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PL
The paper is an inquiry into the origins and impact on the historical culture of modern Lithuania of the view of GDL as an empire. The inventor or discoverer of the GDL as empire was a Lithuanian geographer and geopolitician Kazys Pakštas (1893–1960), who provided seminal imperiological analysis of the ancient Lithuanian polity in his book Political Geography of Baltic Republics (1929). This work was probably the main source of inspiration for the Antanas Smetona (1874–1944), who was Lithuanian President in the years 1926–1940. He repeatedly designated GDL as an empire in his speeches, starting with the celebration of the 500th death anniversary of Vytautas Magnus in 1930. An important exponent of this idea was Vytautas Alantas (1902–1990), who served as editor-in-chief of a semi-official newspaper “Lietuvos Aidas” in 1934–1939 and contributed to the discourse on GDL as an empire in the Lithuanian diaspora. Because of ideological reasons, the subject of ancient Lithuanian imperialism was avoided by Lithuanian historians in the Soviet era. In the post-communist times, Gintaras Beresnevičius (1961–2006) resurrected and popularized the idea of GDL as an empire to legitimize the Eastern strategy of the foreign policy of the contemporary Lithuanian state and to mythologize the challenges of the Lithuanian membership in the European Union. Because of the mainstream historiography’s commitment to hermeneutic methodology (historism), Lithuanian academic historiography in the interwar period remained cautious about the very idea of GDL as an empire. 
EN
The paper explores the epistemic fruitfulness of the contemporary theories of modern relations for historical research about the relations between premodern polities. The application of the neorealist theory in such research is blocked by the assumption that its subject is an international system, consisting of sovereign national states. However, there were no such states (and nations) in medieval Europe and most other places in premodern times. In the article (TS) the concepts of “international system” and “international society” are replaced by the broader notions of “interpolity system” and “interpolity society”, and the distinction between “sovereign polities system/society” and “suzerain (impe rial) polity system/society”, borrowed (with modifications) from Martin Wight. They are used in the case study about the changing roles and challenges of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) as the subject of interpolity relations in XIII- -XV centuries. The second part is about the rise of GDL from the polity playing the role of the barrier (but not that of a buffer) polity, separating Central European and Eastern European interpolity systems and belonging to both of them, to the regional empire and suzerain polity of the Eastern European interpolity system by the early XVth century. However, Lithuanian hegemony in Eastern Europe lasted only for a few years. After 1430, the Eastern European interpolity system was about to transform itself from the suzerain polity system into a multipolar sovereign interpolity system of the type that consolidated in the Central and Western Europe after 1648 and survived for 300 years. However, the political leadership of GDL failed to meet the challenge to maintain an emerging multipolar balance of power in this system. Mainly due to the pursuit by Jagiellonian rulers of GDL and Poland of the dynastic politics in the Central Europe, at least three windows of opportunity to preserve this interpolity system from its annihilation by rising Moscow empire were not used. Last of them was the opportunity to re-establish the independence of Great Novgorod in 1480. These failures of the Lithuanian statesmanship sealed the fate of the Eastern European interpolity system: its disappearance in the Moscow empire. Therefore, the history of Eastern European interpolity politics in the XIII -XVIII centuries is another case proving the finding of the recent research by Stuart J. Kaufman, William C. Wohlforth, Richard Little, David Kangi, Charles Jones, Victoria Tin-bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and Williams Brenner: that a long-lasting balance of power in a interpolity system is rather an exception than rule, the rule being a displacement of the multipolar or bipolar balance of power interpolity systems by empires.
EN
During recent economic crisis 2008 – 2010, the economic policy of internal devaluation in the Baltic States earned the applause of exponents of the neoliberal orthodoxy. How to explain the choice and ability of the Baltic States to maintain the fixed exchange parity? Economists look for conventional costbenefit calculation. The paper advances culturalist NeoWeberian argument, elaborating the concept of “nation neoliberalism” of Henri Vogt and the research of Eric Helleiner on the contribution of national currencies to the modern nation building. Because of the destruction of the national Baltic States by Soviet occupation in 1940, postcommunist transformation in the Baltic States was restitutionally oriented. Hard national currency, modelled after “that old good Litas, Lats, or Kroon” of the interwar time became a central symbol of national identity along with national flag, anthem and coat of arms. This “monetization” of the Baltic identities predisposed indigenous Baltic peoples to embrace the neoliberal model of capitalism and to accept the cost of the defence of currency peg during the crisis. The success was ironically selfdefeating, as it enabled Baltic nations to join European Monetary Union, which conclusively disenchants the money by abolishing national currencies.
EN
In the long term perspective two post-communist decades in the Eastern Europe weremost recent attempt to close the economic development gap with the West after the communist “detour from the periphery to the periphery” (Iván Berend). The 1989 revolutions involved the restoration of capitalism and new integration into the capitalist world system. The paper compares the performance of post-communist capitalism in the reduction of the economic disparity with that of the pre-communist capitalism in 1913–1938. For almost all countries covered by the long-time diachronic comparison, the periods of catching up alternated with those of falling behind. All Eastern European countries except Romania decreased during pre-communist period their GDP gap separating them from the capitalist world system hegemonic power (U.S.). The catching-up performance of post-communist countries widely varies: best performers during post-communist time performed better than the best performers in the 1913–1938 period, while the worst failures under post-communism performed worse than the weakest performers in 1913–1938.
EN
After more than two decades since the exit from Communism, no former communist country has been completely successful in catching up with the technological frontier countries. However, they divide into two groups: those which decreased the GDP gap with frontier countries since 1989-1990, and those which failed to do so. One may ask: What were the decisive causal conditions for their progress or failure in convergence? Were they the early implementation of Washington consensus style market reforms; their neighbourhood with advanced affluent countries; peaceful transition; accession to the EU; endowment with natural resources; state sovereignty before postcommunism; or interactions between these factors (or others)? Because of the small N, statistical analysis is not an appropriate tool for testing these hypotheses. Hence this paper uses qualitative comparative analysis to identify four explanatory puzzles of the catching-up growth performance of the postcommunist countries.
PL
Po ponad dwudziestu latach od upadku komunizmu, żaden z byłych krajów bloku komunistycznego nie był w stanie całkowicie dogonić krajów technologiczne przodujących. Jednak, kraje postkomunistyczne można podzielić na dwie grupy: te, którym udało się zmniejszyć lukę w produkcie krajowym brutto (PKB) w stosunku do krajów technologiczne przodujących, i te, którym nie udało się tego zrobić. Nasuwa się zatem pytanie, jakie uwarunkowania zadecydowały o powodzeniu lub niepowodzeniu konwergencji? Czy to było wczesne wdrożenie reform rynkowych w stylu Konsensusu waszyngtońskiego; Sąsiedztwo zaawansowanych gospodarczo krajów zamożnych; spokojny, pokojowy przebieg transformacji systemowej; przystąpienie do Unii Europejskiej, zasobność kraju w zasoby naturalne, skala suwerenności państwa przed transformacją lub interakcje między tymi czynnikami (lub inne czynniki)? Ze względu na małą liczebność próby (N), analiza statystyczna nie jest odpowiednim narzędziem do testowania tych hipotez. Dlatego w artykule zastosowano jakościową analizę porównawczą identyfikując cztery zagadki w wyjaśnianiu przyczyn powodzenia lub klęski wzrostu doganiającego w krajach postkomunistycznych.
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