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PL
Autor przedstawia tezę, wedle której ze względu na doświadczenia z czasów II wojny światowej, Republika Federalna Niemiec po 1949 r. preferowała zachowania pacyfistyczne i budowała państwo cywilne. Jednakże po zjednoczeniu wydarzenia na arenie międzynarodowej (konflikt w Bośni i Kosowie) zmusiły ją do aktywniejszego współdziałania na rzecz utrzymania europejskiego bezpieczeństwa. Do dnia dzisiejszego polityka niemiecka w zakresie bezpieczeństwa zdominowana jest przez tzw. kulturę wstrzemięźliwości. Ze względu na sytuację międzynarodową, od Niemiec wymaga się aktywnego udziału w misjach międzynarodowych i zarządzania kryzysami, co przychodzi im z dużą trudnością. Opinia publiczna w zdecydowanej większości sprzeciwia się takim działaniom.
EN
The author presents the thesis that because of the experience of World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany after 1949 was determined to preserve a pacifistic attitude and build a “civil state.” However, after the unification, the events in the international arena (the conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo) forced it to cooperate more actively to maintain European security. To date, the German policy in the field of security is dominated by the so-called “culture of abstinence.” Because of the international situation, Germany is required to actively participate in international missions and crisis management, with which they comply with great difficulty. The majority of the public is opposed to such actions.
EN
The author analyzes the genesis of the Weimar Triangle and its contribution to Polish integration with NATO and the European Union. Despite many differences, and differences in interests between the three partners, the result is positive. Major opportunities for Triangle should be sought in the intensifi cation of cooperation in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. In the author’s opinion, should strengthen its functioning by the creation of small informal “Weimar Triangle”.
EN
After the re-unification of Germany, the governments of the Republic were pushing for the policy of strategic partnership with Russia, especially in the area of economy. It was only A. Merkel’s government who started paying more attention to the violation of human rights in Russia and to paralysing the opposition. The Russian aggression against Ukraine shook the foundations of the German-Russian cooperation. From the middle of 2014, Germany carried out a two-track policy of sanctions to the Russian Federation and looking for a dialogue on international issues with Moscow. Currently, Germany is trying to ‘Europeanisate’ more its policy towards Russia. Germany and the EU still need Russia as a strategic partner in settling the problems of the Middle East and fighting against international terrorism.
PL
Po zjednoczeniu Niemiec, rządy Republiki Federalnej forsowały politykę strategicznego partnerstwa z Rosją, szczególnie w obszarze gospodarki. Dopiero rząd A. Merkel w większym stopniu zaczął zwracać uwagę na łamanie praw człowieka w Rosji i sparaliżowanie opozycji. Agresja Rosji na Ukrainę zachwiała podstawami współpracy niemiecko-rosyjskiej. Od połowy 2014 r. Niemcy prowadziły politykę dwutorowości: sankcji wobec FR i szukania dialogu z Moskwą w kwestiach międzynarodowych. Niemcy obecnie w większym stopniu próbują „europeizować” swoją politykę wobec Federacji Rosyjskiej. Niemcom i UE Rosja jest nadal potrzebna jako strategiczny partner w rozwiązywaniu problemów Bliskiego Wschodu i walki z międzynarodowym terroryzmem.
PL
W opinii autora artykułu, Niemcy wiązały poważne nadzieje na głębokie reformy gospodarcze, liberalizację i demokratyzację Rosji pod rządami D. Miedwiediewa (2008–2012). Instrumentem polityki niemieckiej, do którego włączono Unię Europejską, był program Partnerstwa dla Modernizacji. Nie spełnił on pokładanych w nim nadziei w sferze gospodarczej i politycznej. W Niemczech krytykowano sterowaną demokrację tandemu Miedwiediew/Putin. Jednakże w pierwszej kolejności obowiązywała formuła „strategicznego partnerstwa”, która sprowadzała się do dbania o niemieckie interesy gospodarcze w Rosji.
