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On the Demonstrative Use of Expressions

100%

Ciecierski T.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

2005

vol. 14

issue 1(53)

153-173

Clear understanding of the demonstrative use of expressions, the author argues, is a complicated philosophical task. We have to decide whether relevant contextual factors that determine semantic values of demonstratively used expressions are: (i) speaker's intentions; (ii) speaker's pointings; (ii) teller-hearer attention. Arguments supporting (ii) are given - e.g. the author thinks that there are mistakes in arguments favouring intentions over pointings and that the careful analysis of the notion of intending shows that typical causes of pointings are treated as having property of influencing semantic values of expressions. However, since this last feature can be properly predicated of pointings themselves, proponent of (i) confuses intentions with effects of expressing them.

Why the Modal Logician Need Not Worry About the Slingshot Argument Any More

63%

Ciecierski T., Wilkin P.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

2008

vol. 17

issue 4(68)

303-318

The authors address various versions of the so-called slingshot argument, which Quine uses in his various attacks on modal logic. They sketch out various formulations of the argument and explain different interpretations of them. Then they show that none of the interpretations is logically sound - each of them tacitly assumes some premise regarding identity or equivalence that is unacceptable. Subsequently they provide some insights into the motivations that might have led Quine to present repeatedly a fallacious argument, and they surmise that the rejection of the slingshot arguments would require a revision of Quinean holism.

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2 Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

1 2008

1 2005

2 Ciecierski T.

1 Wilkin P.

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On the Demonstrative Use of Expressions

Why the Modal Logician Need Not Worry About the Slingshot Argument Any More