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Polityka wyznaniowa. Zakres zjawiska

100%
Michalak R.
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio K – Politologia
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2019
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vol. 26
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issue 1
EN
Confessional policy is primarily a specific kind of public policy of the state, focused on the activity of religious organizations (religious or confessional associations), that is, communities whose purpose is to confess and spread religious faith (within the meaning of each religion), having their own hierarchy, doctrine and worship. The essence of politics is then shaping the relationship of the state with individual religious relationships, but also influencing the relations between them. The religious policy of the state includes activities of a conceptual, program, operational and executive nature, implemented by specialized entities of state power towards religious entities. Under the conditions of a democratic state, they are administrative institutions (independent, e.g. in the form of an office or ministry, or being part of a wider structure, e.g. a department within the ministry) and special services (e.g. monitoring the activities of religious fundamentalists or destructive sects). In authoritarian and totalitarian countries, the subject pursuing denominational policy may be more complex (e.g., apart from state structures, party structures have a decisive status, and extended special services also play a greater role). Confessional policy is conditioned by a number factors, among which the following can be distinguished: internal (e.g. the specificity and the religious and confessional structure of the state, the political system, the ideology prevailing in the state, the pragmatics of political struggle, the legal and systemic religious model of the state, the relationships between the ethno-cultural and religious identifications) and external (e.g., state security considerations, the nature of confessional policy within the international environment, geopolitical conditions, international legal norms in which the said state participates, the scale and nature of international "networking" of a given religious community). Among the varieties of confessional policy the following can be distinguished: the confessional policy of the concession (practically unrestricted, with the activities of a religious association state-supported or  at least approved), the confessional policy of rationalizing (consent of the state to the basic activity of religious associations, directed mainly at the faithful of their own community and consent to limited external activity) and the confessional policy of liquidation (counteracting the negatively evaluated tendencies and phenomena occurring in the activities of a religious organization, or even attempts at its delegalisation and complete eradication). The confessional policy of the state is most often considered as a component of internal policy, however, it may also be an important component of foreign policy.
PL
Celem artykułu jest zdefiniowanie polityki wyznaniowej oraz ustalenie zakresu występowania tego zjawiska. Towarzyszy temu prezentacja najważniejszych uwarunkowań (wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych), profilów polityki wyznaniowej (koncesja, reglamentacja i likwidacja) oraz prawidłowości w jej obszarze. Poza podmiotowością państwa – jako głównego twórcy i realizatora polityki wyznaniowej – w takiej roli można odnaleźć także: organizacje międzynarodowe, podmioty samorządowe, związki religijne oraz podmioty wewnątrzkonfesyjne (frakcje, grupy interesu). W artykule podjęto również próbę zarysowania najważniejszych zależności między polityką wyznaniową państwa, jego strukturą religijną oraz zróżnicowanym podłożem systemowym i ustrojowym. Rozważania umiejscowiono w kontekście refleksji naukowej na gruncie politologii religii.
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„Na drugim planie”. Nierzymskokatolickie Kościoły i związki wyznaniowe na obrzeżach głównego nurtu polityki wyznaniowej PRL.