EN
In the opinion of the author of the article, Germany tied serious hopes for deep economic reforms, liberalization and democratization of Russia under Medvedev (2008–2012). The Partnership for Modernization program was the instrument of German policy to which the European Union was incorporated. He did not fulfi ll his hopes in the economic and political sphere. In Germany, the controlled democracy of the tandem Medvedev / Putin has been criticized. However, the fi rst was the formula of a “strategic partnership” that was about taking care of German economic interests in Russia.
PL
Autor dokonał analizy udziału Niemców w najważniejszych strukturach Unii Europejskiej pod kątem ich wpływu na procesy decyzyjne w tej organizacji. Podkreślił, że wprawdzie pod względem ilości urzędników Niemcy nie są reprezentowani proporcjonalnie do liczby ludności, ale to w ich rękach znajdują się najważniejsze stanowiska. Język niemiecki uznawany jest za język roboczy w UE, ale z różnych przyczyn posługuje się nim niewiele osób. Rząd niemiecki, Auswärtiges Amt i Instytut Goethego od wielu lat zabiegają o zwiększenie posługiwania się językiem niemieckim w administracji UE, ale nie przynosi to spodziewanych efektów.
EN
The author analyzed the participation of Germans in the most important structures of the European Union in terms of their impact on decision-making processes in this organization. He emphasized that, although in terms of the number of officials, Germany is not represented in proportion to the population, but the most important positions are in their hands. German is recognized as a working language in the EU, but for various reasons few people speak it. The German government, Auswärtiges Amt and Goethe Institute have been striving for many years to increase the use of German in the EU administration, but this is not bringing the expected results.
EN
In the 1990s, following the conflict in the Balkans, the European Union began implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 1999 the first steps to build common defensive capacity which was to be of autonomous character, were begun. This lead to conflicts and disagreements in the triangle USA - NATO - EU, as there was no agreement on the division of competences and tasks. Together with France, Germany under Schroeder/Fischer were considered the main promoters of the CESDP. When Poland joined NATO in 1999, the country sought principal guarantees for its security in the North Atlantic Treaty, and it was not without major resistance that she agreed to the development of the CESDP. Such a position provoked conflicts with Germany, whose apogee came at the time of Iraqi crisis and the international intervention on its territory.The Federal Republic of Germany opposed the American action, believing that to the peaceful means of pressure on Iraq had not been exhausted, while Poland diplomatic support for the American action and participated in the stabilization mission on its territory. Poland’s accession to the European Union in May 2004 automatically forced Poland to support more strongly EU’s security and defense efforts. An opportunity to find a common platform of understanding for the European Union and NATO arrived after the normalization o f American-German relations that resulted from the coming to power of the CDU/CSU-SPD Alliance with A. Merkel at the helm. The strengthening of the North Atlantic is a live interest Poland, much like the active participation in the development of the CESDP and close cooperation with Germany in this field.
EN
In the early twenty-first century. France and Germany closely work together to strengthen the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the. European Security and Defence Policy They led to their treaty and institutional strengthening. Governments Chancellor Angela Merkel focused on the ”culture of moderation“ in foreign policy and ill-considered reform of the Bundeswehr weakened the role of Germany in the area of foreign policy, security and defense policy of the European Union. After the return France to NATO’s integrated structures in 2009. It took place a close military cooperation A with the United Kingdom. Arab revolutions and the crisis in the Ukraine is not caused reevaluations so far in German-French cooperation to strengthen the defence of the European Union and its foreign policy.
