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EN
Article aims to discuss the directions and specific features of the reform of the electoral law to parliament in the Republic of Italy. The Italian institutional reforms are an interesting example of electoral engineering, which is treated as a remedy for the dysfunctions of the political system. During the 65 years the principles of the Italian electoral law, especially the method of allocation of mandates, were changed four times. In practice, there were used variants of the proportional system, proportional with majority bonus, and mixed system (proportionalmajority). In 2013, the Italian Parliament has started works on the new electoral reform.
EN
This article examines the change of intra-executive relations under the Fifth Republic. In particular, it looks at the presidential decision to change or reshuffle governments as well as the practice of realization of political responsibility. The political system created by the 1958 Constitution has been called semipresidential. Originally, the concept of the “semi-presidential regime” coined by M. Duverger, has been contested by G. Vedel or O. Duhamel. The Fifth Republic aimed at founding the “rationalized” parliamentarism and re-establishing executive authority as a means of improving cabinet stability and legislative capacity. One of the consequences was the weakened position of the parliament. The government in a semi-presidential system is said to be subject to “dual responsibility” it has to be supported or accepted by parliament, as in parliamentary systems, but also, not formally but in the practice, by the president. The autonomy of the government with regard to the presidency varies over time. Especially this depends on divided executive called “cohabitation”. Cohabitation practice took nine years out of 50 years of history. That nine years are concentrated in the most recent period, between 1986–2002. It shows that cohabitation practice is more exception than the rule. In this context the very significant was the constitutional amendment of 2000, which reduced the presidential mandate, in order to limit the danger of cohabitation. The president has the effective power to change ministers and prime ministers. The resignations of governments have followed either a lost parliamentary elections or the president’s demand to do so. It shows that the president has used the institutional privileges and political circumstances to replace governments or reshuffle in many cases in his own interest. Since 1962, no government has been forced to step down after a successful motion de censure, as laid by art. 49.2 of the Constitution. In the fact, eight of the 18 prime ministers of the Fifth Republic have dismiss without having lost the majority in parliament. The strengthening of the role of the president in the French political system reflect the general tendency towards stronger executive dominance, called “presidentialisation”. There are various reasons for “presidentialisation” i.e. the globalization processes, personalisation of politic, transformation of party system, development of mass media, etc. Some scholars argue that the French political system is evolved in to “ultra-presidentialist”, during the periods when presidential and legislative majorities coincide. In the fact current situation under President N. Sarkozy shows progress of presidentialisation. Actually, the 2008 Constitutional revision aimed at revalorization of the parliament and “democratization of the institutions” has not changed this tendency.
PL
Artykuł jest poświęcony praktyce stosowania narzędzi partycypacyjnych w procesie stanowienia prawa w Polsce. Przedmiotem badania uczyniono wysłuchanie publiczne, wprowadzone do polskiego porządku prawnego w 2005 r. Wykorzystano w nim przede wszystkim metodę instytucjonalno-prawną oraz porównawczą. Analizy zostały osadzone w ramach teoretycznych koncepcji demokracji partycypacyjnej, deliberatywnej i pluralistycznej, koncentrując się na wymiarze legitymizacyjnym procedury wysłuchania publicznego. Analiza normatywna oraz praktyka stosowania tej instytucji pozwala na sformułowanie uogólniających wniosków, które wskazują na jej potencjał legitymizacyjny, w tym na możliwości wpływania na układy instytucjonalne. Zarazem ujawniły one swoistą „wrażliwość” procedury wysłuchania publicznego na kontekst polityczny i społeczny, niosącą ryzyko przekształcenia jej w rodzaj instytucjonalnej fasady dla przedstawicielskiej reguły (o iluzorycznie partycypacyjnym charakterze).
EN
The article is devoted to the practice of using participatory tools in the law-making process in Poland. The subject of the study was the public hearing introduced into the Polish legal order in 2005. It mainly used the institutional-legal and comparative methods. Embedded in the framework of the theoretical concepts of participatory, deliberative, and pluralist democracy, the presented analyses focus on the legitimizing dimension of the public hearing procedure. The analysis of the normative construction and practice of using this institution allows for formulating general conclusions that indicate its legitimizing potential, including its potential to influence institutional arrangements. At the same time, however, this practice revealed a specific “sensitivity” of public hearing procedure to the political and social context, carrying the risk of transforming it into a kind of facade institution for the representative rule (with a somewhat illusory participatory character.
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