Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

The “Gryfice Scandal” In Poznań - Dealing with Abuses Committed in the Process of Establishing Cooperative Farms in the Poznań Region

100%
Jankowiak S.
Studia Historiae Oeconomicae
|
2017
|
vol. 35
61-79
EN
Several years after the war, a revolution started in the Polish agriculture - even though until 1948, the authorities claimed that farms in Poland would not be collectivized. The new stage meant that things accelerated quickly. Central party authorities determined the number of cooperatives to be established per year in a top-down manner. The Poznań region was considered particularly opposed to the system, hence the pressure to establish cooperative farms was particularly intense. The quick pace of the operation and accountability of the party officials for its results meant that they often resorted to prohibited methods of forcing resistant individuals to enter into cooperatives. Though party guidelines emphasized that the process was voluntary, and formally banned any form of pressure, various forms of power abuse were tolerated in practice. Only when the situation rapidly escalated into scandals, the authorities stigmatized the illegal methods. However, after a while, the situation returned to normal, and the anomalies reoccurred. The problem was that the principles of the operation were flawed. One of the party activists claimed that establishing cooperatives according to the guidelines would have taken 200 years to complete. Farmers had to be coerced, otherwise they would never have joined cooperatives. Most cooperative farms established this way collapsed in 1956.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

New Reality – New Problems. Financial Crime in Greater Poland in the Years 1945-1970

100%
Jankowiak S.
Studia Historiae Oeconomicae
|
2016
|
vol. 34
105-128
EN
Systemic transformation in Poland after the Second World War led to deep transformations within the economy. It did not, however, change the way people thought. Despite the chaos of the post-war period, in which all the negative features shaped in the period of occupation manifested themselves, it seemed that the conceptual leaders of the Polish political and economic life would create new quality. However, it soon turned out that old habits die hard and the system created by communists opened a field for many abuses. This was accompanied by a sense of impunity, as the most prominent personalities in a given region were also involved in economic scandals. All this resulted in the creation of “cliques” in which both prominent Party activists and people put by the Party in high positions (usually also members of the Polish United Workers’ Party, PUWP) played important roles. On the one hand, after 1956, surveillance by the Security Office (UB) or Security Services (SB) was not that strict anymore, and on the other, the so-called “private initiative” started to develop fast – therefore the more “entrepreneurial” individuals started to exploit the situation and gain wealth. Abusing one’s position to organize large-scale thefts was considered relatively normal. This happened in various forms: sometimes directly, but more often by supporting or even organizing private projects with the use of the national, though unsupervised, supply of raw materials or products. This way, the Party members grew richer at the expense of the companies they worked for. This business was relatively widely tolerated by ordinary citizens, who saw it as an excuse to also “organize” goods individually for their own purposes in the companies which employed them. This common belief that “everybody steals” allowed people to justify their own dishonesty. Any attempts to fight this problem failed to produce satisfactory results. The diagnosis, even if correct, had to face reality, in which the pursuit of a better quality of life by the Party elites collided with the officially promoted ascetic lifestyles of the “ideological communists”, who, like Władysław Gomułka, did not understood the new times.
3
Content available remote

Droga do wolności. Refleksje nad Okrągłym Stołem

100%
Jankowiak S.
Przegląd Zachodni
|
2014
|
issue 3(352)
91-114
EN
Suppression of an independent movement, and Solidarity is beyond doubt acknowledged as such, did not resolve any of the crucial problems of the ruling power in Poland. A declining economy coupled with utter apathy of the society necessitated changes, but the authorities were not prepared to implement them. Additionally, the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union forced those in power to seek internal rather than external solutions to Poland’s problems, hence the idea to make some changes in the principles of the system’s functioning without impairing its essence. The pivotal element of the plan was to maintain in practice the monopoly of the Polish United Workers’ Party on power by introducing new elements (President, upper house of the parliament) with a concurrent enticing of moderate opposition which was predisposed to engage in talks with the authorities, into shared responsibility for the situation in the country. Although the agreement negotiated at the Round Table seemed to favor the authorities, who hoped to postpone further changes for another four years, reality turned out quite differently, as the society supported the opposition. A reconstructed ruling coalition created a new, non-communist government, thereby effecting a transformation of the political system.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Wysiedlenia Niemców z Polski po II wojnie światowej

100%
Jankowiak S.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
|
2004
|
issue 2(6)
139-160
EN
Experiences of the past, especially the horror of Nazi occupation, led to the opinion popular both among the Underground activists and the emigration politicians that Poland has to protect itself against another German aggression by moving the western border towards the Oder river. Such an attitude was often presented by the Polish government in the exile. It was also suggested that territories behind the Oder river should be occupied by the Poles. Similar opinions were held by the Communists, although their declarations concerning the borders were at first rather general. It was only later when, on Soviet inspiration, they started postulating border on the Oder and Nysa Łużycka rivers. It seems that also western powers during military operations could have supported Polish territorial postulates, but only under the condition that Stanisław Mikołajczyk had assumed authority in Poland. Such a large change of the western border must have raised a question of the future of German residents living in the borderland. The failure of international authorities to protect the rights of national minorities during the interwar period and the tragic experience of WW II caused hatred towards the Nazis to expand onto all German people. No-one could imagine living in one country with the Germans. Thus the idea of displacement of all the Germans beyond new borders of Poland was commonly accepted. At first Communist authorities thought that the problem of the German people could be easily solved. A great number of people ran away from the front, moreover, in June and July 1945 the Second Army of the Polish Army was ordered to drive the rest of the Germans out of a several kilometers wide area along the Oder river. It was believed that in such a way „accomplished facts” would be created, thus there would be a proof that areas demanded by Polish Communists are practically free from German citizens. The reality proved to be different. An exile of such a large number of the Germans (about 3.5 mln) was not possible in such a way and in such a short time. However, at that time both Soviet and Polish postulates concerning borders were supported by representatives of Western superpowers. On the Potsdam conference a decision was taken to displace all the Germans from areas on the eastern bank of the Oder and Nysa Łużycka rivers. The displacement started in the beginning of 1946 and it was led in an organized way in the following years. Nevertheless, it did not mean that it was really planned to displace everybody. Not only war criminals or prisoners, but also so called professionals were tried to be kept in Poland. It should be underlined that „professionals” often meant anyone able to work. The situation of the Germans in Poland began to change at the end of the forties. It was decided then that all the Germans had left Poland, although the official end of the displacement did not mean the end of the process itself. Motions of individuals to leave were voted down. For political reasons it was only possible to leave to the German Democratic Republic. The situation changed during the Thaw in the middle of the fifties. Agreements with the Red Cross of the Federal Republic of Germany were signed then, which began the series of departures to West Germany. In the second half of the fifties the vast majority of the Germans in Poland desired to leave for the Federal Republic of Germany. In the beginning of the sixties it was officially acknowledged that there are no Germans in Poland, consequently the number of departures was much lower, transforming gradually into emigration, for which German origin was only one of the reasons.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.