delivered, it can be concluded that metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School is understood as a way of knowing in which the reason employs the universal laws of being and thought and strives to discover the first and singular factors or causes that render free of contradiction that which exists and which is given to us in a germinal way in the empirical intuition of the material world.
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The Lublin Philosophical School: Founders, Motives, Characteristics

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Krąpiec M. A., Maryniarczyk A., McDonald H.
Studia Gilsoniana
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2015
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vol. 4
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issue 4
405-422
EN
The article is focused on the Lublin Philosophical School; it explains its name, presents its founders, reveals the causes of its rise, and introduce the specific character of the School’s philosophy. It starts with stating the fact that in the proper sense, the term “Lublin Philosophical School” describes a way of cultivating realistic (classical) philosophy developed in the 1950s by a group of philosophers at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. The Lublin Philosophical School is characterized by cognitive realism (the object of cognition is really existing being), maximalism (taking up all existentially important questions), methodological autonomy (in relation to the natural-mathematical sciences and theology), transcendentalism in its assertions (its assertions refer to all reality), methodological-epistemological unity (the same method applied in objectively cultivated philosophical disciplines), coherence (which guarantees the objective unity of the object), and objectivity (achieved by the verifiability of assertions on their own terms, which is achieved by relating them in each instance to objective evidence). The term is the name of the Polish school of realistic (classical) philosophy that arose as a response to the Marxism that was imposed administratively on Polish institutions of learning, and also as a response to other philosophical currents dominant at the time such as phenomenology, existentialism, and logical positivism.
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