The paper sheds light on the idea of uploading persons. Trans-humanists defend the possibility of uploading persons. However, this might lead to substantial dualism of a person and its substrate. Dualism contradicts other trans-humanist philosophical presuppositions so, the trans-humanist theory as a whole could be contradictory. The problem of dualism can be eliminated by introducing the concept of emulation. Thus the concept of emulation could resolve the aforementioned contradiction in the trans-humanist theory. On the other hand, the drawback of the concept of emulation could be a threat to personal identity. Hence, the main task of transhumanism is not to tackle the problem of person but rather that of personal identity.
The paper deals with the diachronic personal identity, defining two fundamental approaches to the problem: realism and anti-realism. The theory of D. Parfit serves as an illustration of anti-realism, while perdurantism as a specific case of realism. Contrary to D. Parfit, perdurantism is able to solve the problem of the split while preserving the realistic position as far as the diachronic personal persistence is concerned. Several problematic aspects of the perdurantism’s realistic position in practice are examined as well. According to the author and contrary to the widespread conviction perdurantism is compatible with responsibility. Nevertheless, there are some un-acceptable consequences concerning punishment and reward.
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