DE
Nach 1990 wurde Deutschland zum meist begünstigten Staat der neuen Situation nach Beendigung des West-Ost-Konflikts. Zum ersten Mal ließ sich die traditionelle und für Europa und die Welt grausame Abhängigkeit der Macht und Größe Deutschlands vom undemokratischen oder totalitären Regime vermeiden. Auch das Jahr 1994 war bedeutend für die Stärkung der internationalen Position der Bundesrepublik. Das Urteil des Verfassungsgerichts im Sommer 1994 ließ der Bundeswehr die friedensstiftenden und -erhaltenden Handlungen im Rahmen der UNO zu. Mit der Zeichnung des EU-Vertrages aus Maastricht am 7. Februar 1992 gab Deutschland ein Beweis, das es der Vertiefung der europäischen Integration zustimmt, was in der Praxis die eigenständigen Handlungen auf der internationalen Szene begrenzt hat. Die Zeit der „Zurückhaltung“ und der „Selbstbegrenzung“ endete mit dem Rücktritt des Kanzlers H. Kohl aus dem politischen Leben 1998, der die Außenpolitik aus dem Gesichtspunkt eigener Lebenserfahrungen betrachtet hat. Symbolisch endete dabei auch die Ära der Bonner Republik; nach dem Umzug der Hauptstadt nach Berlin begann die Ära der Berliner Republik. Die neue Regierung von Schröder und Fischer betrieb die „Realpolitik“, versuchte eine weitergehende Selbstständigkeit auf der internationalen Szene und Entschiedenheit in den Relationen mit den Partnern aufzuzeigen. Die ersten Jahre der Regierung A. Merkel brachten die Bezeichnung Deutschlands als eine „mitteleuropäische Großmacht“ oder eine Mittelmacht. Unter dieser Bezeichnung definiert man die Bundesrepublik als einen relativ selbstständigen, proatlantisch orientierten Staat, aktiv in der Sache der europäischen Integration mitwirkend, jetzt aber stärker als bis dahin an den daraus resultierenden Vorteilen interessiert.Eine Besonderheit dieses Staates ist die in vielen Hinsichten und mit großer Entschiedenheit präsentierte nachdrückliche Stellung, die die Bonner Traditionen in Frage stellt und offen für den „neuen Patriotismus“ ist. Deutschland befindet sich immer noch in der Phase der Festlegung eigener Position in Europa und in der Welt in den komplizierten Bedingungsrahmen des 21. Jahrhunderts. Sicherlich wird es die Versuche unternehmen, seine internationale Position, sowohl in der transatlantischen, als auch europäischen Perspektive, zu stärken. Man kann es aber auch als einen Wettbewerb in dem Globalisierungsprozess, und nicht als Anstrebung zur Hegemonie ansehen. Bis jetzt sind diese Handlungen noch nicht ausreichend kohärent, es kann auch nicht von deren großer Erfolgquote die Rede sein. Man kann aber sagen, dass die um Deutschland gestrickten schwarzen Szenarios keine Erfüllung fanden und die Bundesrepublik, obwohl zu tiefgreifenden Haushaltsschnitten gezwungen und von der Alterung der Population geplagt, gut unter den sich schnell ändernden europäischen Bedingungen auskommt. Deutsche Eliten sind sich im Klaren, dass sich die Berliner Republik in der heutigen Gestalt in dem „Zustand des Werdens“ befindet, und einigermaßen ein„Übergangsprodukt“ auf dem Weg zu Gestaltung einer neuen internationalen Ordnung und neuer Form des Systems der Europäischen Union ist.
EN
In the article the author analyzes the election campaigns to the German Parliament of three Social- Democratic candidates (P. Steinbrück, F.-W. Steinmeier, M. Schulz) in the years 2009-2017. The author describes the political career of the candidates, focusing especially on the preparation for and progress of the successive election campaigns in 2009, 2013 and 2017. The main hypothesis was to verify the claim that although the candidates were well prepared and showed personal commitment, they had no chance of winning in confrontation with the experienced Chancellor Merkel. Their election defeat was an outcome of an all-European crisis of the social-democratic formation with a shrinking social (workingclass) backing. In this respect SPD did not differ much from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) or the crumbling Socialist Party of France. Besides, CDU cynically took over the social slogans of the left and lifted them on its own banners. Merkel did not hesitate to take over from SPD the postulate of a minimum per hour wage of € 8.50, or the idea to close down nuclear power plants, which was the main driving engine of The Greens’ election campaigns. In the article the descriptive, comparative, decision and statistical research methods were used.
