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Overshadowed by kala. India‑Burma Relations

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EN
India seems to fit well with Burma. Long common history, deep cultural relations, similar heritage and geographic proximity – all this should help to upgrade India‑Burma relations. There is, however, one major obstacle: a historical and cultural burden, which can be summarized by the Burmese name for Indians: kala. Literally kala means “alien,” but at present it refers to Indians only. In Burmese conditions it has a wider, metaphorical meaning: something between “unwanted,” “hated” and “despicable.” In this sense, kala is a cultural phenomenon, a kind of “burdensome heritage” that influences the political relations between India and Burma. In this way, kala still looms large on the horizon of India‑Burma relations blocks their development.
EN
This paper deals with the problem of the Burma-Korea relations. It starts from the intriguing fact that both Burma and Korea, despite not having much in common, have been called the Hermit Kingdoms. This paper asks whether this “hermit” similarity has had any effect on their relations and what the place of Korea in Burma’s foreign policy has been. After describing the hermit heritage in the Burmese and the Korean political cultures, this papers concludes that Korean issues have not been central to the Burmese policy. They form an important, though a secondary, dimension. As for the place of Korea(s) in Burma’s foreign policy, the answer is equally unimpressive. The political relations between Burma and both Korean states have not been strategic. Two events attracted the world’s attention to the Burmese-Korean relations – the assassination in Rangoon and Burma’s nuclear affair with North Korea – but both turned out to be mere incidents. North Korea – Burma relations stalled, or hibernated, after Burma started its reforms and opening up to the West in 2011. For the same reasons of reforms, however, Burma has become even more interesting for South Korea. Myanmar may become a place for massive South Korean investments soon. It is the economic dominance of South Korea that makes the Burma-Korea relations asymmetric. It’s a “normalized asymmetry”, however, one where both sides are confident of fulfi lling their basic interests and expectations of mutual benefits. This “normalized asymmetry” makes the Burma-South Korea relations bound to develop in the future.
EN
Russian‑Sino relationships are constantly improving which lead a significant amount of scholars to focus on their cultural similarities. This is true particularly to Russian academicians who try to point out civilizational and cultural closeness between Russia and China as a counterweight to the Western model. Indeed, there are some similarities, like predominance of collectivism over individualism and the need for a strong leadership. Nevertheless, if we take the risk of venturing into deeper space of cultural background and take into account not only political issues but also Russia’s and China’s identity and consciousness, then striking differences appear. On this level we can clearly see that similarities between Russia and China are superficial and they exist only on the surface. On the deeper, cultural level, however, those two “civilizations that became countries” have very little in common. They are – as we said – different civilizations incomparable to each other due to several historical, cultural and social reasons. This thesis leads to a conclusion that a successful cooperation and interaction between Russia and China is possible only on political, tactical issues, but there could be no real “melting pot” between them. This does not mean they are bound to conflict, but it clearly shows the artificiality of their “everlasting friendship”. Political conjunctures are bound to change whereas civilizational factors lasts longer and this explains why Russia and China will never become as close as the try to show. For similarities between them are of tactical, political importance, whereas differences are of strategic, ontological nature.
EN
Since the fall of the USSR, Russia has been trying to improve its position in the Korean Peninsula. In the 1990s this ended in almost total failure. Only in the 2000s did one see an improvement in Russia’s position: Moscow was able to balance its position in the Peninsula, achieve good relations with both Koreas and was invited to Six-Party Talks. Unfortunately, these beneficial circumstances did not last long. Since then Russia has been a rather non- active international player in the Peninsula, which has usually been bound up to Chinese actions. Hence, despite the ups and downs, Russia’s position since 1991 has been quite constant – that of a secondary great power in Korea.
EN
Until 2011 Aung San Suu Kyi has been the point of reference for U.S. policy towards Burma/Myanmar. Her struggle with Burmese military junta has attracted a widespread attention and a global affection for her. As a result, Suu Kyi enjoyed an unquestioned support from subsequent U.S. president administrations. This, however, has changed in 2011 when Suu Kyi was politically sacrificed by the U.S. pivot to Asia. Nevertheless, she faced it bravely and did not give in; just changed her tactics from confrontation to cooperation with the post-military regime. That gave her a stunning electoral victory in 2015 and power from behind-the-scenes in Myanmar. Suu Kyi’s relations with Washington have remained cordial, yet complicated ever since.
