Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 10

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Alternatywizm w teorii percepcji

100%
Schetz A.
Diametros
|
2007
|
issue 14
85-104
PL
Artykuł ten prezentuje alternatywizm, stanowisko, które łączy w sobie dwie idee; pewien nienaiwny wątek realizmu naiwnego z reprezentacjonizmem. Jest ono rezultatem próby zmierzenia się z niektórymi problemami związanymi ze zjawiskami iluzji i halucynacji percepcyjnych. Będę argumentować, że formułuje ono przekonującą strategię obrony realizmu nie-naiwnego.
EN
I claim in the paper that there is an important difference between episodes of veridical perceptual experiences and illusions or hallucinations. In the case of the latter, our experience displays no phenomenal difference from a situation in which we enjoy proper or veridical perception. According to M. G. F. Martin and his disjunctivist position, in the case of illusions and hallucinations one has no reflective knowledge that one is deceived by mistaken perception. However, there are features of the phenomena in question which entail the difference in principle. My conclusion is similar to Martin’s, but I propose to supplement his position with the additional idea that only representational contents enable us to explain the difference between veridical and non-veridical perception.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Representationalism and the Problem of Perception

100%
Schetz A.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2007
|
vol. 15
|
issue 3
107-120
PL
In various philosophical explanations of perceptual experiences two ideas are usually invoked: the idea of intrinsic quality of experience (perceptual quale) and the idea of representation. I argue that the former may be eliminated and replaced by the latter. While discussing the traditional position known as "the sense-data theory" I emphasize the tension between the environment-dependent content of visual experience and its inner or narrow content. I conclude that one cannot find adequate support for the claim that perceptual qualia exist. One should rather admit that perceptual experiences can be fully accounted for in terms of mental representations of apparent features of external objects.
3
Content available remote

Percepcja bez wrażeń zmysłowych. „Nowa psychologia” J. J. Gibsona

100%
Schetz A.
Roczniki Psychologiczne
|
2012
|
vol. 15
|
issue 1
31-53
PL
Artykuł stanowi omówienie faz rozwoju nowego, w latach 1950-1980, podejścia do zagadnienia percepcji wzrokowej, które zaproponował amerykański psycholog James J. Gibson. Odnoszący się z dużym sceptycyzmem do wyrosłej na gruncie filozofii idealistycznej kategorii wrażenia zmysłowego, Gibson znany jest ze swojej ekologicznej teorii percepcji, w której zaciera się granica między podmiotem i środowiskiem. Nie wszyscy jednak zdają sobie sprawę z tego, że nawiązując do podstawowych założeń psychologii postaci, sformułował on wiele idei, które są w stosunku do niej nowatorskie, a przeprowadzona przez niego drobiazgowa analiza pojęcia ekosystemu bardziej zbliża go do postaciowców, niż wymierzona w kategorię Gestalt krytyka go od nich oddala.
EN
The paper discusses the development of the new – in 1950-1980 – approach to the visual perception proposed by the American psychologist James J. Gibson. He is known from his skepticism about the category of sensation that emerged within the context of idealistic philosophy, and from his ecological theory of perception, wherein the boundary between the subject and environment is obliterated. However, it is not always noticed that while referring to the Gestalt psychology he formulated a lot of original ideas. His detailed analysis of the ecosystem concept makes him more akin to the Gestalt theorists, despite the fact that his criticism of the Gestalt category seems to suggest the very opposite.
4
Content available remote

Minimalistyczny reprezentacjonizm ekologicznej teorii percepcji

100%
Schetz A.
Roczniki Psychologiczne
|
2014
|
vol. 17
|
issue 1
197-235
PL
Celem artykułu jest rozważenie możliwości włączenia kategorii reprezentacji umysłowej do ekologicznej teorii percepcji, obmyślanej przez jej pomysłodawcę - Jamesa J. Gibsona, jako rodzaju antyreprezentacjonizmu. Pełnowymiarowa idea reprezentacji percepcyjnej wydaje się „zbyt ciężka" na potrzeby podejścia ekologicznego, według którego percepcja polega na bezpośrednim zbieraniu czy ujmowaniu zmysłami cech przedmiotów znajdujących się w otoczeniu. Skoro jest to proces bezpośredni, to postulowanie reprezentacji umysłowej w niczym nie ułatwia, zdaniem Gibsona, rozumienia go. Z drugiej strony pojęcie reprezentacji umysłowej we współczesnej filozofii umysłu i psychologii poznawczej jest niemal niezbywalne. W artykule ukazana jest próba zinterpretowania percepcyjnego procesu nabywania informacji w kategoriach teorii systemów dynamicznych, a dokładnie jako rodzaju symulacji. Symulacyjna koncepcja percepcji, bazująca na minimalistycznym rozumieniu reprezentacji (jako wiedzy typu proceduralnego), ma stanowić uzupełnienie ekologicznej teorii zaproponowanej przez Gibsona.
EN
The aim of the article is to consider the possibilities of incorporating the category of mental representation into the ecological theory of perception, devised by its originator, James J. Gibson, as a kind of antirepresentationalism. The full-blooded idea of perceptual representation seems "too heavy" for the needs of the ecological approach, according to which perception consists in directly collecting or apprehending the features of objects present in the environment by means of the senses. Since this process is a direct one, Gibson believes postulating mental representation does not in any way make it easier to understanding it. On the other hand, in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology the concept of mental representation is almost indispensable. The article presents an attempt to interpret the perceptual process of information acquisition in terms of dynamic systems theory - or, more precisely, as a kind of simulation. The simulation model of perception based on a minimalist understanding of representation (as procedural knowledge) is meant to complement the ecological theory of perception proposed by Gibson.
5
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Is Mind-Body Problem Solvable?

