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PL
The subject matter of this document is the formation of the concept of supplementary penalties in the criminal law in the period of the Second Polish Republic. The article presents the birth of the concept of supplementary penalties in Polish criminal law science, which was formed in the early 20th century against a background of criticism regarding the institution of legal consequences of conviction and efforts to grant judges more discretion with regard to sentencing. The article contains a broad presentation of the views on criminal law doctrine concerning the need to break-away from the automatic consequences of conviction and to introduce supplementary penalties. The article also presents discussion on the final model of supplementary penalties that took place during the works of the Codification Committee and describes the normative form of supplementary penalties in the Penal Code of 1932. It was concluded that the replacement of legal consequences of conviction with supplementary penalties was an expression of the idea of progress in Polish criminal law.
EN
The subject matter of the article is the penal policy of courts of law implemented in 2005 and 2010, and in the years 2014–2015, presented based on court statistics. The principal objective of the discussion is to find the answer to the question of whether the penal code reform implementedby the Act of 20 February 2015, which became effective on 1 July 2015, brought about the expected changes in the jurisprudence. The preliminary results of the research demonstrated that the penal code reform did to an extent result in the expected changes in the penal policy, because, after its implementation, the extent to which the penalty of imprisonment with conditional suspension of its enforcement was imposed decreased, and the importance of the penalty of restriction of liberty increased. Also, the importance of the so-called mixed penalties increased. However, contrary to the expectations, the importance of unconditional imprisonment did not decrease and, instead, its share increased from 12.1% in 2014 to 14.4% in 2015.
Ius Novum
|
2020
|
vol. 14
|
issue 2
38-54
PL
Artykuł podejmuje problemy rozległych zmian przepisów kodeksu karnego w ujęciu ustawy z 13 czerwca 2019 r. Przedmiotem rozważań uczyniono najważniejsze rozwiązania wprowadzone w części ogólnej kodeksu karnego w obrębie kar i instytucji wymiaru kary. Dotyczyły one: wyeliminowania kary 25 lat pozbawienia wolności z katalogu kar; wydłużenia z 15 lat do 30 lat górnej granicy terminowej kary pozbawienia wolności; podwyższenia dolnej granicy grzywny oraz kary ograniczenia wolności; modyfikacji treści art. 37a k.k. dopuszczającego możliwość orzeczenia grzywny lub kary ograniczenia wolności zamiast kary pozbawienia wolności; ogólnych dyrektyw sądowego wymiaru kary oraz katalogu okoliczności obciążających oraz łagodzących; orzeczenia kary dożywotniego pozbawienia wolności bez możliwości warunkowego zwolnienia skazanego. Przeprowadzona analiza doprowadziła do konkluzji, że przestawione rozwiązania nie zasługują na aprobatę.
EN
The article discusses the issues concerning extensive amendments to the provisions of the Criminal Code laid down in the Act of 13 June 2019. It considers the most important solutions introduced to the General part of the Criminal Code in the field of penalties and sentencing. These concern: elimination of the penalty of deprivation of liberty for 25 years from the catalogue of penalties; increasing the maximum limit of the penalty of deprivation of liberty for a period determined by court from 15 years to 30 years; modification of the content of Article 37a CC admitting a possibility of imposing a fine or the penalty of limitation of liberty instead of the penalty of deprivation of liberty; general directives on judicial sentencing decisions and the catalogue of aggravating and extenuating circumstances; and imposition of the penalty of life imprisonment without a possibility of conditional release. The analysis carried out leads to a conclusion that the proposed solutions do not deserve approval.
