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  1. 2 Filozofia Nauki

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  1. 2 Devitt M.

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  2. 1 2013

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The “Linguistic Conception” of Grammars

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Devitt M.
Filozofia Nauki
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2013
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vol. 21
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issue 2
5-14
PL
The received Chomskian view is that a grammar is about the language faculty. In contrast to this “psychological conception” of linguistics I have argued in Ignorance of Language for a “linguistic conception”. This paper aims to strengthen the case for this conception. It argues that there is a linguistic reality external to the mind and that it is theoretically interesting to study it. If there is this reality, we have good reason to think that grammars are more or less true of it. So, the truth of the grammar of a language entails that its rules govern linguistic reality, giving a rich picture of this reality. In contrast, the truth of the grammar does not entail that its rules govern the psychological reality of speakers competent in the language and it alone gives a relatively impoverished picture of that reality. For, all we learn about that reality from the grammar is that it “respects” the rules of the grammar.
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An Ignored Argument for Scientific Realism

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Devitt M.
Filozofia Nauki
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2020
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vol. 28
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issue 2
5-24
PL
Why believe in scientific realism? The answer that overwhelms the mainstream debate is “the no-miracles argument” (NMA): realism best explains the observational success of scientific theories. Yet more than thirty years ago another argument was proposed by Smart, Devitt, Glymour, McMullin, and Salmon and called “the basic argument” (BA) by Devitt: realism best explains the observed phenomena. Rather than having been addressed and assessed since, BA has been almost entirely ignored. The paper carefully distinguishes BA from NMA and argues that whereas NMA is dubious, BA is good. Why has BA been ignored? Experience suggests that philosophers may find it too close to science and mistakenly hanker after a “more philosophical” justification for realism. No such justification is needed or desirable.
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