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Michalak R.
Studia Zachodnie
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2014
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vol. 16
153-176
PL
Intencją i strategicznym celem władz partyjno-państwowych w Polsce Ludowej była likwidacja wszystkich organizacji religijnych (z Kościołem Rzymskokatolickim na czele) i całkowity zanik życia religijnego. W praktyce polityka likwidacyjna oznaczała konsekwentnie represyjne działania wobec dwóch związków wyznaniowych w latach 1945-1989 (Kościół Greckokatolicki i Świadkowie Jehowy) i wobec czterech innych w latach 1945-1956 (Kościół Metodystyczny, Zjednoczony Kościół Ewangeliczny, Unia Zborów Adwentystów Dnia Siódmego, Kościół Polskokatolicki). Polityką reglamentacyjną przez cały okres Polski Ludowej objęta była większość związków wyznaniowych. Po 1956 roku dołączyły do tego grona cztery uprzednio przeznaczone do likwidacji. Głównym środkiem wiodącym do osiągnięcia celów polityki wyznaniowej była obsada kierowniczych stanowisk we wszystkich wspólnotach, a podstawowym przeznaczeniem organizacji religijnych stało się ich propagandowe zaangażowanie o charakterze propaństwowym i antyrzymskokatolickim. Niektórymi wspólnotami władze interesowały się w mniejszym stopniu. O klasyfikacji „drugiego planu” decydowały kryteria ilościowe („mała liczba wyznawców”), a przede wszystkim jakościowe („brak zagrożeń dla interesów państwa”). I choć w odniesieniu do tych grup nie prowadzono większych spraw koncepcyjno-programowych, ani też zakrojonych na dużą skalę działań operacyjnych, to pozostawały one pod kontrolą władz, a ich przywódcy objęci byli planową i praktyczną inwigilacją. Był to najbardziej wymowny dowód na utrwalanie systemu opartego na dogłębnym nadzorze politycznym nad związkami wyznaniowymi i całością życia religijnego. Z punktu widzenia władz, korzyść jaką przynosiła egzystencja tych wspólnot (dostrzeżona po 1956 roku), wyrażała się w możliwościach propagandowych na forum międzynarodowym. Mozaika religijna miała być argumentem na poszanowanie zasad pluralizmu religijnego i swobód wyznaniowych w PRL. Artykuł omawia problematykę dotyczącą mniejszości religijnych w Polsce, które w latach 1945-1989 znalazły się na obrzeżach głównego nurtu polityki wyznaniowej państwa, tj.: muzułmanów, starokatolików, staroobrzędowców, pietystów, irenistów, zielonoświątkowców (poza strukturą Zjednoczonego Kościoła Ewangelicznego), mormonów, buddystów, hinduistów, synkretystów oraz wspólnot funkcjonujących poza oficjalną ewidencją władz.
EN
The intention and strategic aim of the party and national authorities in the People's Republic of Poland was to eradicate all religious organizations (with the Roman Catholic church as their main target) and the complete cessation of religious life. In practice, the eradication policy meant regular, repressive action against the two religious associations in the years 1945-1989 (the Greek Orthodox Church and Jehovah's Witnesses) and four other in the years 1945-1956 (the Methodist Church, the United Evangelical Church, the Union of Churches of Seventh-day Adventists, the Polish-Catholic Church). Regulatory measures were imposed on the majority of religious associations in the whole period of the People's Republic of Poland. After1956 the group was extended to include the four churches previously appointed for eradication. The main aim was to be achieved by staffing the top hierarchical positions within the religious communities and ensuring that the main aim of the religious organizations be to engage in pro-country and anti-Roman Catholic propaganda. The authorities were to a lesser degree interested in some other associations. The classification into the "background" was based on quantitative ("a small number of followers"), but primarily on qualitative principles ("non-threatening to the country's policy"). While the groups were not involved in major conceptual-programme activities, nor large-scale operations, they remained under regular and practical invigilation. It was the most outspoken attestation to the strengthening of the system based on in-depth political supervision over religious associations and the whole of religious life. From the perspective of the authorities, the advantage resulting from the existence of the associations (noticed only after 1956), offered some propaganda opportunities at the international level. The religious mosaic was to become an argument for respecting the principles of religious pluralism and religious liberties in the PRP. This article is concerned with the issues pertaining to the religious minorities in Poland which in the years 1945-1989 found themselves on the outskirts of the mainstream of the country's religious policy, i.e. Muslims, Old Believers, Pietists, Irenicists, Pentecostals (those outside the structures of the United Evangelical Church), Mormons, Buddhists, Hinduists, Syncretists and communities operating outside the official registration of the authorities.
3

Czynnik religijny w procesie kształtowania nowego wymiaru nordyckiej wspólnoty kulturowej