Ius Novum
|
2021
|
vol. 15
|
issue 1
5-28
EN
The article discusses the issue of the revival of short-term deprivation of liberty in the Polish criminal law and justice system practice, the penalty, which was extensively applied in the interwar period. at the beginning of the paper the author presents widespread criticism of short-term penalties in the doctrine of the interwar period. at the same time she notices the approval of short-term penalties by the authors of the 1932 Criminal Code and an extensive scope of the imposition of the penalty of short-term deprivation of liberty. analysing the legal state and practice in the People’s republic of Poland, she presents the standpoint of the jurisprudence on the issue of short-term imprisonment, which challenged the role of this penalty as an adequate means of combating crime. the article also indicates scientists’ positive opinions about advantageous features of the penalty of short-term deprivation of liberty and its preventive function. Particular attention is drawn to the perception of a short-term penalty as an alternative to a long-term one and not an alternative to non-custodial penalties. the article also indicates the criticism of short-term imprisonment worldwide. Further comments characterise the idea of crime stratification and criminal liability polarisation that was laid down in the regulations of the 1969 Criminal Code, which raised the minimum length of a short-term penalty from one week to three months. it is established that in practice the idea of applying the penalty of short-term deprivation of liberty was implemented in the 1960s and after the introduction of the 1969 Criminal Code it was only strengthened. the analysis of the 1970s highlights the criticism of the penalty of deprivation of liberty in world jurisprudence and the collapse of the social rehabilitation model of that penalty execution. attention is drawn to the change in the standpoint of the doctrine on the issue of short-term imprisonment and acknowledgement that such penalties are less harmful than long-term penalties and may be useful for the purpose of the so-called shock therapy. Further deliberations focus on the presentation of the lawmaker’s stand and legal solutions of the 1997 Criminal Code, the establishment of the one-month minimum length of imprisonment and the adoption of regulations extensively promoting non-custodial penalties and measures. at the same time, the author presents the standpoint of the contemporary jurisprudence, which approves of the decrease in the minimum length of the penalty of deprivation of liberty and sees the need to return to the one-week imprisonment penalty as laid down in the 1932 Criminal Code. there is also an analysis of the practice of applying short-term imprisonment penalties in the period when the new Criminal Code came into force, which made it possible to establish that the actual return to short-term imprisonment penalties was accompanied by considerable decrease in one-year or two-year penalties in particular. it is also highlighted that the observed revival of the penalty of short-term deprivation of liberty and the abandonment of the opinion that such penalties are completely useless have demonstrated themselves in a new institution in the form of a mixed penalty combining the penalty of short-term deprivation of liberty and the penalty of limitation of liberty, which constitutes a form of legal response mainly to the so-called medium-weight crime and makes it possible to limit the scope of application of long-term imprisonment penalties. the article presents positive assessment of the revival of the penalty of short-term deprivation of liberty in the legislation and justice system practice.
PL
Artykuł podejmuje problematykę powrotu we współczesnym prawie karnym i w praktyce wymiaru sprawiedliwości krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności, która w szerokim zakresie była stosowana w okresie międzywojennym. autorka rozpoczyna rozważania od przedstawienia szerokiej krytyki kar krótkich w doktrynie okresu międzywojennego. Jednocześnie odnotowuje akceptację kar krótkich przez twórców k.k. z 1932 r. oraz szeroki zakres orzekania krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności. analizując stan prawny i praktykę okresu Polski ludowej, przedstawia stanowisko doktryny w przedmiocie krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności, która zakwestionowała rolę tego rodzaju kary jako odpowiedniego środka walki z przestępczością. w artykule wskazano również na pojawiające się głosy przed-stawicieli nauki na temat dodatnich cech krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności i funkcji zapobiegawczej takiej kary. w szczególności zwrócono uwagę na postrzeganie kary krótkiej jako alternatywy kary dłużej trwającej, a nie alternatywy kar wolnościowych. wskazano na krytykę krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności na forum międzynarodowym. Dalsze uwagi charakteryzują ideę rozwarstwienia przestępczości i polaryzacji odpowiedzialności karnej, która została ugruntowana w nowych uregulowaniach k.k. z 1969 r., a który podwyższył dolną granicę kary krótkoterminowej z 1 tygodnia do 3 miesięcy. Ustalono, że w praktyce idea ograniczenia stosowania krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności została zrealizowana już w latach sześćdziesiątych, a po wejściu w życie k.k. z 1969 r. była pogłębiana. analizując lata siedemdziesiąte XX w., wskazano na krytykę kary pozbawienia wolności w światowej nauce prawa karnego i załamanie resocjalizacyjnego modelu wykonywania kary pozbawienia wolności. zwrócono uwagę na zmianę stanowiska nauki w kwestii krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności i uznanie, że takie kary są mniej szkodliwe niż kary dłuższe i mogą być przydatne dla celów tzw. terapii szokowej. Przedmiotem dalszych rozważań uczyniono prezentację stanowiska ustawodawcy i rozwiązań prawnych w świetle k.k. z 1997 r., wyznaczenie dolnej granicy kary pozbawienia wolności na okres 1 miesiąca i przyjęcie uregulowań promujących w szerokim zakresie kary i środki wolnościowe. równocześnie przedstawiono stanowisko współczesnej doktryny prawa karnego, która akceptując obniżenie dolnej granicy kary pozbawienia wolności, widzi niekiedy potrzebę powrotu do dolnej granicy kary pozbawienia wolności w wymiarze 1 tygodnia, jak stanowił k.k. z 1932 r. analizie poddano także praktykę stosowania krótkoterminowych kar pozbawienia wolności w okresie obowiązywania nowego kodeksu karnego, która pozwoliła stwierdzić, że nastąpił powrót do krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności przy istotnym zmniejszeniu zwłaszcza kar w wymiarze 1 roku do 2 lat. zwrócono też uwagę, że odnotowany renesans krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności i odrzucenie poglądu o całkowitej bezużyteczności takich kar uwidocznił się także w nowej instytucji w postaci tzw. kary mieszanej, która łączy w sobie krótkoterminową karę pozbawienia wolności oraz karę ograniczenia wolności, i stanowi formę reakcji karnej główniena tzw. średnią pod względem ciężaru gatunkowego przestępczość, umożliwiając ograniczenie zakresu stosowania kar pozbawienia wolności w wymiarze dłuższym. w artykule oceniono pozytywnie renesans krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności w ustawodawstwie i w praktyce wymiaru sprawiedliwości.
