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Symbol (w) Cutting Age

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With reference to the idea of postmodern culture which uses the episteme of tmesis, I attempt to consider in its context the status of symbol. Even if the Nietzschean programme of suspension of symbolization processes is preached, the desymbolization – forced by the Cutting Age – cannot succeed. By distinguishing various types of symbolization based on the concepts of tekmérion, tekmar and eikos, I show that the postmodern cut makes a paradoxical synthesis of those types and it does not violate the identity of symbol, because symbol as a unit (sym-bállica) implies some dichotomisation. Referring to Carl Gustav Jung, who referred to a ceremony of reconstructing an ape, I find the most spectacular manifestation of this symbolization in the attempts at dehumanization and demonization of Barack Obama's person.
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How to read out the work of A.G. Baumgarten after Duchamp’s anesthesia? The author of this interpretation of aesthetics as asteiology (Greek: asteidzomai – to be witty) seeks to reconstruct the foundations of aesthetic thinking as the art, science and paideia of wit, and he proves that the category of acutum ingenium occupies the central role in Baumgarten’s aesthetics. From Quintilianus to Kant wit (ingenium) was comprehended as a form of invention, cognition, expression and a talent for social communication, and in Baumgarten’s asteiology as the ideal (habitus) of arts and sciences. Raising the issue of asteism (Greek: asteísmos) as a mental process in the Polish art, starting with – nomen omen – the wit of Witkacy, we have to make use of a normative model of asteic intelligence. This is the author’s answer to the wit – often without asteism – of the contemporary post-art, post-aesthetics or post-philosophy.
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Will the dog crush heron’s leg, or will the heron pluck out the dog’s eyes? – an array of possible decodings of this animalistic drama appears in the logical-ontological space of the image. However, an image does not participate in any of the worlds it implies. This visual asteism shows that the ontological participation is different from the metaphysical. Thus, the problem of metaphysical participation will not be solved by the logical-rhetorical trope of diaporesis that Abraham Hondius used to achieve almost an isocephaly in this struggle between what is high-flying and what is mundane or – perhaps – between metaphysics and asteiology. We find a paradigmatic display of this struggle in the Parmenides, where the One was wittily juxtaposed with idea of ... dust. Moreover, in the case of analogy of being, the diaporia is also an aporia, since analogia entis as analogy as such must be ultimately understood analogically (sic!), and thus asteiologically. And this is not a mistake of ignotum per ignotum but a good solution to our problem (an euporia), which is unlikely to satisfy ontology seeking an evidentialist truth. Such a conclusion would be potentially important for asteiology as the ingenium theory, which traces its subreptions also to metaphysics.
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Czy pies zgruchocze łapę czapli, czy czapla wydłubie mu oczy? – ustawia się w przestrzeni logiczno-ontologicznej malowidła szereg możliwych rozstrzygnięć zwierzęcego dramatu. Lecz obraz nie partycypuje w żadnym ze światów, które implikuje. Ten wizualny asteizm ukazuje, że partycypacja ontologiczna różni się od partycypacji metafizycznej. Problemu partycypacji metafizycznej nie wyczerpie więc trop diaporezy, jakim posłużył się Abraham Hondius, by osiągnąć prawie izokefalię w tej walce pomiędzy tym, co górnolotne, i tym, co przyziemne, czy – być może – metafizyczne i asteiologiczne, a czego paradygmatyczny popis mamy w Parmenidesie, gdzie Jedno zestawiono z ideą … kurzu. Co więcej, w przypadku analogii bytu diaporia jest zarazem aporią, skoro analogia entis musi być ostatecznie rozumiana analogicznie (sic!), a więc asteiologicznie. I nie jest to błąd ignotum per ignotum, lecz dobre rozwiązanie naszego problemu (euporia), które ontologii poszukującej ewidencjalistycznej prawdy raczej nie zadowoli. Taka konkluzja jest potencjalnie doniosła dla asteiologii jako teorii ingenium, która tropi jego subrepcje także w metafizyce.
