Search results

1

POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITY OF POLISH PROACTIVE CIRCLES IN RUSSIA IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONS (MARCH - NOVEMBER 1917) (Dzialalnosc polityczno-wojskowa polskich kregow proaktywistycznych w Rosji w okresie miedzyrewolucyjnym (marzec-listo

100%

Miodowski A.

Białostockie Teki Historyczne

|

2010

|

vol. 8

105-122

EN

The emergence and functioning on the territory of Russia in 1917 of the Polish political circle directed at the Central States is to be considered as a kind of a marvel. Liberal-democratic groups created the core of the proactive camp in Russia. Since October 1917 they operated behind the common fac¸ade of the Supreme Democratic Committee (Naczelny Komitet Demokratyczny). The proactive Pilsudski left functioned in the background. It consisted of political activists belonging to such emigrational structures as the Polish Socialist Party - Revolutionary Faction (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna Frakcji Rewolucyjnej) and the Polish People's Union (Polski Zwiazek Ludowy). The third proactive group, of a rather niche nature - both in terms of the number of members and the influence on the Polish society in Russia - consisted of conservative fractions active from October 1917 as the National Union Block (Blok Jednosci Narodowej). Liberal democrats were the leading force in this internally diverse political circle. Taking advantage of the internal chaos in Russia in the period between the revolutions (March-November 1917), the above mentioned groups reached agree-ment with the Provisional Council of State (Tymczasowa Rada Stanu) during the I Stockholm Conference organized in May 1917. The most spectacular effect of this cooperation was the postponement and then liquidation of chances for the creation of Polish Eastern formations in Russia in the former shape. This idea was popular among national democrats and their supporters of the Supreme Polish Military Committee (Naczelny Polski Komitet Wojskowy). The character of political and military activity of the proactive circles in Russia - of both party members and soldiers gathered around the Main Committee of Union of Polish Military Men - the Left (Komitet Glówny Zwiazku Wojskowych Polaków - Lewicy) - underwent major transformations after the Bolshevik coup d'´ etat. It was then that the first symptoms of both decomposition of the circle itself and reorientation of policy co-created by these groups occurred. It happened during the short period between the Bolshevik coup d'´etat and the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace by commissars.

2

Proces ewolucji polityki wojskowej Komunistycznej Partii Robotniczej Polski w okresie rokowań ryskich (październik 1920 – marzec 1921)

100%

Miodowski A.

Białostockie Teki Historyczne

|

2015

|

vol. Białostockie Teki Historyczne, 2015, tom 13

EN

After the defeat in the war against Poland, the Bolshevik leaders withdrew their support for the previous military policy of the Communist Workers Party of Poland (KPRP). Soldiers of Polish origin, who in 1920 had been delegated to the I Polish Red Army, were retransferred to the Red Army units, where they had formerly performed military service. After the ratification of the Riga Treaty of 16 April 1921, Polish communists had to limit their activities to psychological warfare and propaganda against their political adversaries at home and intelligence infiltration of the Polish Army structures.

3

Dywersja polityczna KPRP przeciwko Wojsku Polskiemu na przełomie lat 1918/1919

100%

Miodowski A.

Studia Podlaskie

|

2015

|

vol. 23

EN

Since the Polish Armed Forces were established, a priority task of Russian and Polish communists was to evoke disintegration of this armed force they treated as their enemy so that it did not hamper the Red Army’s march towardsWest. To implement the program of the Polish Armed Forces disintegration successfully, it was necessary to launch it simultaneously in units deployed in the Borderlands, those located along the central passage between the Rivers Niemen–Bug and Vistula as well as those stationed West of the Vistula River. National structures of KPRP (Communist Workers Party of Poland) would not have been able to undertake such a wide action of infiltrating their undercover agents into the Polish Armed Forces structures without staff and especially financial support from the party’s Moscow headquarters. Thus the arrival of KPRP’s activists from the Soviet Russia in Poland propelled disintegration actions within the Polish Armed Forces.

RU

С начала основания Войска Польского приоритетным заданием русских и польских коммунистов стало доведение вражеских вооруженных сил до дезинтеграции, чтобы не были преградой маршу красноармейцев на Запад. Осуществление программы дезинтеграции Войска Польского было необходимо для одновременного захвата әтими действиями как единиц, находящихся на пограничных территориях, так и расположенных в центральной части между линиями Немон – Буг и Висла, а также распределившихся на запад от линии Висла. Местные структуры КПРП без кадровой, а точнее финансовой поддержки со строны московского партийного органа, не были бы в состоянии препринять широко презираемую всеми акцию проникновения в структуры Войска Польского своих законспирированных деятелей. Приезд в страну из Советской России активистов КПРП дал начало дезинтергационным действиям в польских вооруженных стилах.

