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1
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Konstytucyjne aspekty zawieszonego parlamentu w Wielkiej Brytanii

100%
Wieciech T.
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego
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2011
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issue 1 (5)
11-29
PL
Zjawisko zawieszonego parlamentu, w którym żadna z partii nie dysponuje większością ogólnej liczby mandatów w Izbie Gmin ma w Wielkiej Brytanii znaczenie nie tylko polityczne, ale i konstytucyjne. Analiza precedensów ustrojowych oraz stosownych konwenansów konstytucyjnych prowadzi do wniosku, że konsekwencją zawieszonego parlamentu może być zwiększenie ustrojowej roli monarchy prowadzące do jego zaangażowania w procedurze tworzenia rządu oraz w zakresie rozwiązywania parlamentu. W obu tych kwestiach może pojawić się konieczność skorzystania przez monarchę z tak zwanych uprawnień zastrzeżonych, to znaczy wykonania konstytucyjnych funkcji wbrew radzie premiera, co może wpływać negatywnie na neutralność polityczną królowej. Konstytucyjne kwestie wiążące się z brakiem jednopartyjnej większości parlamentarnej dotyczą również odpowiedzialności politycznej rządu przed parlamentem, która ulega modyfikacji w związku z koniecznym w takiej sytuacji tworzeniem gabinetów mniejszościowych lub koalicyjnych. Korekta konwenansowej zasady rządów odpowiedzialnych odnosi się trzech elementów składających się na solidarną odpowiedzialność gabinetu: zasady zaufania; zasady jednomyślności oraz zasady poufności, przy czym w warunkach funkcjonowania gabinetów koalicyjnych zmienia się treść pierwszej z nich a w warunkach gabinetów koalicyjnych dwóch pozostałych.
EN
The article points out that a hung parliament, one in which no party commands a majority in the House of Commons, raises not only political but also important constitutional questions. The latter are concerned with the proper role of the monarch in constitutional democracy as well as with ministerial responsibility which in a hung parliament needs to be accommodated both to minority and coalition governments. In a hung parliament the government formation is not straightforward and the Queen may be compelled to engage more actively in the process and even to use its reserve powers in case the prime minister defeated at the elections would not resign and ask her for a dissolution of parliament instead. In a hung parliament either minority or coalition government can be formed, though the latter has never been created until 2010. When there is no one-party majority in parliament collective ministerial responsibility has to be accommodated to the circumstances, the confidence rule when minority government was formed and unanimity as well as confidentiality rules if coalition was created.
2
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Monarcha brytyjski jako gwarant konstytucyjnych podstaw ustroju

100%
Wieciech T.
Przegląd Prawa Konstytucyjnego
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2011
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issue 4 (8)
81-94
PL
W warunkach nieskodyfikowanej konstytucji, której elementem są pozaprawne normy konwenansowe sądy nie mogę pełnić wobec niej funkcji gwarancyjnej. W ustroju brytyjskim rolę gwaranta konstytucyjnych podstaw ustroju może odgrywać monarcha. Prerogatywy królewskie, z których monarcha korzysta za radą odpowiedzialnych przed parlamentem ministrów mogą być bowiem w szczególnych okolicznościach wykorzystane dla ochrony zagrożonych wartości konstytucyjnych. W tym kontekście szczególnego znaczenia nabierają prawo monarchy do zdymisjonowania premiera, rozwiązania parlamentu oraz udzielania sankcji ustawom parlamentu. Monarcha brytyjski może pełnić funkcję gwaranta konstytucji pomimo braku demokratycznej legitymacji. Wymaga to jednak od niego zachowania szczególnej ostrożności oraz powściągliwości. Interwencja monarchy dopuszczalna jest jedynie w wyjątkowych okolicznościach, w których aktorzy polityczni występowaliby przeciwko podstawowym zasadom demokracji parlamentarnej, rządów odpowiedzialnych oraz suwerenności ludu.
EN
Under unwritten constitution, part of which are constitutional conventions courts are unable to guarantee obedience to constitutional rules and values. In United Kingdom it is therefore the monarch who stands as a custodian of the constitution. Royal prerogatives that are normally exercised only on advice of responsible ministers can be used to protect constitution. The most important are so-called reserve powers to dismiss prime minister and other ministers, to dissolve parliament and to give royal assent. The Monarch is able to successfully perform this function despite the want of democratic legitimacy but he should always be cautious and act only if he is perfectly positive that his intervention is absolutely necessary. He would therefore be entitled to intervene only in a dire emergency if political actors stood against the fundamental rules of parliamentary democracy, responsible government and sovereignty of the people.
3
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Konstytucyjne aspekty limitu kadencji dla kongresmenów i senatorów w Stanach Zjednoczonych

100%
Wieciech T.
Przegląd Sejmowy
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2018
|
issue 1(144)
135–164
EN
Term limits for US Congress are back in the political agenda with another proposition of constitutional amendment having been introduced in the House of Representatives. Even though it seems that it doesn’t stand much chances in Congress, it shows yet again that congressional term limits are still considered the most desired of all constitutional reforms. From constitutional perspective the right of the states to impose term limits on their representatives and senators remains the most controversial issue, despite Supreme Court’s Decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton in 1995. The article not only offers a critical comment on this particular decision, but it also presents argument in favor of constitutionality of term limits under both the tenth amendment and — to a limited extend — time, places and manner clause. It is argued that congressional term limits removing long-term representatives and senators from the ballot but allowing them to run a write-in campaign are a manner regulation which means that they are constitutional under the time, places and manner clause of the constitution. To support this conclusion the article draws on current as well as historical sources, both primary and secondary
4
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VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE UNDER THE WESTMINSTER PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM (Wotum nieufności w parlamentaryzmie westminsterskim)

