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Naturalism of W.V.O. Quine

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Dziobkowski B.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2008

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vol. 17

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issue 4(68)

117-135

EN

W.V.O. Quine declared more than once that he was a naturalist. This claim must not be limited to one or another field of philosophy but should be understood as pertaining to every possible aspect philosophy. In ontology Quine wrote about 'ontological commitments of theories', in philosophy of logic he spoke of 'existence being a value of a variable', in semantics he opted for 'semantic behaviorism', and in epistemology he urged to 'make do with psychology'. The author concentrates on Quine's epistemology and shows how his views were different from other positions held in that field. The common key is naturalization. This view is supported by showing how Quine responded to his critics. To fend off skeptical doubts he argues that sceptical doubts are to be placed within science and not used as an external criterion of its results. When defending himself against the acusation that he eliminated all normative claims from science, Quine argued that axiological investigation have ultimately a scientific character. Finally when he proposed to naturalize epistemology his justification was based on the concept of holism, which was to be construed as one more plank in the naturalisatic boat that must be repaired at open sea, in his favorite metaphore invented by Neurath.

2

Internal Realism and Relativism

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Dziobkowski B.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2006

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vol. 15

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issue 3(59)

27-46

EN

The paper discusses philosophy of Ludwig Fleck in an attempt to single out and defend three tenets about it: (i.) Fleck is a internal realist, (ii.) Internal realism is a form of relativism, (iii.) Relativism is theoretically untenable. The discussion of Fleck's philosophy leads the author to formulate more general observations. In the first place, he shows that the polemic between Fleck and Bilikiewicz may be viewed as a paradigm of discussion between the internal realist and the metaphysical realist. Subsequently, three versions of relativism are outlined, and the author claims that Fleck was a relativist in all three senses of the term, even though Fleck himself denied it was so. Finally the author traces consequences of the possible identification of internal realism with relativism. This identification can be interpreted as an empirical, a philosophical or a pragmatic stance. Having made this point, he argues that in none of these interpretations relativism is tenable. The claim offers an indirect support to a more objective view of knowledge.

3

Was J.S. Mill a Descriptionist?

100%

Dziobkowski B.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2006

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vol. 15

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issue 4(60)

181-191

EN

At first glance it may seem that the question of whether J.S. Mill was, or was not, a descriptionist has been solved once and for all. It is commonly assumed that with respect to general terms, like 'man', Mill was a descriptionist, while with respect to proper names, like 'Aristotle', he was not. The author finds this answer questionable. He believes that 'The System of Logic' lends support to a different interpretation of proper names. Finally the author shows that it is possible to distinguish between type and token use of proper names. The token use is especially interesting. A language user can apply a proper name as a token even though he/she neither associates any descriptive content with the name nor does he/she act within a causal chain of the name application. Basic elements of this position are outlined and the author discusses its soundness against stock arguments used in the controversy between the descriptive and causal interpretation of name use.

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3 Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

1 2008

2 2006

3 Dziobkowski B.

Naturalism of W.V.O. Quine

Internal Realism and Relativism

Was J.S. Mill a Descriptionist?