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THE DEBATE ON THE NORMATIVITY OF MEANING IN ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (Spór o normatywnosc znaczenia w analitycznej filozofii jezyka)

100%
Poslajko K.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2009
|
vol. 37
|
issue 1
123-155
EN
The thesis that meaning is normative, i.e. that statements ascribing meaning to sentences express norms, advocated by Kripke-Wittgenstein, has been subjected to numerous critical arguments. However, these doubts can be refuted if certain modifications are made. Firstly, one must reject Boghossian's requirement that a correct use is a true use and allow for correctness of speech acts which do not aim at truth. Secondly, one must reject conflation of correct use and correct application. Thirdly, the fact that the normativity of meaning sentences is not the normativity of moral sentences does not prove that meaning sentences are not normative in a different way. In line with the 'folk' theory of meaning, presented in the paper, the author accepts the meaning normativity thesis, which, however, does not mean embracing the existence of a set of rules shared by all users of a given language, which was questioned by Davidson. The idea that uses of language can be classified as correct or incorrect is central to our ordinary concept of meaning.
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SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS OF CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM (Semantyczne zalozenia sceptycyzmu kartezjanskiego)

100%
Poslajko K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2010
|
issue 12
167-182
EN
The paper purports to show that in order to formulate the hypothesis that all our beliefs are collectively false - which is taken to be the core of Cartesian skepticism - one must accept the presumption that semantic properties of subject's beliefs locally supervene on 'internal' properties of said subject. In order to show that the responses to skepticism from semantic externalism, i.e. those formulated by Putnam and Davidson, are analyzed. It is argued that even though these arguments are controversial they indicate that Cartesian skeptic must assume that subject beliefs' semantic properties can remain the same in different surroundings, which is exactly what the supervenience thesis amounts to. Finally, it is pointed out that the skepticism introduced by Kripke in his discussion of rule-following is indeed more radical than traditional, Cartesian one, as the former denies the very thesis that the latter must assume.
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