100%
Wieciech T.
Przegląd Sejmowy
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2010
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issue 6(101)
83-102
EN
Under the Westminster system of government, the normative basis of political accountability of the government is provided by constitutional conventions being the norms of an informal and extralegal nature. Consequently, there are no formalized procedures to hold the government politically accountable to the parliament, which would allow the latter to pass a vote of no confidence in the government. Currently, the Cabinet is accountable only to the lower chamber of parliament, which means that only the loss of confidence of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom and Canada, and the House of Representatives in Australia, imposes on the prime mister a constitutional obligation to submit his resignation or to bring about the dissolution of parliament. Parliament may express a vote of no confidence directly or indirectly, and, in the practice of governance, the possibility of withdrawal of confidence from an individual member of government has been eliminated. The defeat of a supply bill (one that concerns the spending of money) is an indirect form of expressing a vote of no confidence. Any voting in parliament may be transformed by the prime minister into a motion of no confidence, who is required to make a declaration to this effect. The specificity of the procedures for passing a vote of no confidence by parliament under the Westminster parliamentary system is evident in the lack of traditional instruments to rationalize political accountability of the government. In these circumstances, rationalization of political accountability manifests itself in limiting the possible use of indirect form of passing a vote of no confidence almost only to refusal to authorize the expenditure of funds on government activities, consideration only those motions of no confidence which are submitted by the Opposition leader, as well as exclusion of the possibility of unexpected fall of a government having majority support in the parliament, inter alia, by the use of the mechanism of pairing. However, the lack of classic mechanisms rationalizing political accountability of the government does not result in strengthening of the position of parliament in relation to the government, as could be manifested by a frequent application of the motion of no confidence by the legislature. In practice, a stable two-party political system enabling the creation of majority one-party Cabinets, should be considered to the most important mechanism for rationalization of political accountability of the government.
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CONTINGENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BY THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE (Rezerwowa procedura wyboru prezydenta Stanow Zjednoczonych przez Izbe Reprezentantow)

100%
Wieciech T.
Przegląd Sejmowy
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2011
|
issue 4(105)
91-110
EN
If no candidate for President receives a majority of the electoral votes (in Electoral College), election is determined by the House of Representatives. In this event, the House is limited to choosing from among no more than the three candidates who received the most electoral votes. Delegation of each state has one vote, it votes collectively. In order to win, a candidate must receive an absolute majority of state delegation votes. Contingency procedure for election of President by the House was applied only twice: in 1801 and 1825. Therefore, it is one of the lesser-known functions of the lower house of Congress. This procedure has never been the subject of a Supreme Court judgment. Apart from the most important procedural aspect, an analysis of the contingency procedure for Presidential election should also take in account a wide constitutional aspect, considering its relations with basic constitutional principles and the problem of legitimacy of a President elected by the House of Representatives.
6
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THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A MEMBER OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (Zasada indywidualnej odpowiedzialnosci politycznej czlonków rzadu Wielkiej Brytanii)

100%
Wieciech T.
Przegląd Sejmowy
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2010
|
issue 2(97)
117-138
EN
Individual ministerial responsibility to Parliament, together with the principle of collective responsibility of government, creates the concept of responsible government being the foundation of the system of government in the UK. Political responsibility of ministers is regulated by a constitutional convention which specifies the circumstances in which a minister should resign taking responsibility for the mismanagement of his/her department. The scope and form of ministerial responsibility to Parliament is diversified: their responsibility is unconditional as regards the requirement to inform and explain, and to take remedial steps. Resignation is, however, expected when responsibility for irregularities, failure to act or mistakes may be ascribed to a particular minister. In the recent years, the principle of individual ministerial responsibility has considerably evolved. The most important change was the introduction of a distinction between political and administrative issues. For political issues a minister bears full responsibility, while in case of administrative issues his/her responsibility is limited and does not include the obligation to resign. This distinction has been reflected in the doctrine, by the proposal of separation of the notions of responsibility and accountability to define various aspects of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. Due to the lack of precise norms regulating particularly the question of ministerial resignation and Parliament's incapability to effectively enforce ministerial requirement to account, the principle is sometimes considered ineffective. However, it is still the basic principle of the British system of government that underlies mutual relations between the Government and Parliament.
7
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Polityka koalicyjna w systemie westminsterskim Przemysław Żukiewicz Koalicje w systemie politycznym Nowej Zelandii. Od klasycznych do sieciowych porozumień Instytut Politologii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2020, s. 161

100%
Wieciech T.
Przegląd Sejmowy
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2022
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issue 1(168)
217-228
EN
The Mixed Member Proportional electoral system introduced in New Zealand in 1993 resulted in major changes to the political system. In a multi-party environment, government formation required cooperation between different political parties. Hence, single-party majority governments have been replaced by coalition governments, and support contracts emerged as a new form of an agreement made between parties in addition to or instead of the traditional coalition agreement. This book discusses coalition politics and government formation in New Zealand after 1993. It argues that support contracts, as an innovative form of cooperation between political parties in the government formation process question traditional government-opposition and minority government-majority government divides.
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