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EN
The method of thematic analysis of science may be related to methodological innovations, which allow to formulate new visions of the scientific knowledge not only in the process of its formation, as it is presented by Holton, but also when knowledge acquires the form of the “intellectual fossil”, which is independent of time. The latter case may be related rightfully to Aristotle’s syllogistics. The thematic analysis of the dual nature of its logical forms within Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistics is conducted in the framework of two categories: correlated and mutual. The principle of complementarity by Niels Bohr is compared with that of correlation by Aristotle. The new theme of correlated is introduced, the logical forms and alternative themes distinguished by Holton being estimated in its framework. The relation between the indeterminate dualism by Pythagoras and Aristotle’s category of correlated is traced.
EN
The analysis the induction and deduction as “correlated objects” permits to expose a number of properties which are common to all “correlated objects”: the property of mutuality in the process of deducing, its direction from the general to the particular and vice versa, in relation of the novelty and trustworthiness in the inference, in the refutation and substantiation. The relation between correlated deduction and induction is estimated in the article as inner relation, which is a characteristic feature for the state of “relational collapse”. This means that the nature of the inductive conclusion depends on the nature of deductive conclusion. To consider the inductive conclusion in isolation from the deductive one means to destroy the correlation and mutuality.
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