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Polityczny zmierzch birmańskiej noblistki

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EN
Against the background of the dramatic events unfolding in Myanmar/Burma - the military has been pacifying the mass peaceful protests there - the political career of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, the political leader of Myanmar/Burma in 2016-2021 and previously the most famous political prisoner worldwide, is nearing its end. Once the darling of the Western world, then mercilessly criticised by yesterday supporters, Suu Kyi remains an ambiguous person evoking strong emotions both domestically and internationally. As such Suu Kyi represents a fascinating case study in leadership studies. Using the agency-centred explanation in political studies, this article tries to answer the following questions: what enabled Suu Kyi to take power and which factor contributed to her political fall? Why there is her political demise? Why Suu Kyi enjoyed the West's support and why she lost it? How can we assess her governanance?
EN
The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 has been a popular theme of journal and media articles for obvious reasons. Its “Chinese”, or rather Sino-Russian dimension has been less so, though the Chinese reaction to the Ukrainian crisis and the implications of this reaction represent interesting political phenomenon. This article tries to fill this gap and uses the description of Russia and China policies during the crisis as a case study of Moscow and Beijing political behavior on the international scene in general. Its thesis is that the Ukrainian crisis represents a great case study of these behaviors. Moreover, this case is also a supplement to the general discussion in the field about the state of Russia-China contemporary political relations.
EN
In 2017 statistics showed that Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Poland for 2016 amounted to a more than half of all Chinese FDI in Poland for the 2000–2016. Yet the overall amount of Chinese FDI remains modest in comparison with Western Europe or even with Hungary. Despite much proclaimed Sino-Polish rapprochement in 2015–2016 and high hopes for OBOR/BRI initiative in Poland, cooperation with China has not been a breakthrough for Poland in terms of economic results. There have not been ground-breaking Sino-Polish projects and Polish government’s desire to strengthen ties with China loosened in late 2016/early 2017 (though it may revive now).There are several reasons for that, from the perception of Poland as non-attractive for majority Chinese investments, via lack of overall Polish strategy of attracting these investors to discrepancies of economic interests between Poland and China.
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Azja-Pacyfik
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2012
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issue XV
110-137
EN
Burma is inhabited by roughly 129 nationalities, being therefore a real melting pot of nationalities. Many of them tried in vain to secede from the Union of Burma, and as a consequence Burma remains the country with the longest ongoing armed conflict in the world. The ruling juntatreats all the minorities with suspicion and disdain. According to Martin Smith, the ruling military regime regards the ethnic nationalist groups with intense suspicion because of their lack of unity and their refusal to submit to Burmese authority in the past. Ethnic groups are economically marginalized while their social, cultural, and religious rights are suppressed. In Burma we can see an open discrimination of non-Burmese citizens in a country where every protest is considered a mutiny: the military junta believes that the minorities are inherently inferior (culturally/ socially) and would split from Burmese authority if given the chance. This was the picture of the country up to 2011. Since August of that year, however, Myanmar has witnessed a liberalization of the press, the release of political prisoners and the initiation of a political dialogue between the regime on the one hand and the opposition and ethnic groups on the other. Another challenge is the complex question of national reconciliation. The plan envisions a new national conference (“Panlong II”), which is something many ethnic politicians have been calling for. This last stage of reforms, which could lead to a new framework for center– regional relations and true federalism, has the potential to solve the long running core-periphery conflict in Burma.
EN
This article deals with public, political discourse over One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in Poland. OBOR has recently become very popular in Poland as it encapsulates the noticeable fascination on China and on geopolitics among parts of Polish society. This article describes this phenomenon and delaminates the mainstream political discourse over OBOR into two main strands: great geopolitical and/or geoeconomic chance (pro-OBOR discourse) and security threat (anti-OBOR). The advocates of the former see the project as a great geopolitical and economic opportunity for Poland; the supporters of the latter find it a threat to Polish security and/or economic interests. This discourse echoes internal divisions within current Polish government on its China policy and can be observed against the background of China’s dynamic enter to Central and Eastern Europe, particularly to Czech Republic, Hungary and Serbia.
