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EN
My aim is to put together Husserl’s main ideas on the phenomenological method, to show the phases of its development as the consciousness’ reflection about itself. The condition of possibility of such reflection is that there be a point of view which guarantees access to the intentional domain, and also that the subject be able to enquire into the ways its intentional experiences are connected to the world. This condition, it is argued here, should be considered to be a regulative idea. Phenomenological reduction, which enables phenomenological reflection, is really an unending process, a series of reductions that lead to evidence. Looking for evidence is the source of the dynamic of consciousness; this primary curiosity, this striving to fulfill intentions lies at the bottom of all its interests and purposes. Cartesian clara and distincta perceptio motivates the positing of each object as real or unreal, possible, probable, or dubious. The search for evidence is, therefore, the character of consciousness as such; striving for evidence makes life of the mind rational, i.e., oriented toward truth and objectivity. Phenomenology, seen as reviving the norms of cognizing and acting, makes it possible to think of the unity of philosophy, science, and life, and is still worth being treated as a cure for today’s irrationality and subjectivity.
EN
The first phase of analytical philosophy dates from the eighties of 19th century to the late twenties of 20th century. Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein then wrote their eminent works. The structure, function, and meaning of language were also the subject of investigation of Franz Brentano and his pupils, especially Marty, Twardowski, Meinong, and Husserl. The linguistic turn in philosophy would not have been possible if it had not been for the broad influence of Brentano's ideas. In this context one may speak of the English-Austrian School. The paper takes into account Brentano's theory of meaning and his important successors.
EN
The paper takes into account Husserl’s theory of consciousness and presents it in the light of the theory of autopietic system. Consciousness is able to organize its elements, processes, levels and structure into a system only when is capable of reflection. Reflection is essential for unity and efficacy of consciousness.
PL
Świadomość jest podstawą świata ludzkiego życia we wszystkich jego aspektach, również w aspekcie osobowym. Szczególną postacią świadomości jest refleksja. Ma ona największe znaczenie dla jedności, jednolitości, złożoności i efektywności systemu, jakim jest świadomość. Z punktu widzenia historii fenomenologii, kolejne jej przekształcenia – realistyczna, transcendentalna i genetyczna są etapami refleksji rozumianej jako „spojrzenie niezaangażowanego obserwatora”. Skoro rdzeniem metody fenomenologicznej i warunkiem możliwości fenomenologii jest refleksyjność świadomości, nic dziwnego, że fenomenologia nie ma żadnej z góry ustalonej logiki i metodologii, ponieważ swoją metodę i sens może uzyskać poprzez wciąż ponawiany namysł nad sobą.
EN
The article presents Andrzej Półtawski’s criticism of the concept of experience, aimed primarily at Husserl’s theory of perception. This critique led Półtawski to the concept of a personal conceptual model of the world. It was only from this perspective that it became possible to combine the cognitive, moral, and spiritual aspects into one coherent concept of man. Półtawski has repeatedly emphasized the importance of phenomenology in understanding the foundations of knowledge, values, and the human position in the world. Phenomenology was his constant point of reference, and in it he sought inspiration to answer questions about the sources and certainty of knowledge, principles of conduct, and the concept of man. He strongly rejected idealistic trends in phenomenology and unfounded claims of certainty. He argued for its realistic interpretation and tried to develop it creatively, referring to the evolutionary theory of cognition, psychology, and psychiatry.
6
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Poznanie siebie jako podstawa tożsamości

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PL
Socjologiczne badania pozwalają zrozumieć zmiany, jakim podlegają pojęcia tożsamości, indywidualności, zobowiązań wobec siebie i społeczeństwa, sztuki, instytucji uniwersytetu, religii. Zmiany zagrażają integralności jednostki. Autor zwraca się do poglądów Immanuela Kanta, Martina Heideggera, Ludwiga Wittgensteina, Karola Wojtyły i Charlesa Taylora po środki konieczne do tworzenia i zachowania tożsamości.
EN
Sociological investigations show the ever changing meaning of concepts of individual, identity, obligation towards self and others, and also culture, university, religion. In consumerist societies these concepts become fluid. Not only the project of a life style becomes market-oriented, but also that of self-fulfilment. The personal identity requires attention, goals, values, a language. Personal identity requires reflection. Kant, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Wojtyła and Taylor provide guidelines as how to examine this kind of reflection.
