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Unlawful deeds referred to as active and passive bribery define the scope of penalisation of administrative corruption, namely that related to the area of public activities. The connection between a corruption activity and the public function that is performed by the person who accepts a bribe is listed in the set of characteristic features of unlawful deeds in Articles 228 and 229 of the Polish Penal Code. The controversies that existed about the interpretation of this feature, which have resulted in a gradual extending of the passive bribery notion, and consequently of the responsibility for active bribery, were supposed to be solved by the amendments to the Penal Code of 2003. The amendments covered the legal definition of the notion of “a person that performs a public function”. The broad scope of this notion has been limited by the obligation to examine, at the stage of subsumption of the specific case, whether the person performing this function has indeed accepted a benefit in connection with the performance of this function.
EN
The aim of this article is to analyse the problem of the criminal liability of a perpetrator who, while committing an offence, was in the state of inebriation or intoxication as a cause of insanity. Although the regulation of this matter was introduced in Art. 31 § 3 of the Criminal Code, it should be re-examined in the light of the separation of intentionality or negligence and culpability in the Criminal Code of 1997. Traditionally, insanity was treated as an exonerating circumstance, although the legislator mentions the elements that characterise intentionality and negligence. That is why, firstly the relation between Art. 31 § 1 and Art. 9 of the Criminal Code should be examined. Taking under consideration the result of this analysis, the article presents evidence that in the light of Art. 31 § 3 of the Criminal Code, the perpetrator can be sentenced only for a negligent offence.
EN
One of the most disputable issues related to the interpretation of Article 231 (1) of the Criminal Code currently in force, is the qualification of this type of a prohibited act as formal (with no consequences) or material (with consequences). It seems that the majority of the arguments support the opinion that an abuse of power should belong to the specific group of abstract exposures to danger, which are called offences of potential danger. The problem is, however, that the legislator has not clearly set out, nor provided for appropriate criteria for the court to asses, in a concrete case, a possibility to create a threat to legal interest.
EN
Within the legal and criminal protection of the activity of public institutions and local self-governments, the legislator has rightly connected the special protection of public officials with their liability for individual offences. Such liability does not, however, apply to persons subject to the protection foreseen for the officials that are not listed in Article 115 (13) of the Criminal Code and this, justifiably, raises doubts. What should be also criticised is the lack of correlation between the specific liability that applies to both officials and other persons who perform public functions, while the other do not have the same protection provided. In her article, the author also discusses the issue of the scope to which the special protection applies to persons not being public officials, related to an unlawful attempt due to the job performed or the position occupied (Criminal Code, Article 231a)
EN
Only a taxpayer may be a perpetrator of a prohibited act consisting in tax evasion. However, this tort is often committed in cooperation with other persons, who jointly make up a criminal group. Then, a problem arises of indicating the grounds for criminal liability of those cooperating who do not have the characteristics required of the perpetrator. The legal provisions regulate differently the liability of extraneous for cooperation in committing a tax tort under Article 54 of the Fiscal Penal Code, depending on whether it is a crime or a minor offense. This difference concerns both potential forms of cooperation and the scope of responsibility of individual persons who have participated in committing the act. In the article, an analysis of these provisions is preceded by an interpretation of the characteristics of the prohibited act under Article 54 of the Fiscal Penal Code, in connection with the issue of an obligation to report on taxation that is an illegal activity.
PL
Sprawcą czynu zabronionego polegającego na uchylaniu się od opodatkowania może być tylko osoba będąca podatnikiem. Delikt ten jest jednak często popełniany w ramach współdziałania z wieloma osobami tworzącymi grupę przestępczą. Powstaje wówczas problem wskazania podstaw odpowiedzialności karnej tych współdziałających, którzy nie posiadają cechy wymaganej od sprawcy. Przepisy prawa regulują odmiennie odpowiedzialność ekstraneusa za współdziałanie w popełnieniu deliktu skarbowego z art. 54 Kodeksu karnego skarbowego w zależności od tego, czy chodzi o popełnienie przestępstwa, czy wykroczenia. Odmienność ta dotyczy zarówno możliwych form współdziałania, jak i zakresu odpowiedzialności poszczególnych osób uczestniczących w popełnieniu czynu. Analizę przepisów poprzedza interpretacja pojęcia podmiotu czynu zabronionego z art. 54 k.k.s., z uwagi na obowiązek zgłoszenia przedmiotu opodatkowania będącego czynnością sprzeczną z prawem.
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EN
This article discusses various ideas concerning the legal nature of attempted crime, which has traditionally been viewed as a stage of crime. Using the method of analysing criminal law provisions based on a systemic examination of the normative structures encoded in these provisions, some authors have come to a different conclusion and posited that an attempt is a separate type of prohibited act. The article attempts to interpret this method which, taking into account the scholarly achievements to date in the field of normative analyses of penal provisions, does not question the nature of an attempt as a stage of crime that does not have an independent existence. A separate problem related to the way of interpreting the normative nature of an attempt is the issue of the application of the provisions on attempted offenses to those that are delictum sui generis of an attempt. A normative analysis of the attempt, shaped in the penal code as a stage of crime, leads to the conclusion that the basis of this legal structure is a violation of the same sanctioned norm that we extrapolate from the provision specifying the act.
PL
W artykule omówiono różne koncepcje na temat charakteru prawnego usiłowania postrzeganego tradycyjnie jako forma stadialna przestępstwa. Stosując metodę analizy przepisów prawnokarnych opartą na systemowym badaniu struktur normatywnych zakodowanych w tych przepisach, niektórzy autorzy dochodzą do odmiennych wniosków i przyjmują, że usiłowanie jest odrębnym typem czynu zabronionego. W artykule podjęto próbę takiego sposobu interpretacji, który uwzględniając dotychczasowy dorobek nauki w zakresie analiz normatywnych przepisów karnych, nie kwestionuje jednocześnie charakteru usiłowania jako nieposiadającej bytu samoistnego postaci stadialnej przestępstwa. Osobnym problemem, związanym ze sposobem odczytania charakteru normatywnego usiłowania, jest kwestia stosowania przepisów o usiłowaniu do przestępstw będących delictum sui generis usiłowania. Analiza normatywna usiłowania ukształtowanego w kodeksie karnym jako forma stadialna przestępstwa prowadzi do wniosku, że u podstaw tej konstrukcji prawnej leży naruszenie tej samej normy sankcjonowanej, którą odczytujemy z przepisu typizującego dokonanie.
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