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One of the most spectacular turns in the art of the 20th century was based on the linguistic reorientation of philosophy, whose extreme manifestation was Wittgenstein's non- denotational conception of meaning. It inspired the so-called analytical conceptualism that was trying in vain to overcome the heterogeneous nature of conceptism, from which it derived. This is reflected especially in Joseph Kosuth's confusion concerning the neo-positivist inspiration and one of the guiding themes of natural language philosophy which emphasizes the significance of metaphor and the fundamental role of the functor as in human thinking. The following article presents this process of inconsistent reduction of art to language, showing some of its consequences and its replacement by contextualism.
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Podstawą jednego z najbardziej spektakularnych zwrotów w sztuce XX wieku była lingwistyczna reorientacja filozofii, której skrajnym przejawem była niedenotacyjna koncepcja znaczenia Ludwiga Wittgensteina. Jej aplikacji dokonał tzw. analityczny konceptualizm, który w tym lingwistycznym zwrocie daremnie usiłował przezwyciężyć heterogeniczny charakter konceptyzmu, z którego notabene się wywodził. Świadczy o tym, zwłaszcza u Josepha Kosutha, pomieszanie neopozytywistycznej inspiracji z motywem filozofii języka naturalnego, który podkreśla doniosłość metaforyzacji i myślenia z pomocą funktora as [podobnie jak]. Niniejszy tekst przedstawia proces tej niezbornej redukcji sztuki do języka, ukazując niektóre jej konsekwencje oraz jej wyraźną granicę, jaką stał się kontekstualizm.
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Veer Towers (2010) – one of the architectural works designed by Helmut Jahn – is here only a good allegory of the healthy scepticism after 9/11, regarding the new modernism. They may be seen as being iconologically linked with the philosophical question of its founding, namely, with the reasons for its perception as new in relation to the historical modernism. To this end, it is first necessary to consider the concept of the end of modernity. We can argue that, contrary to the claims of Gianni Vattimo, postmodernism can be viewed as a necessary development or return of modernism, which is primarily the mission of the post-Kantian proceduralism of Jürgen Habermas. However, a major role in the proposed strategy for the sustainable inclusion of the Other should be again played by anger, as suggested by Peter Sloterdijk. Must then the new – contortive or loose – modernism veer into another disaster? Will this attempt to control resentiments – such as the anger of the political Islam – force a turn to some timocracy well-known from the past, if proceduralism is in fact only a tortuously delayed voluntarism or quasi-occasionalism?
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Veer Towers (2010) – jedno z architektonicznych dzieł zaprojektowanych przez Helmuta Jahna – jest tu tylko dobrą alegorią zdrowego sceptycyzmu po 11 IX 2001 roku, odnoszącym się do problemu nowego modernizmu, który musimy ikonologicznie powiązać z filozoficzną kwestią jego ugruntowania, mianowicie z uzasadnieniem możliwości tego, co w nim nowe w stosunku do modernizmu historycznego. W tym celu należy rozważyć najpierw koncept końca nowoczesności. Jeśli wykażemy, że wbrew Ganniemu Vattimo zaistniały warunki, by ponowoczesność wkomponować w konieczny rozwój czy powrót modernizmu, który byłby głównie misją postkantowskiego proceduralizmu Jürgena Habermasa, to i tak główną rolę Innego ponownie musi tu odegrać gniew, jak zasugerował Peter Sloterdijk. Czy wówczas nowy – skręcający czy poluzowany – modernizm nie zboczy ku kolejnej katastrofie? Czy jego próba zapanowania nad resentymentami – na przykład gniewem politycznego islamu – wymusi skręt ku jakiejś znanej z przeszłości tymokracji, jeśli proceduralizm to faktycznie tylko pokrętnie odwlekany woluntaryzm czy quasi-okazjonalizm?