EN
Burma/Myanmar seems to be a perfect ground for transitional justice with both long-failed transitions to democracy that seemed to succeed in 2015 finally and smouldering civil war taking place there since 1948 (since the 1990s limited to Borderlands). Unfortunately, the political realities in Burma/Myanmar make it unlikely, if not impossible, for transitional justice to be applicable in Burma/Myanmar. The victorious in 2015 elections democratic opposition party, National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power thanks to the political deal with the former military government and is consequently being forced to cohabitate politically with the army that still holds critical political checks over the government. It made NLD’s leader, Aung San Suu Kyi to conduct moderate domestic policy without trying to charge the generals for their former crimes. In this circumstances, transitional justice is unwanted by mainstream political actors (NLD, the army) and seen as threatening to peace by many in the Myanmar society. This approach firmly places Burma/Myanmar on one side of the ‘peace vs justice’ dilemma. It answers the “torturer problem”, one of the central problems of transitional justice – how to deal with members of the previous regime which violated human rights – in ‘old fashion’ way, by granting them full amnesty. As such Burma/Myanmar case also falsifies an optimistic claim that transitional justice is necessary for political reforms.
EN
In political science an accent on individuals (political leaders) in researching politics is neither popular nor advocated one. In authoritarian countries like Russia or China, however, political leaders and their personalities are a crucial factor in trying to understand the political processes there. Both Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China have dominated their respective political systems. This, combined with good state of Russia-China relations makes it an interesting case study of the influence of political leaders on authoritarian countries. Both Putin and Xi are new type of leaders: they both follow the main ideas of political realism (though with “national differences”) and they share a 19th century outlook on the global affairs (“concert of powers”) yet they use contemporary means to fulfil these interests. Their personal understanding provides a predictability and stability: both Putin and Xi function in accordance with balance of power and respect for zones of influence concepts. That is why differences in other spheres, like Russia’s and China’s approaches to the USA do not influence the general good mood of Sino-Russian relationship.
RU
В политических науках фокус на политических лидеров не является популярным. Однако, в авторитарных странах, таких как Россия и Китай, это лидеры имеют ключевое значение для понимания политических процессов. Владимир Путин и Си Цзиньпин доминировали российский и китайский политические системы, что, в связи с хорошими российско-китайскими отношениями, является интересным примером в исследовании влияния политических лидеров на политику. Путин и Си Цзиньпин – это лидеры нового типа. Они оба – политические реалисты, хотя с «национальными» отличиями, у них похожее видение мира с перспективы концепции системы концерта держав и одновременно современные средства осуществления государственных интересов. Взаимопонимание между Путиным и Си Цзиньпином, схожая политическая философия, диктовавшая уважение собственных зон интересов и сохранение баланса сил, положительно влияют на российско-китайские отношения. Хотя и существуют отличия между Россией и Китаем (например, в вопросе политики в отношении США), они не влияют на хорошее состояние российско-китайских отношений”.
EN
More than decade ago Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) became a popular theme of analysis and research, evoking polarizing views. It was described as a successful regional, multilateral organization which responds to local challenges (such as terrorism) and represents a good case of Sino-Russian cooperation in Central Asia. On the other hand, SCO was also being portrayed as a geopolitical, authoritarian answer to NATO, stronger in words than in actions. Since than SCO has developed and strengthened Sino-Russian relations. On the other hand, since 2010s SCO has been losing its importance and facing marginalization. India’s and Pakistan’s access in 2017 is bound to reverse this trend and give SCO a new energy. The outcome of this enlargement, combined with integration of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project with SCO will decide about SCO’s future.
RU
Более 10 лет тему назад Шанхайская организация сотрудничества (ШОС) стала популярной темой анализов и исследовании, возбуждила тоже поля ризацию взглядов. Одные считали ШОС успешной, многосторонной ор- ганизацией отвечающей на региональные вызовы (такие как терроризм) и будучей хорошим премером российско-китайского взаимодеиствия в Цен тральной Азии. С другой стороны о ШОС писали как о геополитическом, ав торитарном ответе для НАТО, ведучим себя жестко на словах, но не на деле.