100%
Schetz A.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2004
|
vol. 12
|
issue 3-4
69-86
PL
The paper discusses the problem of naturalistic theories of mind-body relation. It displays knotting lines of arguments, which are presented by two influential philosophers: O. Flanagan and C. McGinn. The former author claims that the mind-body problem can easy be resolved by showing that mind and body are two somehow similar concepts. The latter is strongly convinced that because of human epistemic limitations we cant in principle to formulate solution of psychophysical problem. I go on to argue that we can prepare good empirical hypotheses but I see no way to answer the philosophical question: how it is possible that subjective phenomenal states like pain, tickle etc. "are made" from physical staff?
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Alethic Pluralism and Minimalism

100%
Schetz A.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2006
|
vol. 14
|
issue 2
85-95
PL
Among various recent approaches to truth one should distinguish a large family of minimalist accounts, which emphasize that the notion of truth is less substantial than it was traditionally taken for granted. Some philosophers (including, among others, Crispin Wright and Michael P. Lynch) propose to combine this minimalism about the notion of truth with pluralism of some kind, namely the idea that "what property serves as truth may vary from discourse to discourse". Briefly, there is one minimal notion of truth but many properties satisfying it. I consider and contrast two ways of elaborating this interesting and promising view, defended respectively by Wright and Lynch. For Wright the common minimal notion of truth does not express any single property; the notion is simply multiple realized by various properties in different discourses. Lynch amends this view by claiming that the common notion of truth expresses a single property after all: it is a supervenient role property. I argue that more minimalistic Wright's alethic pluralism has certain advantages over functional-supervenient alethic pluralism advocated by Lynch.
7
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Biological Externalism Approach to the Architecture of the Mind and the Nature of Perception

100%
Schetz A.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2014
|
vol. 22
|
issue 1
85-104
PL
The paper presents an attempt to apply the term "biological externalism" to a couple of related positions regarding the general architecture of the mind and the nature of perception: (1) enactivism, also called by its founders, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, neurophenomenology; (2) Thelen's theory, which emphasizes the role of body and action in cognitive processes; (3) radical enactivism of No¸, O'Regan, and Hurley, which eliminates the category of experience; (4) Clark's combination of computationism with connectionism. Such conceptions, due to their treatment of the category of embodiment cognition and epistemological externalism in regard to the content of perceptual representations, not only have the same conceptual roots, but also the same aim, namely revision and replacement, or transformation and reconstruction of traditional computationism, which is still the dominant force in cognitive science.
8
Content available remote

O tak zwanym problemie prostych umysłów

100%
Schetz A.
Diametros
|
2011
|
issue 30
41-60
PL
Artykuł dotyczy zagadnienia znanego pod nazwą „problemu prostych umysłów” tak, jak klaruje się ono w zestawieniu czterech doniosłych głosów w debacie na temat możliwości przypisywania zwierzętom życia mentalnego bez przypisywania im zdolności do posługiwania się językiem. Głosy te należą do: Donalda Davidsona, Johna McDowella, Petera Carruthersa oraz Jose L. Bermúdeza. Dwaj pierwsi autorzy bronią przekonaniowo-pragnieniowego modelu myślenia, w którym decydującą rolę pełni zdolność do posługiwania się językiem. Dwaj pozostali akceptację modelu przekonaniowo-pragnieniowego łączą z argumentem przeciwko wiązaniu myśli z językiem. Analizując szczegółowo argumenty obu stanowisk przychylam się do rozwiązania proponowanego w ramach podejścia sformułowanego w oparciu o ustalenia Carruthersa i Bermúdeza.
EN
This article is concerned with what is known as "the problem of simple minds", considered by four participants in the debate on the possibility of attributing the mental life to animals without assigning them the ability to use language: Donald Davidson, John McDowell, Peter Carruthers, and Jose L. Bermudez. The first two defend the belief-desire model of thinking in which the ability to use language plays a decisive role. The other two combine the belief-desire model with an argument against the connection of thought with language. After analyzing in detail the arguments of both positions I favor the solution proposed by Carruthers and Bermudez.
9
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Luka eksplanacyjna a pojęcia własności fenomenalnych stanowisko Josepha Levine’a

100%
Schetz A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2012
|
issue nr 17
125-148
EN
The explanatory gap problem arises in the context of the mind-body relation, and especially the phenomenal concepts-physical concepts relation. It is posed as a question about the method which is appropriate for the reduction of consciousness to physical or neural states of the brain. Therefore it concerns – as the paper suggests – theoretical incapability of naturalistic attempts to explain what phenomenal concepts are about in terms of what physical or natural concepts are about. The paper discusses the argument of Joseph Levine, one of the best-known critics of the reductive attempts to close the explanatory gap. The bottom line of the argument is that since phenomenal concepts are theoretically thick, and physical concepts are theoretically thin, there is no way to reduce the former to the latter.
10
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Rola zabawy w redukcji poczucia niepewności

100%
Schetz A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2017
|
vol. 40
95-110
EN
Cognitive, social and physical benefits of playing in development of children and youth are commonly known. In this paper I propose to consider an idea that playing is one of the best ways to achieve reduction of the level of uncertainty. I try to, as well, show how dual processing theory of information and action explains this kind of dependence.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.