EN
The subject of discussion is the issue of the implementation of political and crimi- nal assumptions of the Criminal Code of 1969 in the practice of the justice system in the years 1970-1980. The starting point of the analysis are the basic ideas concerning criminal policy adopted by the Criminal Code of 1969, i.e. stratification of crimes and polarisation of criminal responsibility, and the related striving to limit the scope of short-term imprisonment. In this context, in further considerations, statutory solutions - which were to implement the assump- tions adopted by the Criminal Code - have been discussed, and an important role in shaping current criminal policy of the guidelines for the judiciary and judicial practice, adopted by the Supreme Court, has been pointed out. The findings have served as a basis for the confrontation of political and criminal assumptions of the Penal Code of 1969 with judicial practice. For this purpose, findings have been made concerning the structure of the measures of penal reaction adjudicated for crimes prosecuted by public indictment in the years 1970-1980, the dimension of absolute imprisonment in 1970, 1975 and 1980, and the effects of the penal policy implemented in the form of the size of the prison population in the years 1970-1980. The presented picture of the practices has allowed to formulate several conclusions. It has turned out that the idea of polarisation of liability and the related aspiration to significantly reduce the use of absolute im- prisonment for non-custodian penalties was not achieved, and as a result of elimination of the shortest penalties (up to 3 months) and limitation of the use of short-term imprisonment penal- ties, the sentences imposed were significantly extended. The result of the conducted penal policy was a very significant size of the prison population, which confirmed that the penal policy was excessively repressive.
DE
Den Gegenstand der Ausführungen bildet die Frage der Realisierung der politischen und kriminellen Annahmen des Strafgesetzbuches von 1969 in der Praxis der Justiz in den Jahren 1970-1980. Als Ausgangspunkt für die Analyse gelten die durch das Strafgesetzbuch von 1969 angenommenen kriminalpolitischen Ideen, d.h. die Aufteilung von Verbrechen und die Polarisierung der strafrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit sowie das damit verbundene Streben danach, den Umfang der Anwendung der kurzfristigen Freiheitsstrafe einzuschränken. In diesem Zusammenhang werden in den weiteren Überlegungen die gesetzlichen Lösungen erörtert, die der Umsetzung der durch das Strafgesetzbuch angenommenen Annahmen dienen sollten, sowie es wird auf die wichtige Rolle der Richtlinien der Justiz und der Gerichtspraxis bei der Ge- staltung der aktuellen strafrechtlichen Politik hingewiesen, die durch den Obersten Gerichtshof verabschiedet wurden. Die Erkenntnisse dienten als Grundlage dafür, die politisch-kriminellen Annahmen des Strafgesetzbuches von 1969 mit der Gerichtspraxis zu konfrontieren. Zu diesem Zweck wird Folgendes bestimmt: Struktur von strafrechtlichen Maßnahmen für Straftaten, die wegen der öffentlichen Klage gefahndet wurden, Ausmaß der absoluten Haftdauer in den Jahren 1970, 1975 und 1980, Auswirkungen der umgesetzten Strafpolitik in Form des Ausmaßes der Ge- fängnispopulation in den Jahren 1970-1980. Das dargestellte Bild der Praxis erlaubt es, einige Schlussfolgerungen zu formulieren. Es stellt sich nämlich heraus, dass die Idee der Polarisierung der Verantwortlichkeit und der damit verbundene Wunsch, die Anwendung der absoluten Frei- heitsstrafe zugunsten Strafen ohne Freiheitsentzug wesentlich einzuschränken, nicht realisiert wurde. Infolge der Beseitigung der kürzesten Strafen (bis zu 3 Monaten) und der Einschränkung der Anwendung von kurzfristigen Freiheitsstrafen kam es zur erheblichen Verlängerung von ver- hängten Freiheitsstrafen. Das Ergebnis der durchgeführten Strafpolitik war eine sehr große Ge- fängnispopulation, was den übermäßigen repressiven Charakter der Strafpolitik bestätigte.
