Józef Piłsudski’s Poland – particularly during 1926–1935 period – appeared to be a completely atypical and distinctively separate model of the state which was not a totalitarian dictatorship and which did not imitate Fascism but which at the same time possessed a charismatic leader. Although Polish state obviously was not a European superpower (it was rather seen as a „new state” in the peripheral part of the continent), considerations on contemporaneous Poland were nevertheless relatively often and quite attentively undertaken in the West. Out of all attempts to understand and interpret Piłsudski’s phenomenon the most interesting ones appear to be those which pay particular attention to peculiar properties of „lenient dictatorship” in Poland. It can justifiably be claimed that these interpretations led to the establishment of separate scientific model of „self limiting dictatorship”. Polish state, governed in accordance with authoritarian principles, purposefully refrained from intervening in many spheres of social existence and respected many significant elements of political pluralism but overthrew the rule of power alternation. These were the most important features of indicated structural model. This type of dictatorship was a result of Piłsudski’s work. He deliberately tried to implement a model of „non-ideological rule” and decided not to build a single-party system. Although the year 1930 – the symbolic moment of which is the imprisonment of opposition Members of Parliament in Brest – at least partly undermined the validity of such interpretations, it still did not entirely abolish them. The careful collection of various evaluations of Polish political system during 1926–1935 period formulated by many Western observers seems to be an essential component of „Reborn Poland’s” image in the „eyes of the West”. The author of this article prepares an extensive monograph devoted to the latter subject which will be published in 2011.
The study is devoted to the problem of the totalitarian regimes in the perception of Polish lawyers, sociologists, economists and historians in the interwar era (1918–1939). Poland in those times was one of the most vital centers in the Sovietology. Polish debates on the essential dimensions of the totalitarian systems belong to the most interesting from the perspective of seventy five years which divide us from the interwar era. The future of the phenomenon of the totalitarian (or “totalist”) regimes was discussed. Their durability was estimated as problematic. Polish lawyers viewed “total states” as extremely dynamic and based on the maximal mass mobilization, “ideocratic” legitimization of the authority and last but not last maximal concentration of power in the hands of the dictator or ruling elite.
Interwar Polish debates on the nature of totalitarian regimes require attention and reconsideration from the long-time perspective. It permits us to discuss the early visions of the totalitarian era in statu nascendi. The authors of the first interpretations of “the totalitarian revolution” perfectly recognized the phenomenon of “anti-liberal revolution” in Europe. They tried to compare the essential similarities of Stalinist Bolshevism, Fascism and National Socialism in the framework of a vast and dynamic vision. “Anti-liberal revolution” preceded the triumph of totalitarianism. It signified the crises and decline of liberal values like the ideas of the rule of law or of individual rights. In the reality of the years 1930–1939 the shadows of the rationalist patterns of the Enlightenment were on the wane. Upon the remnants of rationalist civilization there appeared a new phenomenon — collectivist, irrational and ideocratic utopia based on force, regarded as a principal instrument of the social life. The theory of “anti-liberal revolution” appeared in Polish sovietology and was promoted by many scholars participating in the debate on “total states.” The most developed form of this conception could be found in the essays and studies written by Kazimierz Zakrzewski, historian and political writer. Among the promoters of the theory of “anti-liberal revolution” we can also include other historians, lawyers and sociologists, like Roman Rybarski, Antoni Wereszczyński, Sawa Frydman and Zygmunt Mysłakowski.
