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Starania Polski o przyjęcie planu Rapackiego w Szwecji, Danii i Norwegii w latach 1957–1960

100%
Kłonczyński A.
Zapiski Historyczne
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2009
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vol. 74
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issue 2
45-61
EN
In the autumn of 1957 at the 12th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the Polish Foreign Secretary Adam Rapacki presented the proposal of creating the zone free from nuclear weapons in Poland and both German states. The proposal met with great interest also in Scandinavian countries, which on the one hand supported the initiatives of the Nordic integration. On the other hand, they were not unanimous as far as their common stand in the international relations was concerned. Denmark and Norway belonged to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while Sweden continued the policy of neutrality and no alliances. The reactions to the proposal of the Polish minister were cautious. Despite the fact that the USA did not comment the Polish minister’s address, the Polish party expressed their satisfaction as the most important aim had been achieved – the discussion was induced in favourable time, confirming the willingness to continue the policy of détente. In the same way the plan was supported by other countries of the Eastern Bloc – the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. In such an ambience the first reactions of the Scandinavian countries were expected. In Sweden the problem of disarmament was vividly discussed, which reflected a visible and strong trend in the public life there. Actions promoting peace initiatives were organized. The pacifist movement was becoming more and more popular. On account of those facts, Poland hoped Sweden to accept Rapacki’s proposal. According to the Polish ambassador, Prime Minister Tage Erlander was to consider the plan interesting and logical. Nonetheless, the Swedish government failed to take a stand on the issue. Neither politicians nor the press paid much attention to Rapacki’s address, waiting for the official stand of the government. According to Swedish politicians, Rapacki’s plan was interesting but its future depended on superpowers. Sweden advocated the initiative to discuss the proposal on the international level and declared to take part in it. In Denmark the reaction to Adam Rapacki’s proposal met with various opinions. From some point in time Social Democrats manifested a very positive viewpoint concerning the creation of the nuclear-free zone which would include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Denmark and Norway. Nevertheless, with time it became obvious that the concept of involving Denmark had little chance to succeed as it would complicate relations with the allies. It was widely thought that the initiative had been inspired by the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the stand of the Danish government depended on the opinions of the superpowers. Prime Minister H. C. Hansen emphasized many times that meetings at the highest level would be necessary, but the initiative was constructive and worth talking about. The Prime Minister was cautious and did not attach much significance to the plans. The visit of the Danish Foreign Secretary J. O. Krag in Poland in September 1959 did not change the stand Denmark had on the issue. He was the first minister from the countries belonging to the NATO to visit Poland officially. The meeting was a further step to strengthen the Polish-Danish cooperation in many fields, but it did not bring any solutions for Rapacki’s proposal. Neither did the return visit paid by the minister A. Rapacki in Denmark on 7–10 June 1960. Norway accepted the words of the minister Rapacki with attention. The cautious stand of the Norwegian government and doubts concerning the Polish origin of the proposal were connected with bad Norwegian-Soviet relations at that time, which were caused by incidents on the border and the Soviet criticism of the Norwegian involvement in equipping the army with short-range missiles. The Polish proposal was important as it constituted a starting point in the discussion about the condition of the international security. However, according to Norwegian politicians it was too general. It was stated that in the current shape the plan could not be accepted, but it could be a basis for further talks. Rapacki’s visits in Oslo in 1958 and the minister H. Lange’s visits in Poland in 1959 concerned mainly economic issues and the cooperation in the field of culture. They did not change the Norwegian government’s stand on the issue. Exacerbating the international situation, the Berlin and Cuban crises led to resigning from the plan of Adam Rapacki despite its other versions presented later by Poland. The Scandinavian Social-Democratic parties were interested in the plan, particularly in its initial stage, despite the fact that it did not concern directly any of the Scandinavian countries. The positive attitude of politicians and the press came from the rising interest of the Scandinavian societies in the problem of reducing nuclear armament. However, the final decision was influenced by the superpowers with which the Nordic countries were connected through belonging to the NATO (Denmark, Norway) or through continuing the policy of neutrality (Sweden). Polish politicians had to realize that the reaction to Rapacki’s proposal would be dependent on many factors and no Scandinavian country would lead to the conflict of interests, which would arise due to the explicit support given to the plan. Carrying out the plan would have strengthened the position of the Soviet Union in the Baltic area. Polish attempts to have the plan accepted brought only partial results. One of them was a more and more positive image of Poland in Oslo, Kopenhagen and Stockholm, and, indirectly, a closer cooperation mainly in the economic field.
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Warszawa wobec polskiej emigracji w Szwecji w latach 1945–1968