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Ponieważ znam klienta w Amsterdamie, marzę, by odwiedzić Muzeum Van Gogha. Zobaczyć jego oryginały i poczuć to, co on czuł. Chcę inspirować się jego obrazami, bo wtedy mój cel będzie bardziej wyraźny – czytamy napisy w filmie China’s Van Goghs (2016). Trudno nam zrozumieć znaczenie tej wypowiedzi producenta masowych replik. Czy jego pragnieniem jest pogłębienie wiedzy typu knowing that czy chce tylko podnieść efektywność posiadanej już wiedzy typu knowing how? Ale po cóż Zhao Xiaoyong – dysponujący coraz lepszą chińską connectivity – miałby trudzić się, skoro nie ma gwarancji, że jego świetnie prosperujący biznes dostarczy doskonalsze efekty sztuki niż oryginały Van Gogha? Czy istnieją inne konteksty – jak na przykład uczenie bez nadzoru – w których możemy inaczej spojrzeć na słynne rozróżnienie Gilberta Ryle’a i uprzywilejowaną pozycję dobrze ugruntowanej wiedzy?
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“Since I know the client in Amsterdam I have a dream to visit the Van Gogh Museum. See his originals and to feel how he felt. I want to get some inspiration from his paintings then my goal will be more clear,” read the subtitles in the movie China’s Van Goghs (2016). It is difficult for us to understand what the mass replicas manufacturer means. Does he want to deepen the knowledge of the knowing that type or does he simply want to increase the effectiveness of the knowledge of the knowing how type? But why would Zhao Xiaoyong – who has increasingly better Chinese connectivity – bother, despite the objections voiced by his wife, who is in charge of their home budget, since there is no guarantee that his thriving business will provide better art effects than Van Gogh originals? Are there other contexts – as, for example, Unsupervised Learning – in which we can look differently at Gilbert Ryle’s famous distinction and privileged position of well-established knowledge?
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Sztuka jako akt unieważniania

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Jan Swidzinski (b. 1923) has been the one of the main representatives of the post-conceptual movement since mid-seventies. His artistic doctrine Art as Contextual Art (published in February 1976), considered in confrontation with Joseph Kosuth's tautological model of art, makes it possible to appreciate Swidzinski's contribution to overcome the hegemony of conceptualism and New York. Swidzinski was right to indicate that conceptualism of the Art and Language group and Kosuth, although it did try to bring back the profound meaning of art (art is a meaning, not decoration) by introducing non-artistic considerations (self-consciousness), but in fact replaced the traditional formalism of art with the formalism of the neo-positivistic philosophy which was hard to maintain. Kosuth's thesis that the works of art are analytical and tautological sentences - was a mistake because Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as a method of expression, implied an entropy of meaning in art and revealed a need for some sort of verification of the theory of the meaning itself. The tautological model as a relativistic one, while assuming a self-reflection in the autonomous context of art, did not answer the question: why is the term 'art' used this way and not in a different way? So, in 1975 Swidzinski compared the artifacts not to analytical sentences but to sentences comprising intensional functors (their veracity depends upon the contents replacing the variables). The intensionality of artistic statements, that is to say, the presence of functors in them (I know, I believe, I suppose, I must etc.) studied by the epistemological or deontological logic, indicates that they are restricted by the pragmatic moment of experience. Swidzinski declared that Art as Contextual Art is an opposition to the multiplication of meaning, and thus to relativism, and at the same time he recognized the dissimilarity and changeability of contexts, stating that what is real in one context is not real in another, and therefore he tried to sanction relativism. This is the perspective shown in his book Art, Society and Self-consciousness (1979) in which he attempted to define the structure of intensionality as the antagonistic one. In the global context there coexist various logics that regulate our image of the world: the logic of norms, the logic of freedom, the epistemological logic and the logic of a game. The awareness of the intensional structure of the context requires from us today to work out a model of culture, different from the absolutistic and relativistic one, a model in which the repressive opposition of absolutism and relativism have lost significance. It is a question: what society should be? The book is an introduction to Swidzinski's Freedom and Limitation - The Anatomy of Postmodernism (1987). Today, in my opinion, Swidzinski does not resemble the old contextualist who would foster the intentions of a traveller-researcher. He is more of a neo-pragmatic contextualist-tourist. But his doctrine is very important for our understanding of the present art and culture, though the debate between Kosuth's conceptualism and Swidzinski's contextualism appears only to be a case of the history of conceptism and, last but not least, wit (ingenium comparans).
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