The article deals with the genesis of the co-operation of the Third Reich with the Soviet Union in 1939. This issue has been analyzed on numerous occasions by historians but it is still controversial and disputable. This is connected with several problems: 1. What were the short-term and long-term intentions of Adolf Hitler towards Poland in 1938–1939? 2. Who was the initiator of the pact: Hitler or Stalin personally, the German Auswärtiges Amt or the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR? 3. What were the aim and the function of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in the political and war strategy of the Third Reich? What goals was the pact supposed to achieve as far as the political ideas of Hitler are concerned, and what was the real role of the pact in the reality of 1939? The close German-Soviet relations were the process of several stages. The first stage started with the Polish government rejecting the German demands and with the British guarantees issued for Poland in March 1939. The second stage lasted from May till July 1939, that is: simultaneous steps taken by the governments of western powers and Germany diplomacy to gain the support of the USSR. The third and fi nal stage is August 1939 when Adolf Hitler personally took over the initiative which resulted in organizing decisive talks on strategic interests of the Third Reich and the USSR. Actually, Stalin was always ready to negotiate with Germans as he perceived Germany ‘one of the countries of bourgeoisie’ that is neither better nor worse than the western powers. Hitler made a fi nal decision to sign the agreement with the Soviet Russia not earlier than in June 1939. However, it is probable that he started considering such a step in the spring. In the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs people still followed the Bismarck way of thinking that is the desire to establish the German-Russian condominium over Central and Eastern Europe. The Polish issues played a fundamental role in the genesis of the German-Soviet relations. Hitler thought that the political normalization of relations with Poland in 1934 and diplomatic co-operation of Berlin and Warsaw on many issues in 1934–1938 seemed promising. That is why he thought that one day the future Poland would become the ally of the Great Germany in. That was probably the main condition imposed on Poland by Hitler. The demands concerning the return of the Free City of Danzig to Germany and exterritorial motorway via Polish Pomerania presented for the fi rst time in October 1938 by the German minister of foreign affairs were to lead to the formation of stronger bonds between Poland and Germany. Poland was to play a role of a vassal-type neighbour. Polish government rejected such a perspective. Hitler condemned that decision. He decided to reach a tactical agreement with the USSR, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was to lead to a complete annihilation of Poland.
The Polish-Soviet War (1919–20) is one of the key events in the process of implementation of the Versailles order in Eastern Europe. Having saved the Versailles deal, the war gave the nations of Central and Eastern Europe an extremely valuable opportunity, for twenty years, to decide about themselves and build their own nation states on the remnants of three empires, which disintegrated in the aftermath of the geopolitical revolution brought by the Great War (1914–18). From the very beginning, the West did not understand the geopolitical significance of the Polish-Soviet War, seen as a local conflict of two countries, triggered by ‘Polish imperialism’.
The author critically analyses Krzysztof Rak’s book Poland. Hitler’s Unfulfilled Ally (2019). The monograph attempts a new look at Polish-German relations between 1933 and 1939. However, it contains simplifications and unauthorised interpretations. The author uncritically accepts the German efforts for an anti-Soviet alliance with Poland as reality. He unjustifiably suggests that the Polish and German governments agreed on a joint modus operandi against Czechoslovakia in 1938.
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Autor krytycznie analizuje książkę Krzysztofa Raka Polska – niespełniony sojusznik Hitlera (2019). Monografia stanowi próbę nowego spojrzenia na stosunki polsko-niemieckie w latach 1933–1939. Zawiera jednak uproszczenia i nieuprawnione interpretacje. Autor bezkrytycznie przyjmuje za rzeczywistość niemieckie starania o antysowiecki sojusz z Polską. Bezpodstawnie sugeruje ustalenie między rządami Polski i Niemiec wspólnego modus operandi przeciw Czechosłowacji w 1938 r. Politykę polską w 1939 r. przedstawia w sposób karykaturalny.