PL
Przedmiotem rozważań jest zagadnienie realizacji założeń polityczno-kryminalnych kodeksu karnego z 1969r. w praktyce wymiaru sprawiedliwości w latach 1970-1980. Punktem wyjścia analizy są podstawowe idee dotyczące polityki kryminalnej przyjęte przez kodeks karny z 1969r., tj. rozwarstwienie przestępstw i polaryzacja odpowiedzialności karnej oraz związane z nią dążenie do ograniczenia zakresu stosowania krótkoterminowej kary pozbawienia wolności. W tym kontekście w dalszych rozważaniach omówiono rozwiązania ustawowe, które miały służyć realizacji przyjętych przez kodeks karny założeń oraz wskazano na istotną rolę w kształtowaniu bieżącej polityki karnej wytycznych wymiaru sprawiedliwości i praktyki sądowej, uchwalanych przez Sąd Najwyższy. Poczynione ustalenia służyły za podstawę konfrontacji założeń polityczno-kryminalnych kodeksu karnego z 1969r. z praktyką sądową. W tym celu dokonano ustaleń w zakresie struktury orzeczonych środków reakcji karnej za przestępstwa ścigane z oskarżenia publicznego w latach 1970-1980, wymiaru bezwzględnej kary pozbawienia wolności w 1970r., 1975r. i w 1980r. oraz efektów realizowanej polityki karnej w postaci rozmiarów populacji więziennej w latach 1970-1980. Przedstawiony obraz praktyki pozwolił na sformułowanie kilku wniosków. Otóż okazało się, że idea polaryzacji odpowiedzialności i związane z tą ideą dążenie do znaczącego ograniczenia stosowania bezwzględnej kary pozbawienia wolności na rzecz kar nieizolacyjnych nie została zrealizowana, a w wyniku eliminacji kar najkrótszych (do 3 miesięcy) i ograniczenia stosowania krótkoterminowych kar pozbawienia wolności nastąpiło znaczące wydłużenie orzekanych kar pozbawienia wolności. Rezultatem prowadzonej polityki karnej były bardzo wydatne rozmiary populacji więziennej, które stanowiły potwierdzenie o nadmiernej represyjności polityki karnej.
Ius Novum
|
2022
|
vol. 16
|
issue 3
7-26
EN
The article analyses and evaluates the proposal to amend the regulations concerning the penalty of deprivation of liberty that consists in the eradication of the fixed penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment from the catalogue of penalties laid down in Criminal Code and exceeding the upper time limit of the penalty of deprivation of liberty from up to 15 to up to 30 years. The article presents the opinions of the doctrine and the judicature on the nature and function of the penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment and other penalties of deprivation of liberty, points out practical difficulties indicated in the literature that are connected with the imposition of the fixed penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment in case of perpetrators cooperating in the commission of crime, and presents proposals to amend the regulations by means of successive CC amendment bills from 2000 up to now, as well as the opinion of the doctrine on the proposed changes. The considerations presented in the article lead to the conclusion that neither the proposal to eliminate the fixed penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment nor exceeding the so-called standard penalty of deprivation of liberty to 30 years deserves approval.
PL
Przedmiotem opracowania są analiza i ocena propozycji zmian uregulowań dotyczących kary pozbawienia wolności, których istota polega na eliminacji z katalogu kar Kodeksu karnego punktowej kary 25 lat pozbawienia wolności oraz na podwyższeniu górnej rodzajowej granicy terminowej kary pozbawienia wolności z 15 lat do 30 lat. W tym zakresie przedstawiono stanowisko doktryny i judykatury na temat charakteru i funkcji kary 25 lat pozbawienia wolności i terminowej kary pozbawienia wolności, wskazano podnoszone w piśmiennictwie trudności praktyczne związane z wymierzaniem punktowej kary 25 lat pozbawienia wolności, powstające na tle wymierzania kar w wypadku sprawców współdziałających w popełnieniu przestępstwa, oraz przedstawiono propozycje zmian dotyczących uregulowań przez kolejne projekty nowelizacji k.k. począwszy od 2000 r. do chwili obecnej, a także zapatrywania doktryny na temat zgłoszonych propozycji. Artykuł ma charakter krytyczny wobec proponowanych zmian. Przeprowadzone w artykule rozważania prowadzą do konkluzji, że ani propozycja eliminacji kary 25 lat pozbawienia wolności, ani wydłużenie tak zwanej zwykłej kary pozbawienia wolności do 30 lat nie zasługują na aprobatę.