EN
The aim of the article is a survey of the legal and informal competences of the Federal Chancellery in Germany with a focus on the European policy of the Federal Republic. As the research problem the author sets himself the task of demonstrating in a scientific argument that the Federal Chancellery effectively performs the function of coordinator of Germany’s European policy, closely cooperating with the ministries (especially the Federal Foreign Office) and the Permanent Representation of Germany to the European Union. The hypothesis has been adopted that the Federal Chancellery plays the role of mediator between the government and the parliament, the federal states, social organizations and representatives of foreign states. It provides the Chancellor with current information and various analyses pertaining to the functioning of the European Union. The article uses the following research methods: systemic analysis, institutional-legal analysis and decision method analysis.
EN
The author forwards the thesis that after two years of administration of the PiS-LPR-Samoobrona coalition in Poland (2005-2007), characterized by an escalation of tension in relations with Germany, the PO-PSL coalition government of Donald Tusk opts for restoration of trust in contacts with Berlin. Prof. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, who enjoys considerable authority in the FRG has been appointed the Prime Minister's plenipotentiary for international relations. He managed to work out a compromise on the issue of establishing a 'visible sign' in Berlin and withdrawal of Erika Steinbach from the implementation of this project. The European Union is now the main ground of Polish-German relations and their 'Europeization' exerts growing influence on bilateral relations, as evidenced by Germany's support of Jerzy Buzek's election for President of the European Parliament. The author claims that Poland should approach cooperation with Germany, especially within the European Union, rationally, not being guided by short-term benefits or resentments but with assertiveness and consistently respecting its own interests as well as those of its partner. The present government conceives of the idea of Polish-German partnership in precisely those terms.
EN
The European Commission, acting as an executive power and initiator of the EU legislative process, was in the 21st century at the center of Germany’s European policy. First of all, German politicians wanted to: 1. ensure the appointment, in accordance with their wishes, of the President of the Commission 2. provide the German candidates with the most important and prestigious positions in each college; 3. obtain the possibility of influencing the course of the EC’s work. In the opinion of the author of the article, the Germans under Chancellor A. Merkel succeeded in achieving most of these goals, due to the growing importance of the Federal Republic of Germany in the European Union and in the international arena. The article uses the institutional and legal, comparative and decision-making methods.
EN
After power in France was assumed by President F. Hollande in May 2012, the Franco-German cooperation in the European Union weakened but did not translate into cooperation on a bilateral level. The need for close cooperation in order to overcome the eurozone crisis forced Berlin and Paris to correct their individual ambitious plans and work out the necessary compromises. In turn the celebration of the round 50th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty dictated the strategy of developing mutual relations for the next years. In the European Union, both countries are doomed to cooperation, because according to the general opinion Germany and France are still the motor of European integration and a guarantee of its stable development.
EN
The author analyzes the impact of personal relations between Chancellor Angela Merkel and the French presidents on the development of bilateral relations and European cooperation. Merkel was the only chancellor in the history of Germany that cooperated with four French presidents who represented not only various political options, but also had different life experience and political temperament. In this context, the main research question focuses on whether Merkel, with a view tomaintaining bilateral relations vital for both countries and cooperation in the European Union, managed to establish not only good personal relations with the leaders of the Fifth Republic, but also gradually became the more dominant partner in these bilateral contacts to the benefit of Germany. The author proved the thesis that regardless of the political orientations of the Frenchpartners, their political experience and personal temperament, Chancellor Merkel managed to deepen bilateral cooperation between Germany and France and successfully combated the crises that occurred in the European Union. The source basis of the article are declarations, speeches, press conferences, reports from bilateral meetings posted on the websites of the governments of Germany (Die Bundesregierung; Die Bundekanzlerin) and France (France Diplomatie; Ělysée) and conclusions from meetings of the EU European Councils (consilium.europa). Especially helpful were press articles published in the leading dailies and weeklies of France and Germany. On the methodological level, the comparative, decision-making, behavioral and source content analysis methods were used in the preparation of the article.
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