Artykuł jest komentarzem do nowej książki Andrzeja Nowaka Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement (Kraków 2015). Monografia ta daje nową analizę międzynarodowych aspektów wojny polsko-sowieckiej (1919–1920). Znaczenie tej wojny było i jest bardzo często spychane na margines historii Europy, podczas gdy były to zmagania decydujące dla przyszłości kontynentu europejskiego, a przede wszystkim ładu wersalskiego. Nie sposób sobie nie wyobrazić jego załamania i sowietyzacji przynajmniej wschodniej i środkowej części Europy, gdyby wojna ta zakończyła się klęską armii polskiej. Książka Nowaka nie jest jednak analityczną monografią wojny polsko-sowieckiej, lecz studium nad ustosunkowaniem zwycięskich mocarstw Zachodu wobec tego konfliktu. Wśród tych mocarstw decydujące znaczenie odrywała Wielka Brytania. Autor doszedł do przekonania, iż w polityce tej wolno widzieć prefigurację późniejszego appeasementu z lat trzydziestych XX w. Rząd Zjednoczonego Królestwa czynił w 1920 r. wszystko, aby doprowadzić do ugody polsko-sowieckiej, która w istocie rzeczy byłaby równoznaczna z hegemonią sowiecką nad odbudowaną Polską. Zwycięstwo armii polskiej w bitwie nad Wisłą udaremniło ten plan. Monografia ma w tytule sformułowanie „zdrada”, ale książka – jak napisał we wstępie do niej jej Autor – nie jest „traktatem moralnym”. Nie jest usiłowaniem sądu nad twórcami polityki mocarstw cudzoziemskich, które nie mają obowiązku służyć interesom Polski. Jest wyłącznie analizą pewnego zjawiska z polityki międzynarodowej. A zjawisko to nie jest zamkniętą kartą historii. Może się ono powtórzyć w naszych czasach. Książkę może spotkać zarzut, że jest polonocentryczna. Tak wszakże nie jest, bowiem Autor ma świadomość uwarunkowań polityki brytyjskiej i zawsze stosuje zasadę audiatur et altera pars. Książka Nowaka udokumentowana została nieznanymi (lub słabo zbadanymi) archiwaliami brytyjskimi. Autor wprowadza pojęcie brytyjskiego appeasementu wobec sowieckiej Rosji w roku 1920. Daje wnikliwą rekonstrukcję podejścia elit Zachodu do odrodzonej Polski, analizuje dzieje dwudziestowiecznej wyobraźni politycznej. Ukazuje także znaczenie polskiego zwycięstwa nad Wisłą w nowym świetle. Za jego sprawą ład wersalski został ocalony i uzupełniony pokojem ryskim (1921), czego często nie dostrzega historiografia narodów Zachodu. The First Treachery of the West. On the book by Andrzej NowakThe paper is a review of the new book by Andrzej Nowak Pierwsza zdrada Zachodu. 1920 – zapomniany appeasement (2015). The monograph provides a new analysis of the international aspects of the Polish-Soviet War (1919–1920). The conflict has often been marginalised in the history of Europe, while being decisive for the future shape of the European continent, and first and foremost for the Versailles governance. A collapse of the Versailles governance and sovietisation of at least Eastern and Central Europe are difficult to imagine but would have become a reality if the Polish-Soviet War had ended with a defeat for the Polish army. Nowak proposes a study of attitude of the winning Western superpowers to that conflict rather than an analytical monograph. Among the superpowers, Great Britain had the decisive voice. The author perceives the British policy as a prefiguration of appeasement applied in the 1930s. In 1920, the government of the United Kingdom used every effort to facilitate a Polish-Soviet settlement, what in fact would have turned into Soviet hegemony over reborn Poland. The victory of the Polish army in the Battle of Warsaw thwarted the plan. In spite of the word “treachery” in the title and as mentioned by the author in the introduction, the monograph is not a “treatise on morality”. No attempt is made to judge the architects of foreign policies pursued by the world’s superpowers, which have no obligation to serve the interest of Poland. The author merely undertakes an analysis of a phenomenon in international relations, which does not only belong to history, but continues to resonate throughout the world today. The book may be unfairly considered too Polocentric, yet the author shows awareness of the reality in which the British foreign policy was shaped, and always applies the audiatur et altera pars principle. The work is based on unknown or little examined British archive records. The author introduces the concept of appeasement towards the Soviet Russia in 1920. The book provides a thorough analysis of the attitude of Western elites to reborn Poland, and in this sense constitutes a review of the 20th century political imagination. It casts a new light on Poland’s victory in the Battle of Warsaw. Owing to this victory, the Versailles governance was saved and strengthened by the Treaty of Riga (1921) – a fact which remains unnoticed in the historiography of Western nations.
Teoria Polski jako przedmurza cywilizacji zachodniej na wschodzie Europy ma długą historię. Jest obecna w polskiej myśli historycznej i politycznej od XV w. Co sprawiło, że w odrodzonej Polsce koncepcja ta zyskała nowy wyraz i ożywiała polską myśl polityczną, mając zarazem zwolenników wśród historyków? Jak ją rozumiano w nowym, odrodzonym państwie? Czy w opinii zagranicznej znajdziemy jej wyznawców? The theory about Poland as the bulwark of Western civilisation in the Eastern Europe has a long history. In Polish historical and political thought it goes back to the fifteenth century. What did make this concept revive in the reborn Poland, giving it a new dimension that livened up Polish political thought and gaining its advocates from among historians? How it was understood in the new, reborn Poland? Is it possible to find its supporters among foreigners?