EN
The subject of the article is an analysis of the non-custodial sentencje known in Poland as curtailment of liberty (and thus excluding fines) as an important instrument of penal policy in the 1970-1998, the main focus being on two strands or this policy–legislative policy and penal policy–to the exclusion of the latter’s administrative aspects. In the light of the guiding principles of the 1969 Criminal Code non-custodial sentences were intended to become an important penal policy measure for treatment of perpetrators of  minor offenses and at the same time to provide a substitute for short terms of imprisonment, which had been found relatively ineffective as a means of achieving rehabilitation of convicted offenders. However, the normative extent of the code’s provision for non-custodial penalties proved to be relatively narrow. Within the range of alternatives to custodial punishment curtailment of liberty was an option available only under 17.5% of the defined offenses. Under Article 54 §1 sentencing to curtailment of liberty was admissible for 24% of all offenses and under Article  57 §1.3 for 27.9% of the total. The potential possibilities of non-custodial treatment of offenders were circumscribed by the provisions of Articles 54 §2, 52, 59 and 60.       A significant influence on the frequency of sentencing to curtailment of liberty was the actual incidence of criminal acts punishable by alternative form of treatment. Based on an analysis of Ministry of Justice and judicial statistics it appears that such acts were not among the most frequently committed offenses, amounting to about 10% of all convictions. The systematic growth of the proportion of sentences to curtailment of liberty, from 6.2% in 1970 to l8% in 1980, should, therefore, be regarded as achievement of the maximum level of possible sentences of this kind. If we consider the share of curtailment of liberty in the structure of sentences for offenses punishable by alternative forms of treatment we will find that there was a judicial bias towards curtailment of liberty. The frequency of such treatment of offenders fluctuated between 32.83% and 56.54%, while the range for fines came to 21.26%‒5I,99 % and for imprisonment to 3,4%‒21.26%. It can, therefore, be said that in the first decade following the 1969 Criminal Code’s entry into force curtailment of liberty fulfilled the purpose envisaged by the lawmakers, that is as an alternative to short terms of imprisonment. Undoubtedly, a factor contributing to the increase in the proportion of non-custodial sentences in the structure of final and conclusive judgments was the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, in particular its guidelines for the administration of justice and judicial practice issued on 30 May 1979 (VII KZP 31/1977) concerning sentencing policy with respect to offenses for which the prescribed punishment is, interchangeably, imprisonmet, curtailment of liberty or a fine. Imprisonment, these stated, should be a penalty imposed only in the last resort when non-custodial forms of treatment are deemed incapable of performing the function of protection of the legal order.        If a salient characteristic of the 1970s was stability of legislative policy, which  precluded the possibility of shaping penal policy by means of legislation, the 1980s, or more precisely the period from 12 December 1981 to 1989, saw the emergence of a tendency in the opposite direction. For it brought the adoption of numerous basic amendments in criminal legislation, the general thrust of which was towards severer difinition of criminal responsibility. This was reflected in a decrease in the proportion of non-custodial sentences in the structure of final and conclusive judgments (from 15.6% in 1981 to 8.2% in 1984) and a concurrent increase in the frequency with which courts sentenced offenders to imprisonment (from 25.3% in 1981 to 33.1% in 1984).         During the years in which the rigorous provisions of the Special Criminal Responsibility Act were in force, that is in the period from 10 May 1985 to 30 June 1988, there was a systematic rise in the proportion of curtailment of liberty in the structure of sentences (from 10.1% in 1985 to 17.4% in 1987), which might have something to do with the introduction by the May legislation of provisions allowing for non-custodial treatment of offenders in summary proceedings.        The 1988 amendments to the Criminal Code, aimed at relaxing definitions of criminal responsibility, included, albeit in only a limited degree, provisions relating to the applicability of curtailment of liberty. These changes reflected a desire to increase the significance of non-custodial treatment in penal policy. However, in judicial practice there ensued a decrease in sentencing to curtailment of liberty, from 10.5% in 1989 to 5.3% in 1990.        The period of political, economic and social change in Poland which began  in 1989 stimulated criminal law reform. The aim of numerous legislative change which followed was to reduce the punitive  character of the Criminal Code. One reflection of this was greater provision for non-custodial treatment of offenders (introduced by the new Criminal Code enacted in 1995) through a broadening of the grounds for commuting sentences of imprisonment to curtailment of liberty or a fine under Article 54), reduction of the role of repeated criminality as an aggravating circumstance in punishment of offenders, and abolition of extended sentences for offenses classified as "hooligansm" or committed by repeat offenders.        