EN
The aim of the theory of experience presented in the 'Phenomenology of Perception' was to overcome the traditional difficulties of empiricism and intellectualism by showing their common ground, primordial perception. The starting point made it possible to take into account the genesis of these contrary positions. The analysis of world experienced by a bodily subject led to the conditions of existence of a free and conscious subject and, correlatively, its experienced world. The intentionality of the body proper proved to be so constitutive for conscious being in the world that the consequences of its disintegration, as examples of pathology and experiments had shown, meant breaking up the unity of the experienced and inter-subjective world, as well as of the conscious subject. The intentionality of the body gained the status of a basis of experience, a source and criterion of every type of knowledge. The body proper as capacity of sensing, perceiving, pointing, speaking, expressing, etc. took the place of transcendental consciousness. Merleau-Ponty dismissed the cogito. The author calls this 'transcendentalism a rebours'. But in some fragments of the 'Phenomenology of Perception' Merleau-Ponty did not take for granted the primacy of the intentionality of the body. His next works would confirm this change. The relationship between man and the world is not given along with the nature of the body. It is only one aspect of human existence. Language, history, and culture permeate the level of perception from the very beginning and determine the process of becoming a free and conscious subject. In the 'Phenomenology of Perception' there are, then, two motives, that of primordial perceiving as the guarantee of all sense and that of giving sense with no basis in a ready pattern. The article shows examples of the relationship between perception and cognition and between the subject of perception and the conscious subject, illustrating how the two motives are interwoven.
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PL
Świadomość była nicią przewodnią fenomenologicznych dociekań Edmunda Husserla. Rozumiał je jako krytykę doświadczenia a następnie opartej na nim metafizyki i nauki. Fenomenologia to krytyka poznania, metoda badania i stawiania pytań. Husserl, w późniejszych pismach, określił świadomość jako „system intencjonalnych funkcji”, „system intencjonalnych operacji”. Jego korelatem jest spójny i nacechowany prawidłowościami świat. W systemie intencjonalnych funkcji jednym z ważniejszych aspektów są habitualności – wzorce, reprezentacje mentalne, które powstają w procesie „typizacji” i odtąd kierują naszym zwykłym myśleniem i działaniem. Dzięki nim wstępnie określony jest rodzaju obiektu, jego cechy i własności oraz wyznaczone w zasadzie sposoby jego poznawania. Moim zadaniem jest podać charakterystykę szerokiego kontekstu powstawania habitualności, czyli strumienia świadomości i możliwości czucia i ruchu cielesnego podmiotu. Omówię kolejno temporalną strukturę doświadczenia i jego zależność od ruchu i działania cielesnego podmiotu, a następnie scharakteryzuję formę ogólnej zażyłości ze światem. W tym kontekście „nieokreślonej rzeczywistości” rozgrywa się konstytucja i przywoływanie zdeponowanego sensu, antycypacja rodzaju przedmiotu i jego cech. W zakończeniu sformułuję kilka uwag dotyczących habitualności jako źródła pojęć empirycznych.
EN
At the very basis of the cognitive efficacy of consciousness there is a domain of passive synthesis, a pre-linguistic and pre-predicative intentionality that Husserl called world-experiencing life (welterfahrenes Leben). It also makes possible thematic consciousness and its connection to the world. Husserl holds the opposed notions of passivity and activity to be functional. What has been actively constituted becomes passive and a basis for higher forms of understanding. The article offers arguments for the above mentioned thesis, taking into account the systematic unity of consciousness. It presents the formal and material aspects of consciousness, the domain of passive synthesis and also the role of reflection for its peculiar autonomy. In the broader view it is easier to explain the meaning of the opposed notions of passivity and activity. The opposition depicts the dynamics of the system of consciousness.
EN
The paper presents the process of auto-constitution of consciousness, its main parts and levels. It also explains the principles of working, temporal extension, source of dynamics, unity, aim etc., as well as a relative independence from other systems among which consciousness is placed.
11
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Wittgenstein – przykłady błędów językowych

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PL
Artykuł przedstawia kilka podanych przez Wittgensteina przykładów językowych źródeł koncepcji filozoficznych. Głównymi czynnikami, które prowadzą filozofów na manowce, są analogie i podobieństwa struktur gramatycznych. Zwrócenie uwagi na konteksty użycia słów interesujących z filozoficznego punktu widzenia: piękno, dobro, prawda, czas, myślenie, umysł... itd. przekonuje, że pełnią one określoną rolę w naszym sposobie mówienia, lecz nie denotują faktów.
EN
The article presents linguistic sources of philosophical conceptions. The main reasons that lead philosophers astray are grammatical analogies and the similarity of grammatical structure. Wittgenstein points contexts of use of philosophically interesting words. Beauty, goodness, truth, time, thinking, mind…etc. – these words play a certain role in our way of speaking, but they do not denote facts.
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