Studium jest próbą opracowania działalności dyplomatycznej Szymona Askenazego po odrodzeniu państwa polskiego, a zwłaszcza najmniej znanej karty, jaką była jego walka o kształt granic odrodzonej Rzeczypospolitej w Genewie 1921–1923. Był to jeden z najgorętszych okresów w historii dyplomacji polskiej. Askenazy reprezentował interesy odrodzonej Polski, będącej jego ojczyzną z wyboru. Jego działania nie spotkały się jednak z powszechną aprobatą głównych obozów polityki polskiej. Był też rzecznikiem koncepcji podwójnej świadomości Żydów: żydowskiej i polskiej. Jego zdaniem Żydzi zachować winni swoją religię i kulturę, ale zarazem “niechaj połączą to z poczuciem polskości i patriotyzmu polskiego”.The study is an attempt to describe the diplomatic activities of Szymon Askenazy after the revival of the Polish state, and especially their least known chapter, which was his struggle for the shape of the borders of the reborn Republic of Poland in Geneva, 1921–1923. It was one of the hottest periods in the history of Polish diplomacy. Askenazy represented the interests of the reborn Poland, his chosen homeland. However, his actions did not always receive general approval of the main camps of Polish politics. He was also a spokesperson for the concept of Jews’ double consciousness: Jewish and Polish. In his opinion, Jews should maintain their religion and culture, but at the same time “let them combine it with a sense of Polishness and Polish patriotism”.
Artykuł przynosi próbę reinterpretacji paktu Ribbentrop-Mołotow, komentując obfitą historiografię poświęconą temu przełomowemu wydarzeniu w stosunkach międzynarodowych XX w. Autor dyskutuje różne podejścia do wyjaśnienia jego genezy i znaczenia. Daje też własną interpretację tego taktycznego aliansu dwóch totalitarnych dyktatur.
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The article is an attempt at the reinterpretation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, commenting on the comprehensive literature on this breaking-through event in the international relations of the twentieth century. The author discusses various attempts at explaining its Genesis and importance. He also offers his own interpretation of this tactical alliance between the two totalitarian dictatorships.
Wielki przewrót w Rosji w roku 1917 przyniósł światu doniosłe konsekwencje. Zapewne nawet w decydujący sposób określił oblicze XX w., bo przecież trudno wyobrazić sobie faszyzm i narodowy socjalizm bez bolszewizmu. Poza tym państwo sowieckie było doniosłym aktorem II wojny światowej (największej z dotychczasowych) i zimnej wojny dwóch supermocarstw, jakie z niej się wyłoniły. Wszystko to sprawia, że nie sposób nie powrócić do wydarzeń sprzed stulecia – nie w rocznicowej konwencji, bowiem my Polacy nie mamy czego czcić – ale w imię lepszego poznania spraw już ogólnie znanych oraz refleksji wokół tych, które nie były zbyt uczęszczane przez historiografię polską.
The article discusses Anna Maria Cienciała (d. 2014), professor at the universities of Montreal and Kansas City, an outstanding Polish historian working in the USA, and without doubt one of the prominent historians of twentieth–century diplomacy. First and foremost, Professor Cienciała was the author of the fundamental monograph: Poland and the Western Powers 1938–1939 (1968), which she gave the subtitle: Study in the Interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe. She was also the editor of the reminiscences of Józef Beck about his mission in 1932–1939, and published several score valuable articles and studies about international politics in the first half of the twentieth century. For many years Professor Cienciała studied Polish inter–war foreign policy and indubitably created its highly convincing interpretation. In doing so she defended the validity of the balance policy and was of the opinion that the Polish–German agreement of 26 January 1934 served the interests of Poland. Furthermore, she maintained that the “collective security” mission was an illusion and supported the correctness of the decision made by Minister Józef Beck regarding the ultimatum addressed to Czechoslovakia on 30 September 1938. Rightly opposing the views of Western historians proclaiming the need for Polish–Soviet cooperation, Professor Cienciała declared that in 1939 there were no real chances for the inclusion of the Soviet Union into an anti–German coalition. She arrived at important findings while interpreting British policy as based on a thesis assuming the existence of special spheres of British interests on the Continent (the Mediterranean Sea basin and the frontier along the Rhine). Professor Cienciała perceived Polish policies in 1939 as devoid of a political alternative: the acceptance of German territorial demands resulted in the status of a vassal of the Great Reich and obtaining Soviet aid was impossible. Polish diplomacy was also incapable of gaining the immediate active assistance of the Western Powers in a defensive war against Germany.