PL
Na tle azjatyckich partii komunistycznych Komunistyczna Partia Birmy (KPB) reprezentuje bardzo ciekawy casus. Jej unikatowość wyraża się w niezależności. KPB wyrosła z rodzimych, birmańskich tradycji walki narodowowyzwoleńczej i przez wiele lat, jeśli nie dekad, miała jedynie sporadyczne kontakty z zagranicznymi partiami komunistycznymi (najsilniejsze, choć i tak słabe, z Komunistyczną Partią Indii, dopiero później nastąpiło zbliżenie z Pekinem). To oddalenie od najważniejszych ośrodków komunistycznych spowodowało polityczną niezależność KPB aż do połowy lat sześćdziesiątych. Będąc kilkakrotnie bliska zdobycia władzy w Birmie, nigdy jej nie przejęła, i to pomimo kontrolowania sporych połaci pogranicza birmańsko-chińskiego w latach siedemdziesiątych i osiemdziesiątych. Do swojego samounicestwienia w 1989 r. była ona najważniejszym przeciwnikiem rządu birmańskiego. Przez dekady niezależna ideologicznie, w połowie lat sześćdziesiątych przyjęła maoizm (i płynące za nim istotne wsparcie finansowe Pekinu), co doprowadziło do jej klęski, najpierw w centralnej części kraju, a następnie na pograniczach w 1989 r., gdy została zniszczona od środka przez zbuntowane oddziały mniejszości etnicznych.
EN
Communist Party of Burma (CPB) represents an interesting case studies in the international communist movement. It is interesting by its independence: CPB grew from local, Burmese tradition of nationalism and for many years, if not decades, had little contact with external communist parties (mostly with Communist Party of India and, later, Communist Party of China). Hence, it remained independent from both Moscow and Beijing (later, in 1960s it leant towards the latter). A few times close to getting to power, CPB never achieved that goal, even though it controlled large area of Sino-Burmese borderland in 1970s and 1980s. Until its demise in 1989 it remained the second political force in Burma and Rangoon’s biggest opponent. Initially independent and nationalistic, later it embraced Maoism which contributed to CPB’s failure: first in central Burma in early 1970s and later in the borderlands in 1989.
PL
Uwagę naukowców, dziennikarzy i innych publicystów piszących o Birmie w ostatnich latach przykuła przede wszystkim sprawa prześladowań nieuznanej muzułmańskiej mniejszości Rohingya, której większość ludności została wygnana do Bangladeszu. Brutalna rozprawa armii birmańskiej z Rohingya, niosąca znamiona zbrodni przeciw ludzkości i czystki etnicznej, zepchnęła na dalszy plan birmańską transformację ustrojową i zniszczyła dobry image międzynarodowy Birmy. Sam casus Rohingya pokazuje z kolei w modelowy wręcz sposób głębsze, bo sięgające kolonializmu i dekolonizacji przyczyny konfliktów na obszarach postkolonialnych ogóle, a w Azji Południowo-Wschodniej i Azji Południowej w szczególności.
EN
In the recent years, repression against Rohingya – an unrecognized Muslim minority in Burma/Myanmar expelled recently from Myanmar to Bangladesh – became the most recognised Burma-related (or perhaps even Southeast Asia-related) event worldwide. Rohingya’s exodus, accompanied by crimes against humanity, overshadowed Myanmar’s political transformation and annihilated the positive image of this country. The background that led to this ethnic cleansing, however, is deeper and connected to the painful decolonisation of Burma. As such, it represents the model case study of problematic decolonisation in Southeast Asia.
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Against the background of the dramatic events unfolding in Myanmar/Burma where the military had been pacifying mass peaceful protests, the political career of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Burmese Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, the political leader of Myanmar/Burma in 2016-2021 and previously one of the world’s most famous political prisoners, is nearing its end. Once the darling of the Western world, then mercilessly criticised by former supporters, Aung San Suu Kyi remains an ambiguous figure who evokes strong emotions both domestically and internationally. As such Aung San Suu Kyi represents a fascinating case study in leadership studies. Using the agency-centred explanation in political studies, this article tries to answer the questions related to the political career of Aung San Suu Kyi. These include: What allowed her to take power and what factors contributed to her political fall? What caused her political decline? Why did Suu Kyi enjoy the Western support and why did she lose it? How can her governance be assessed?
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