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The Bundle Theory of Particulars and Accidental Properties

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Nakoneczny M.

Filozofia Nauki

2014

vol. 22

issue 2

125-135

In this paper I evaluate four arguments formulated against the Bundle Theory of Particulars: the argument from tautologous subject-predicate discourse, the argument from essentialism, the argument from the impossibility of diachronic change, and the argument from the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. I propose a general strategy to deal with those and structurally similar problems and show how this strategy solves the four objections. The offered solution consists in analysing subject-predicate discourse in terms of coexemplification of properties rather than set-inclusion and in postulating that ordinary particulars are not bundles of properties but bundles of higher-order: either bundles of temporal parts (that are bundles of properties), which allows us to escape the problem of impossibility of change over time; or bundles of modal parts, which enables us to refute the argument from essentialism; or bundles of modal parts that are bundles of temporal parts that are bundles of tropes - which clears up both difficulties.

Jerrolda Levinsona ontologia dzieł muzycznych a zagadnienie indywidualnej esencji dzieła muzycznego

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Nakoneczny M.

Semina Scientiarum

2014

vol. 13

In this paper, I set to analyze the kind of metaphysical essentialism that follows from Jerrold Levinson’s ontology of musical works. This paper is structured into three sections. In the first, I reconstruct those parts of Levinson’s ontology of musical works that entail essentialism. In the second section, I reconstruct Mackie’s (2009) and Forbes’ (1985) arguments for the indispensability of the individual essences of particular objects and show that they apply equally well to musical works. In the third, final section, I combine the conclusions of the two previous ones to prove that Levinson’s ontology of musical works is compatible with Mackie and Forbes’ postulate for the individal essences. I show, however, that even though Levinson correctly ascribes essential properties to musical works, his choice about which of those properties count as essential leads to counterintuitive consequences. I end this paper with a new argument showing that musical works do have essential properties but that they are different from those postulated by Levinson.

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1 Filozofia Nauki

1 Semina Scientiarum

2 Nakoneczny M.

2 2014

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The Bundle Theory of Particulars and Accidental Properties

Jerrolda Levinsona ontologia dzieł muzycznych a zagadnienie indywidualnej esencji dzieła muzycznego