Autor analizuje na nowo program sowieckiej polityki zagranicznej, zwracając się polemicznie przeciw zwolennikom tezy, iż bolszewicy nie dysponowali długofalową koncepcją polityki zagranicznej swego państwa. Była nią długofalowa strategia stosowania naprzemiennie dyplomacji i siły oraz wykorzystywania sprzeczności wewnątrz systemu kapitalistycznego.The author presents a new analysis of the programme of Soviet foreign policy, assuming a critical stance towards the supporters of the thesis that the Bolsheviks did not work out a long-term concept of foreign policy for their state. It was a long-term strategy of using diplomatic means and force alternatively, together with taking advantage of contradictions within the capitalist system.
This article is a critical commentary on Włodzimierz Mędrzecki’s book, Kresowy kalejdoskop. Wędrówki przez ziemie wschodnie Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918–1939 (Kaleidoscope of the Borderlands. Wanderings through the Eastern Lands of the Second Polish Republic 1918–1939) (2018). The author takes up questions about the historical balance of Polish possession of the eastern territories, obtained in the aftermath of the 1919–1920 war with Soviet Russia, which was victorious for Poland.
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Artykuł jest krytycznym komentarzem do książki Włodzimierza Mędrzeckiego, Kresowy kalejdoskop. Wędrówki przez ziemie wschodnie Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1918–1939 (2018). Autor podejmuje pytania o bilans historyczny polskiego posiadania ziem wschodnich, uzyskanych w następstwie zwycięskiej dla Polski wojny z Rosją sowiecką w latach 1919–1920.
The author tries to reconsider Marshal Piłsudski’s main ideas of Polish foreign policyafter the regaining of the independence (1918) and especially in the last nine years of hislife and dictatorship in Poland (1926-1935). During the Polish-Soviet war (1919-1920) heunsuccessfully promoted the “federalist solution” for Lithuanians, Belarussians, Ukrainiansas the “successor nations” of the ancient Jagiellonian Commonwealth. After the coup d’etatin May 1926 Piłsudski’s foreign policy was the “balance” strategy between two hostile GreatPowers: Germany and Soviet Russia. Under his guidance Poland wanted to remain disengagedin terms of co-operation with either Berlin or Moscow. Piłsudski’s strategy was a mixture ofRealpolitik and idealism. It is true that his conceptions cannot be understood in categories ofthe schematic opposition between his political romanticism and fidelity to the imponderabiliafrom the one side and the philosophy of Realpolitik from the other side.Key words: Marszałek Piłsudski, political realism, Poland, international relations, diplomacy
The author tries to reconsider Marshal Piłsudski’s main ideas of Polish foreign policyafter the regaining of the independence (1918) and especially in the last nine years of hislife and dictatorship in Poland (1926-1935). During the Polish-Soviet war (1919-1920) heunsuccessfully promoted the “federalist solution” for Lithuanians, Belarussians, Ukrainiansas the “successor nations” of the ancient Jagiellonian Commonwealth. After the coup d’etatin May 1926 Piłsudski’s foreign policy was the “balance” strategy between two hostile GreatPowers: Germany and Soviet Russia. Under his guidance Poland wanted to remain disengagedin terms of co-operation with either Berlin or Moscow. Piłsudski’s strategy was a mixture ofRealpolitik and idealism. It is true that his conceptions cannot be understood in categories ofthe schematic opposition between his political romanticism and fidelity to the imponderabiliafrom the one side and the philosophy of Realpolitik from the other side.Key words: Marszałek Piłsudski, political realism, Poland, international relations, diplomacy
The article presents Tadeusz Schaetzel's memorandum from 26 December 1922, containing his analysis of the first round of negotiations at the Lausanne Conference. It was prepared on request of the General Staff, following Schaetzel's return from Lausanne, where he assumed the duties of observer at the peace conference. The document proves strong hopes for a future involvement of Turkey in the anti-Soviet policies of the Second Polish Republic.
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W artykule przedstawiony został memoriał Tadeusza Schaetzla z 26 grudnia 1922 r., pisany jako analiza pierwszej części obrad konferencji w Lozannie. Mjr Schaetzel przygotował go dla Sztabu Generalnego, powróciwszy do Warszawy z Lozanny, gdzie obserwował obrady konferencji pokojowej. Tekst dokumentu przepełniony jest nadziejami na pozyskanie w przyszłości Turcji dla antysowieckiej polityki II RP.