4

Jeńcy austro-węgierscy w niewoli rosyjskiej w okresie przedrewolucyjnym (sierpień 1914 – luty 1917)

100%

Miodowski A.

Białostockie Teki Historyczne

|

2016

|

vol. Białostockie Teki Historyczne, 2016, tom 14

EN

During the Great War between 2.2 and 2.3 million POWs from the Central Powers were taken to Russian captivity. Most of them were citizens of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They became POWs mostly during the years 1914–1916. Apart from those captured during fighting or wounded, the captivity was the final destination for deserters and those who voluntarily decided to surrender themselves to the enemy on the battlefield. The motives of the latter ones were varied. Irrespective of the circumstances, however, in which the Austro-Hungarian solders found themselves in Russian captivity, their further fates as POWs were equally harsh. The hardships of captivity were felt more by the officers and Austrian and Hungarian soldiers, and to a lesser degree by those from the so-called “friendly nations”. POWs of Slavic ethnicity had been treated, prior to February 1917, relatively favourably and had much more freedom in, for instance, everyday contacts with the Russian civilian population. The period of captivity lasting several years put many Austro-Hungarian POWs (mainly Slavs) onto the path of enculturation with Russianness. That process and a parallel socialisation of this particular group of military men forced to learn to live among Russians both remain the most intriguing and still un-researched social phenomena caused by the Great War. That process gained new dynamics and another direction due to the outbreak of both Russian revolutions in 1917. Especially the latter one brought about by bolsheviks resulted in grave consequences not only in terms of individual dimension affecting individual POWs, but also in a wider social dimension, the consequences of which were to become apparent on a wider spectrum and after a longer time, i.e. in the home countries of the POWs upon their return from captivity.

5

POLITICAL AND MILITARY INITIATIVES OF THE POLISH LEFT WING EMIGRANT CENTERS IN RUSSIA (MARCH-NOVEMBER 1917) (Inicjatywy polityczno-wojskowe wychodzczych osrodkow lewicy polskiej w Rosji (marzec-listopad 1917 r.)

100%

Miodowski A.

Białostockie Teki Historyczne

|

2011

|

vol. 9

117-134

EN

In 1917 Polish military men in the Russian army, taking advantage of the inter-revolutionary propitious conditions for grassroots organizational initiatives, undertook the task of establishment of their own union structures. This activity was in line with the process of separation of ethnic constituents of the former imperial army and their gradual transformation into independent formations. Apart from Poles, among others, Latvians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Georgians followed that direction. This tendency got reinforced after the Russian summer offensive defeat. In the case of the Polish military men, party confilicts - transferred from the political scene into the Union of Military Poles theatre - interfered with the fulfillment of these plans. Programmed already during the establishment of the Main Committee of the Union of the Left Wing Military Poles and of the Supreme Polish Military Committee, the conflict arising between these centers proved to be so absorbing for both sides that the opportunity to organize a Polish army counting tens of thousands of soldiers was lost. The establishment of the three Polish Corps in the merely incipient form meant leaving thousands of Polish soldiers outside these formations, which made them vulnerable to the influence of the Russian revolutionaries. Such indoctrination was conducted by the radical Russian left and its supporters from the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, the Polish Socialist Party - Left, the Polish Workers' Union 'Promien' and Polish Revolutionary Military Clubs.

6

PARTICIPATION OF THE RADICAL EMIGRANTS' LEFT IN THE PROCESS OF THE BOLSHEVIK INDOCTRINATION OF POLISH MILITARY MEN IN RUSSIA (Udzial radykalnej lewicy wychodzczej w procesie bolszewizacji wojskowych Polaków w Rosji)

100%

Miodowski A.

