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Moral Realism and Internal Realism: The Application of Putnam's Internal Realism Issue into the Field of Metaethics

100%

Kasprzyk Z.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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vol. 17

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issue 2

69-85

PL

Moral Realism is such theory in metaethics, which can be characterized by three theses: ontological thesis - according to which moral facts exist independently of human opinion; epistemological thesis, that moral judgements can be truth apt, and moral knowledge is possible; and normativity thesis, that asserting a moral claim is a sufficient reason for acting in accordance with its content. However, in contemporary metaethics there is no realistic theory which would embrace all three theses together. Naturalists assert first two theses, but reject the last one, on the other hand nonnaturalists emphasize the third, but renounce first two. The author seeks to show that transferring this issue onto the ground of Putnam's Internal Realism, would help us to get rid of this problem in metaethics altogether.

2

The Frege-Geach Objection – Semantic Problems of Expressivism

63%

Kasprzyk Z., Kuś K.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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vol. 17

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issue 4

131-147

PL

Expressivists distinguish between two languages: the descriptive and the normative. The moral sentences belonging to the latter do not state facts, therefore have no truth conditions and only express moral approval or disapproval towards the evaluated object. This proposition faced the charge that it is possible to find unasserted semantic contexts in which moral sentences appear to be true (Frege-Geach objection). The paper shows how Blackburn (1988) dealt with this problem. We go on to argue that in order to accept Blackburn's solution one needs to have a clear concept of what it is 'to express'. We show which conditions this relation has to fulfill so as to make the theory of expressivism coherent. Using as examples two popular notions of expression relation - expression as a symptom (Husserl, Ajdukiewicz, Ossowska) and expression as a causal relation (Ayer) - we demonstrate that neither of these notions is adequate for the expressivists' purposes, which leads to the conclusion that expression relation remains mysterious and there is a serious gap in the theory.

3

On Performatives and Generating

63%

Brożek A., Kasprzyk Z.

Filozofia Nauki

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2007

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vol. 15

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issue 2

115-130

PL

The conception of performative utterances proposed by John Langshaw Austin is unclear and provokes many fundamental questions. We compare this proposal with Jacek Juliusz Jadacki's conception of performatives, being much more precise one. We develop Jadacki's intuitions and propose to characterize performatives as expressions fulfilling a specific semantic function: A type-expression W is a performative generating an intentional state of affairs S iff there is a convention K and circumstances C such that the convention K says: if somebody utters a token-expression W in circumstances C, so the state of affairs S will take place. Subsequently, we analyze the problem of correctness of performative utterances and relations between different criteria of correctness of performative acts. On the basis of these analyses, the paradox of annulled marriage is formulated and the problem of perfomatives in law is sketched.

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3 Filozofia Nauki

2 2009

1 2007

3 Kasprzyk Z.

1 Brożek A.

1 Kuś K.

Moral Realism and Internal Realism: The Application of Putnam's Internal Realism Issue into the Field of Metaethics

The Frege-Geach Objection – Semantic Problems of Expressivism

On Performatives and Generating