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Kłonczyński A.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
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2010
|
issue 1(15)
73-87
EN
The author attempts to trace the methods of the Polish authorities’ dealing with the Polish immigrants in Sweden between 1945–1968, seeks an answer to the question on how the immigrant communities were treated in this country and in what direction aims and methods of interfering of the Polish authorities in immigrants’life evolved. During the later months of World War II released prisoners from the Nazi concentration camps in Germany were transported to Sweden as a part of count Folke Bernadotte and the UNRRA (The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) action. The total number of Polish citizens staying in Sweden in the middle of 1945 is estimated to have been around 17 000. From November 1945 the Polish Repatriation Mission (Polska Misja Repatriacyjna, PMR) became responsible for the transportation of Polish citizens from Sweden to Poland. Its members were encouraging Polish citizens to coming back to their fatherland. Until June 1947 more than 8 000 Polish citizens had left Sweden which was just over 52 per cent of all Polish citizens residing in Sweden in June 1945. The radio appeals, brochures and personal visits in camps were the PMR’s methods of agitation for a come back to Poland as well as making efforts to discount the influence of those who remained in contact with the Polish Government in Exile in London. During that time, the “immigration environment” was trying to provide Poles staying in Sweden with the information about the dramatic political situation in the country and also about brutal behavior of Soviet soldiers towards Polish people, etc. That “battle for souls” yielded limited results. Soon after repatriation campaign Polish consulate, on the pretext on giving protection to their citizens, set up a registration campaign. It was announced that the consulate would offer help only those who had been registered whereas many of Polish immigrants had not applied for a residence permit. By the end of 1947, 63 per cent of Polish citizens had been registered. Political transformations in Poland during 1955–1956 caused a change in Warsaw authorities’ position. Since that moment, common aims of all Poles like: necessity of fighting for piece, defense of the Oder-Neisse borderline, maintenance of the language and Polish tradition also in immigration environment, were being emphasized. Actions aiming to induce Poles living in Sweden to build favorable atmosphere allowing a reconstruction of Polish-Swedish trade and political cooperation were widely undertaken. The employees of the Polish consulate and embassy were trying to create their own, rivalry organizations, separate Sunday schools. The Consular Department were editing two newspapers: „Det Nya Polen” published fortnightly and the monthly „Polska Odrodzona” („The Reborn Poland”). However, the majority of Poles living in Sweden remained apolitical because of their dispersion and working-class origins. Those, who considered themselves to be the independence immigrants were implacable.
3
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Polityczne i gospodarcze aspekty relacji polsko-szwedzkich w latach 1945-1989

100%
Kłonczyński A.
Studia Maritima
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2015
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vol. 28
125-155
EN
The recognition of the Provisional Government of National Unity (PGNU; Polish: TRJN) and signing of the economic agreement between Sweden and Poland in July 1945 opened a new chapter in the history of the relations between those two countries. This paper presents the diversified forms of bilateral contacts in the economic and political sphere during 44 years (1945–1989) and is an attempt to answer the question which international and internal factors influenced the directions of development of the relations between the two Baltic countries. In that long period of 44 years several stages of cooperation might be identified when those factors changed drastically. In the first stage (1945–1951) the commercial exchange was growing fast and at the same time the political relations were deteriorating, which – to a considerable degree – resulted from the atmosphere of the cold war tension. In the subsequent stages (1952–1960; 1961–1969; 1970–1979; 1980–1989) the situation kept changing, which was influenced by several economic and political factors, both international and internal in character. But in spite of the two countries’ will and involvement the deadlock in the last period was not broken. In spite of the Polish expectations based on the tiny distance between the two countries (which guaranteed low costs of transport), concerning a fast modernisation of its economy, which required foreign loans and exports of necessary raw materials such as iron ore, and high-class machines and equipment, the Swedish lost their confidence in the prompt completion of the contracts and in the quality of the delivered merchandise. The political shock resulting from the martial law and the support by the Swedes for the opposition in Poland did not make the existing contacts easier. The basic sources for the analysis have been the Polish and Swedish archival materials, statistical data and press commentaries.
PL
Uznanie Tymczasowego Rządu Jedności Narodowej oraz podpisanie umowy gospodarczej pomiędzy Szwecją i Polską w lipcu 1945 r. otworzyło nowy rozdział w historii stosunków pomiędzy tymi państwami. Celem artykułu jest zaprezentowanie zróżnicowanych form kontaktów dwustronnych w sferze gospodarczej i politycznej w latach 1945–1989 oraz próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, jakie czynniki wewnętrzne i międzynarodowe miały wpływ na kierunki rozwoju stosunków pomiędzy dwoma nadbałtyckimi sąsiadami. W tym długim okresie wyróżnić można kilka etapów współpracy, kiedy wyraźnie zmieniały się zarówno ekonomiczne, jak i polityczne uwarunkowania relacji dwustronnych. W pierwszym okresie (1945–1951) miał miejsce szybki wzrost wymiany handlowej przy równoczesnym pogarszaniu się stosunków politycznych, które w dużym stopniu wynikały z atmosfery napięcia zimnowojennego. W kolejnych etapach (1952–1960, 1961–1969, 1970–1979, 1980–1989) sytuacja ulegała znacznym zmianom, na co wpływ miało wiele czynników gospodarczych i politycznych, zarówno wewnętrznych, jak i międzynarodowych, które mimo woli i zaangażowania obu partnerów nie doprowadziły do wyjścia z impasu w ostatniej dekadzie. Mimo polskich planów dotyczących szybkiej modernizacji gospodarki, które wymagały pożyczek zagranicznych oraz możliwości sprowadzenia zarówno niezbędnych surowców (ruda żelaza), wysokiej klasy maszyn i urządzeń, a także niewielkiej odległości obu państw, gwarantującej stosunkowo niskie koszty transportu, spadało szwedzkie zaufanie do terminowości dostaw i jakości oferowanych towarów. Polityczny wstrząs związany ze stanem wojennym oraz wsparcie środowisk szwedzkich dla opozycji w Polsce nie ułatwiały odrodzenia dobrych kontaktów, które istniały w okresie powojennym oraz w latach 70. XX w. Podstawę źródłową rozważań stanowią polskie i szwedzkie materiały archiwalne, dane statystyczne oraz komentarze prasowe.
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Słowo wstępu

32%
Kłonczyński A.
Progress
|
2020
|
issue 1
7-9
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