Białostockie Teki Historyczne

|

2009

|

vol. 7

73-92

EN

Trends in the activity of this part of Polish military movement which gathered around the Main Committee of the Association of Polish Military Men of the Left (Komitet Glówny Zwiazków Wojskowych Polaków Lewicy), were created by liberal-democratic groups and individual fractions of the emigrants' left. The strength of this influence did not result from any formal connections between political and military structures. It was rather based on personal relations. Numerous members of the Main Committee were also activists of emigrants' fractions. Sections of the Polish Socialist Party - Left (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna - Lewica), groups of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (Socjaldemokracja Królestwa Polskiego i Litwy) and the Polish Socialist Union (Zjednoczenie Socjalistyczne Polskie), which were coming into being right after the February Revolution, immediately established contacts with Polish soldiers scattered in the Russian army and with those already serving in the Polish Rifle Division (Dywizja Strzelców Polskich). Revolutionary indoctrination of military men aimed at torpedoing plans to establish Polish military forces of a pro-allied profile, and, in the further perspective, at using this Bolshevism influenced human matter while creating the Red Polish Army (Czerwona Armia Polska). Social democrats and both fractions of socialists co-created a fraction of the radical left in the Main Committee. Before 7 November 1917 it had cooperated with liberal democrats, blocking enlargement of Polish corpses. After the Bolshevik coup d'etat, when Bolsheviks reoriented their military policy and tried to include the structures of the Main Committee into the process of organization of eastern formations, liberal democrats started following the path of confrontation with the emigrants' radical left. Leaders of the radical left, having realized that through agitation only it would not be possible to eliminate the influence of liberal democrats on the head office of the association, found it indispensable to turn for help to political and administrative factors. The influence of the radical left on the Main Committee was a significant factor contributing to the establishing of the Commissariat for Polish Affairs (Komisariat do Spraw Polskich). This institution functioned, as one of the sections of the People's Commissariat of Nationalities (Komisariat Ludowy do Spraw Narodowosciowych). This basis enabled conducting activities aiming at first at the takeover of the control over the headquarters of the radical left and, eventually, their liquidation. The conclusive confrontation between both fractions took place at the Second Congress of the Military Left (II Zjazd Lewicy Wojskowej). During the congress, in the days 11-19 November 1917, there was a battle over the souls of the left-oriented military Poles. Thanks to the support of people's commissars, the radical emigrants' left triumphed.

7

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONDITIONINGS OF DEMOBILISATION PROCESS OF POLISH CORPSES IN RUSSIA IN 1918 (Uwarunkowania polityczno-wojskowe procesu demobilizacji korpusów polskich w Rosji w 1918r.)

100%

Miodowski A.

Białostockie Teki Historyczne

|

2008

|

vol. 6

157-175

EN

The existence of the I Polish Corps was primarily endangered due to a series of actions undertaken by General Józef Dowbor-Musnicki against the Bolsheviks from 7th November 1917. Lack of possibility of coexistence with the Soviet Party impelled the Poles at the turn of January and February of 1918 to get in touch with Commander-in-Chief East (Oberbefehlshaber-Ost), General Max Hoffmann. In response,the German document defining conditions of possible cooperation was delivered to Babruysk. These conditions were very hard, for they contained, inter alia, a point, which stated that a recognition of German command's superior authority was demanded and a transfer of the Polish troops to the German military pay was assumed. In respect to the agreement, signed on 26th February in Babruysk, the corps were eventually recognised as de jure neutral formation and it was stated in the document that the name Polish Corps defined not only the I Polish Corps, but also all other formations, which were under command of General Dowbor-Musnicki. A real attitude of the German party toward the corps was revealed in Major von Wulffen's letter of 9th March 1918. General Dowbor-Musnicki learnt from the document that, after the peace treaty with Russia had been ratified, a gradual evacuation of the corps forces to the country should start. It was to concern a group of about a thousand soldiers a month and its final object was a total demobilisation of the corps. The demobilisation of the I Corps, imposed by the agreement of 21st May 1918, begun immediately and was run according to the General Erich von Falkenhayn's directives, included in an order by General Dowbor-Musnicki. Not all the high officers and soldiers of the corps reconciled themselves with the demobilisation and, a few hundred of them proceeded to Ukraine, to the Kuban River and to Murmansk in order to join smaller Polish troops formed there. Also at the turn of February and March of 1918 some other events occurred which had a definitive impact on further fates of the II and the III Polish Corps. The situation changed, inter alia, in relation to the incursion of German and Austro-Hungarian troops into Ukraine; it took place respectively on 18th and 28th February 1918. Military actions of Central Powers enforced immediate decisions concerning further fates of Polish troops, formed in Ukraine. Only two solutions seemed to be obvious. Commander of the formations, General Eugeniusz de Henning-Michaelis, could order an immediate march-out beyond the zone of influence of the Central Powers or try to secure the existence of the troops in the area of Ukraine, occupied by the forces of these Powers, by means of a political agreement. In the case of the II Polish Corps, the situation was additionally complicated by an issue of the Legions' II Brigade, which on 6th March 1918 reached the area of its quarters. A capitulation of the II Polish Corps after the defeat of Kaniv and demobilisation of the I Polish Corps were, in fact, a total elimination of the Polish military formations in Russia. Thus, in the middle of 1918 the over-year attempts to create Polish formation in East came to an and.