In 1991-1995 the share of curtailment of liberty in the structure of sentences held steady at a level of 3.5%‒3,9%, making it the lowest ever for the period in which the 1969 Criminal Code was in force. This was not a result of the greater repressiveness of the criminal justice system since we observed a drop in the frquency of sentences of imprisonment. The courts tended to favor the use of conditional suspension of custodial sentences (the share of which rose from 43.9% in 1989 to 55.1% in 1997) and fines (up from 4.9% in 1989 to 27.4% in 1997). The explanation should, rather, be sought in problems with execution of sentences to curtaiment of liberty, chief among them the job shrinkages caused by changes in the free-market economy.       Analysis indicates that curtailment of liberty did not fulfill the expectations associated with this form of punishment. It did not become a significant instrument of penal policy nor did it contribute to reducing the scale of sentencing to terms of imprisonment. Even after a substantial widening of provision for punishment by curtailment of liberty its share of sentences ordered by the courts reached a level of only 5.2% (in 1977).       The new Criminal Code has substantially expanded the possibilities of sentencing offenders to curtailment of liberty. This form of punishment is intended to be an important instrument of penal policy with respect to misdemeanors and minor offenses and to replace imprisonment and even fines if ordering the latter is thought to serve no purpose. At the same time the Criminal Code has introduced modifications in the legal shape of this punishment. By preserving, contrary to the intentions of the code’s original drafters, multivariate forms of punishment it gives curtailment of liberty some of the hallmarks of probation by introducing the possibility of imposing certain additional conditions and establishing supervision. The new elements in the design of curtailment of liberty have met with numerous criticisms of the doctrine (including by the authors of the article). How it will affect the functioning of the institution analyzed the immediate future will tell.
EN
The publication discusses the nature, premises, and methods of sentencing a penal measure consisting in prohibition of entry to mass events. The first part shows legal solutions accepted in the European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches accepted on 19 August 1985 by Council of Europe. It is recognised at one of the most important international documents providing for the fight with stadium hooliganism. Although the Convention’s aim is to prevent and control incidents by football spectators, provisions of the Convention apply also to other disciplines which might posit the risk of acts of violence and incidents by spectators (article 1 paragraph 12 of the Convention). Subsequently, there follows an analysis of legal solutions accepted in the current Act of 20 march 2009 on Mass Events Safety and the former Act of 22 January 1997 on Mass Events Safety. In particular, the focus was placed on the evolution of the prohibition of entry to a mass event and the definition of a legal mass event which at present is no longer based on the number of participants predicted by the organiser but on the number of places made available by the organiser. It is a result of common malpractice practice of organisers who used to omit the requirements by declaring less people than were actually expected. 2. Second part of the publication presents statistical data concerning contraventions related to mass sport events between 1999 and 2009 in Poland. The data show that there is a decreasing tendency in mass contraventions and hooligan incidents. At the same time, the data bring the conclusion that most hooligan incidents were committed during mass events. This may prove that objects where such events are organised are still ill-equipped but also that the organisers fail to observe their duties, imposed on them by the Act on Mass Events Safety. This part of publication also drafts a profile of the perpetrators of hooligan events. The study shows they are unmarried males between 15 and 25 with primary or secondary education and without a previous criminal record. 3. Part three of the publication is an analysis of normative solutions of the penal measure consisting in prohibition of entry to mass events. It includes provisions of Criminal Code, Petty Offences Code and Act of 20 march 2009 on Mass Events Safety. The analysis brings a conclusion that introduction of mass entry event ban served the purpose of increasing the safety of mass events and excluding persons who posit a risk to said safety. Thus, introduction of such legal solution to Polish law should be undisputable. Doubts can be raised only if particular solutions are examined, for instance the interpretation of “personal appearance” in a police station during a mass event.
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