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EN
The aim of this article is to show that metaphysical level is the core and condition of possibility of axiology. The paper focuses on methodological differentiation concerning two levels: metaphysical and axiological one. The first one is connected with Goodness, which is the essence of values and an atmosphere that precedes every evaluation, while the second one means discourse about values. When metaphysical level with its Goodness is forgotten, axiology changes itself into “game of values”, that arbitrarily builds hierarchy and tries to measure everything. This “game of values” discounts the level of Goodness and functions as a closed area – a system of rules, where there are only  pseudo-values (goods), but there is no reference to Goodness. Without taking into consideration the metaphysical (i.e. ethical in Levinasian terminology) level and personal thinking axiology shows itself as a totalitarian construct, which only seems to be interested in Goodness and in fact it is more focused on constructing values. The difference between metaphysics and axiology is described via phenomenological analysis of Enigma of Goodness (the order of metaphysics) and phenomenon of good (the order of axiology).
EN
The claim of the paper is that postulates of law making, as well as of analyzing law on the basis of thescientific knowledge on the behavioral regularities lead to paradoxical consequences. I present basic assumptions of the behavioral approach to analysis of law and the reasoning which results in the paradox. In the contemporary research on law, one may observe an increasing interest, especially in the United States and Western Europe, in the development and outcomes of behavioral sciences. References to these sciences are justified from the theoretical perspective (behavioral theories and methods should enable better understanding of the behavioral impact of law), as well as from the policy perspective (they should make possible more effective influences on people’s behavior). In the paper I analyze whether current findings of behavioral sciences allow for formulating such far-reaching conclusions concerning the content of legal norms and their behavioral impact. It will be demonstrated how paradoxes could be avoided, when taking into account concepts and analyses of Leon Petrażycki, especially methodological aspects of his work.
PL
W artykule przedstawiam podstawowe założenia behawioralnego podejścia do analiz prawa i wykazuję, że akceptacja twierdzeń dotyczących zastosowania nauk behawioralnych do analiz prawa, formułowanych przez zwolenników tego podejścia, prowadzi do paradoksu. We współczesnej refleksji nad prawem, prowadzonej zwłaszcza w Stanach Zjednoczonych i Europie Zachodniej, twierdzi się, że wyniki badań nauk behawioralnych mogą znaleźć zastosowanie w kontekstach prawnych. Odwołania do wiedzy o działaniu mają umożliwić z jednej strony adekwatne wyjaśnienie (przez teoretyków) wpływu prawa na działania, z drugiej zaś – skuteczne wpływanie (przez prawodawców) na zachowania i decyzje adresatów norm prawnych. Analizuję, czy aktualne badania i ustalenia nauk behawioralnych pozwalają na formułowanie tak daleko idących wniosków i rekomendacji dotyczących treści norm prawnych oraz ich oddziaływania na decyzje adresatów norm, jak te spotykane w omawianych i krytykowanych pracach. Pokazuję, w jaki sposób paradoksów można uniknąć, nawiązując do koncepcji teoretycznych Leona Petrażyckiego, a w szczególności metodologicznych aspektów jego rozważań.
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