8

Działania propagandowo-dezintegracyjne „Wojskówki” KPRP w Wojsku Polskim na przełomie lat 1919/1920

100%

Miodowski A.

Studia Podlaskie

|

2014

|

vol. 22

EN

In the months preceding the 1920 Kiev Operation, the Communist Party of Poland intensified the disintegrating activities in the Polish Military. The action had already been undertaken a year before. Provoking the anti-war atmosphere in the ranks of soldiers could have sabotaged not only Polish offensive plans but also could have spoilt a defensive campaign in case the Soviet Army invaded Poland. Incapacitation of an enemy before a decisive attack was the core of disintegrating actives led by Polish communists at the turn of 1919 and 1920. Pacific attitude manifested by a part of soldiers, as well as internal dissensions between them and officers usually against their social background were suitable factors to arrange hostile actions. Skilful use of those circumstances facilitated revolutionary indoctrination the process of disintegration of the Polish army fanned by communist agitation was gradually developing despite of battles won by the Polish during the Kiev offensive. The situation went even worse while the Polish troops were retreating. The tendency changed dramatically after the successful Battle of Warsaw (1920).

RU

За несколько месяцев до киевского выезда Коммунистическая Рабочая Партия Польши активизировала пропагандистско-дезинтеграционную деятельность, которая велась около года в отделениях польской армии. Призывы в солдатских рядах к антивоенным настроениям на практике могли не только разрушить польские наступательные планы, а также привести к дезорганизации оборонительных действий в случае агрессии Красной армии на Польшу. Обезоруживание противника еще перед решающим боем было очень важным шагом для польских коммунистов на рубеже 1919–1920 гг. в их пропагандистско-дезинтеграционной деятельности. Благоприятными факторами в их проведении были пацифистские проявления у некоторых солдат, так и разногласия между солдатами и офицерами, которые имели место чаще всего на социальном фоне.

9

Lokalne uwarunkowania i efekty rosyjskiej polityki oświatowej na Białostocczyźnie u progu XX wieku

100%

Miodowski A.

Studia Podlaskie

|

2016

|

vol. 24

EN

In the nineteenth century the primary function of school involved educating students, in most cases mechanically, with a limited range of knowledge. The first, often ultimate stage, included instruction on reading, writing and basic arithmetical operations. Learning those skills was enough during the period under consideration within the area of Bialystok district to be recognized an “enlightened person”. Central authorities in Petersburg aimed at promoting, through the schools, knowledge of the state language, components of Russian culture and the most important events in the time of the Romanovs. A primary educational objective was making students loyal in relation to the existing socio-political system. In the opinion of local community, Russian elementary public schools were considered a foreign and unwanted entity. This was mainly the result of the historical occurrences, although not exclusively. Partly, this unwillingness was due to the fact that the central authorities relinquished the costs of schools maintenance to the local people depriving them, at the same time, of the influence on their functioning.

RU

В девятнадцатом столетии основная функция школы заключалась в передаче учащимся, обычно механическим прикладным способом, определенного объема знаний. Первый әтап, часто он же и последний, заканчивался на обучении чтению, письму и простейших арифметических действий. Освоение указанных умений хватало для того, чтобы в описываемом периоде на территории белостокского повета считаться «просвещенным человеком». Центральная власть в Петербурге при помощи школ стремилась к популяризации государственного языка, русской культуры и ознакомлению с самыми важными событиями в истории Империи Романовых. Главной воспитательной целью считалось умение сформировать у учащихся лояльного отношения к существующей общественно-политической системе. Для локальной общественности русские публичные начальные школы являлись чуждыми и нежеланными. Әто являлось последствием исторических событий, хотя и не только. Иногда такое отношение появлялось на основании того, что власти перекладывали на плечи местного населения содержание таких школ, одновременно лишая жителей возможности влиять на их функционирование.

10

POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITY OF THE POLISH RADICAL LEFT DURING A DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE POLISH-SOVIET WAR (JULY - SEPTEMBER 1920) (Polish title below)

100%

Miodowski A.