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Michalak R.
Roczniki Kulturoznawcze
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2017
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vol. 8
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issue 4
7-43
PL
Czynnik religijny był nieodłącznym elementem historycznych procesów kształtowania jedności nordyckiej — np. wspólnota okresu dominacji politeizmu nordyckiego, wspólnota chrześcijańska IX-XIII wieku, wspólnota okresu reformacji. Jednocześnie te same zjawiska stanowiły, przynajmniej w pierwszym swoim stadium, wyzwanie dla ustalonego porządku kulturowo- religijnego i niosły ryzyko długotrwałej dezintegracji. Ta dychotomiczna rola czynnika religijnego wobec homogeniczności kulturowej ujawnia się także współcześnie, gdy nowym wyzwaniem stał się ekspansywny islam. Wobec kryzysu idei wielokulturowości pojawiły się dwa nurty społeczne postulujące restaurację tożsamości etnicznych przy jednoczesnym wzmacnianiu kulturowej wspólnoty nordyckiej: kierunek systemowy i natywistyczny oraz kierunek antysystemowy i kontrakulturacyjny.
EN
The religious factor was an unseperable part of the historical processes of shaping Nordic unity—for example the community of the Nordic polytheism domination period, the Christian community of the 9–13th centuries, the community of the Reformation. Simultanously, the same phenomena presented, at least in the first stage, a challenge to the established cultural and religious order, and bore the risk of prolonged disintegration. This dichotomous role of the religious factor in the face of cultural homogeneity is also emerging today as expansive Islam has become a new challenge. In view of the crisis of the multiculturalism idea, two social trends have emerged suggesting a renewal of ethnic identity while strenghtening the cultural Nordic community both the systemic and nativist as well as the anti-system and anticracial direction.
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Religijne uwarunkowania radykalnego rosyjskiego nacjonalizmu. Tożsamość rosyjsko-prawosławna a islam – kwestia sprzężenia zwrotnego

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Michalak R.
Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne
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2012
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vol. 33
23-35
EN
The aim of this article is a presentation of the most important events of recent years that allows to specify today’s relation between the most radical environments of Russian nationalism and Islam. As the radical nationalists and representatives of the fundamentalistic trend in Islam generally already make themselves enemies, and their growing importance is largely the result of the antagonistic relationship towards each other, obviously it makes sense to talk about effect and the model of “mutual influence and feedback.” This is a relatively new situation. Several years ago, radical nationalists emphasized the need for close cooperation between Orthodox Church and Islam in the name of their common ethos of “municipal community” and the contestation of the liberal-democratic order. In the light of recent events the prognosis for Russia, assuming that the conflict the Russian-Orthodox and Islamic world will be increasing, is surely entitled. Because most immigrants are also Muslims, it should be expected that the radical nationalists will more often identify “strangers” also throughout their religion, which is not rarely seen as “Islamic plague”, and slogans such as “Muslims get out from Russia” raised by skinheads interrupting prayers in Moscow mosques, will be happening more frequently. Even in these national-radical environments which sources were originally neo-pagan, there is no longer any denial of Orthodoxy as the link between Russian nation, but more often and in most cases these groups choose a compromise, namely f.e. pagan-orthodox syncretism directed at Islam.
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Divide et impera. Szkic o złożoności polityki wyznaniowej PRL wobec Kościołów mniejszościowych i jej następstwach

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Michalak R.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
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2005
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issue 1(7)
53-70
EN
Up till 1956 almost all the Churches and religious communities in Poland were affected by the religious policy of the authorities which was aimed at making society atheist while eliminating any subjects standing in the way of this process. Eliminating activities which affected faiths other than Roman Catholic mainly concerned Jehovah’s witnesses, the Polish Catholic Church, Evangelist-Baptist Churches and Unions, the Methodist Church and the Union of the Seventh Day Adventists Communities. “Custom made” solutions were advanced on the basis of the knowledge of the religious policy makers of the specifics, doctrines and dogmas of the various persuasions. The practice of coups within the various Church authorities and the repression of clergymen and leading authorities were typical. At the same time until 1956 the authorities did not try to use other Christian communities against the Roman Catholic Church. The change came in the mid fifties, when the forming of Polish Catholic parishes was supported. The Polish Catholic Church in the mind of the authorities was supposed to become a “Catholic alternative”. As from 1963 this stream was to be supported by Independent Roman Catholic Parishes, i.e. parishes which renounced their submission to the bishops. Most of the Churches and minority communities were used as a propaganda factor during the rivalry between the Catholic Church and State concerning the millennium celebrations in 1966. In April 1981 the “Reformed Evangelical Church” broke away from the group of pro-government Churches. The Church’s synod backed the Independent Self-governing Trade Union “Solidarity” and blamed the authorities for the country’s crisis. The Reformed Evangelists also changed their attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church, seeing it to be the forefront of the “clash with communism and atheism”. After 1989 the clergymen of the Reformed Evangelical Church came to criticize the Roman Catholic Church for the unfair judgement of their leaders, concerning minority religions in general which ignored the complex political context. The Polish People’s Republic’s religious policy did not make society lay or atheist. Its success in reference to Churches and minority religions is, however, that the period of manipulating them and influencing them in other ways, makes ecumenism amongst Polish Christians difficult.
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