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Kotarbinski's theoretical philosophy is close to naturalism. Hence, we have a question of how his independent ethics is related to axiological naturalism. This paper proposes a naturalistic justification of the ethics of the reliable guardian. In particular, the postulates of independent ethics can be interpreted as concerned with the question of how moral equilibrium (in the statistical sense) is to be achieved.
EN
Criteria of demarcation to distinguish science from non-science are considered. The author argues that formal criteria, for example, proposed by logical empiricism, tried to fulfill simultaneously two tasks: (a) to find a logical standard of science, and (b) to discriminate science as it is customary conceived in scientific communities. However, both tasks conceive of science in two different meanings. The issue (a) is addressed to science as a system of sentences, propositions, etc. suitable for logical analysis, but the issue (b) treats science as a social phenomenon. Hence it is difficult to expect that one simple formula could effectively distinguish science from non-science and be applicable to both conceptions of what science is like. On the other hand, philosophical analysis of science is too atrractive to be abandoned as an enterprise. At the end of the paper, an account of rationality of science is outlined which is based on the concept of fair game. The proposal contrasts rational thinking and irrational ways of stating and solving problems.
EN
This paper is on the sources of knowledge. Beginning with the distinction of sources of knowledge in the genetic and methodological sense, and following Ajdukiewicz, a scheme of a more detailed analysis is outlined. As a result, apriorism and aposteriorism are divided into moderate and radical. The author offers a defense of moderate aposteriorism as the most proper epistemological solution. To argue for moderate aposteriorism requires a re-interpretation of the analytic/synthetic distinction that was attacked by Quine. However, there is a possibility of a reconciliation between naturalism and semantic holism -the views that were simultaneously held by Quine - and the dualism of analytic and synthetic sentences. This possibility is provided by a wide understanding of analyticity. On this approach a priori sentences are identified with analytic statements. However, although the laws of logic can be considered as absolute analyticals, no a priori sentences are absolute. The distinction is explained by the concept of apriorization. Finally, the status of logic is investigated in frameworks of aposteriorism. In consequence, no conflict arises between the thesis that all knowledge is derived from experience and the view that all logic is certain.
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