Studia Podlaskie

|

2011

|

vol. 19

61-76

EN

(Polish title: Aktywnosc polityczno-wojskowa radykalnej lewicy polskiej w rozstrzygajacym okresie wojny polsko-bolszewickiej (lipiec - wrzesien 1920 roku). When in July 1920 forces of the Western Front initiated offensive actions against Polish forces, the Bolsheviks not only shattered the outcomes of the preceding attack of Polish-Ukrainian armed forces from the turn of April and May, but they also obtained the possibility to materialize the plan to impose 'the power of the councils ' in the country by the Vistula River. The 'government ' established by Polish comrades-in-arms of Vladimir Lenin, which was formally constituted on 30 July in Bialystok, constituted the tool that army commissioners decided to use in the course of revolutionary war conducted by the Red Army against Poles. This government functioned under the name of Temporary Revolutionary Committee of Poland, and it was colloquially called 'Polrewkom '. The proclamation issued by the organ informed about seizing the power in the country and creating the Polish Soviet Socialist Republic. In practice this meant that the Communist Workers' Party of Poland supported by armed forces of our eastern neighbour aimed to limit the Polish territory and transform its remaining part into union republic of the Soviet state constructed by the Bolsheviks. What constituted a considerable obstacle in the realization of the objectives determined by protectors from Moscow for Polrewkom was the paucity of personnel being at the disposal on areas seized by the Red Army soldiers, as well as too low level of revolutionization among Poles. These circumstances, in connection with defeats of the Red Army in Battle of Warsaw and Battle of the Niemen River, crossed out the possibility to establish communist regime on Polish lands for more than 20 years. Its initiators could return to this project, in a modified form, only in the year 1944.

11

THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUPS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE BOLSHEVIK COUP (Polityka wojskowa srodowisk liberalno-demokratycznych na gruncie rosyjskim po przewrocie bolszewickim (listopad 1917 - listopad 1918))

100%

Miodowski A.

Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej

|

2009

|

vol. 44

5-20

EN

The Bolshevik coup changed the stand represented by the heretofore political opponents of establishing a Polish army in Russia. The liberal-democratic groups active on Russian soil under the aegis of the Supreme Democratic Committee began to reveal inclinations towards a pertinent agreement with the Polish Council of Inter-party Unification, created by the national democrats. This tendency became discernible already prior to 7 November 1917, and its first symptom were the resolutions passed at the Second Congress of the Polish Democracy, held in October in Petrograd. The change in question was the outcome of three fundamental reasons. The first was the fact that in view of the slight chances for the establishment of a Polish army at home, the Regency Council did not oppose the creation of Polish formations in Russia, especially since 7 November 1917. Secondly, faced with the threat of the Bolshevisation of the Polish military circles, the liberal democrats finally managed to perceive the spontaneous drive among the soldiers towards secession from the Russian army. Thirdly, the liberal-democratic environment was increasingly succumbing to the pressure of the allied conservative groups concentrated around the National Unity Bloc, which placed particular emphasis on the necessity of protecting Polish property and culture in the eastern borderlands against the Bolshevik peril. Conservative politicians maintained that such protection could be guaranteed by Polish armed formations, and thus started to be concerned with the removal of the prime obstacle, i.e. the protests of the liberal democrats. These tendencies in the re-evaluation of the programme lines represented by the liberal-democratic groups and their allies created an opportunity for coming to terms with the Polish Council of Inter-Party Unification. The perspective of embarking upon a joint effort for the creation of a Polish army in Russia became increasingly realistic. The first steps were taken already on 9 November 1917 at a political convention attended by representatives of assorted milieus. Due to the agreement achieved at the convention, its participants established a Polish Security Council, which was to deal with the protection of the property and political interests of Polish citizens in former Polish eastern borderlands. These endeavours, however, did not contribute to obliterating all the mutual antagonisms and programme differences. One of the reasons was the fact that the patrons of the majority of the undertakings pertaining to security were the heretofore political opponents of the Polish Council. Activity was displayed predominantly by the right wing, and especially its members concentrated around the Polish Council of the Land of Minsk and Mohylew and the Polish Council in Livonia. This tendency disturbed the national democrats, anxious about its impact. Although this state of affairs was an essential factor hampering the realisation of a harmonious cooperation of the Polish political environments in Russia, it was by no means the only one. Other factors included the attitude towards the two warring sides in Europe. The liberal-democratic groups and the right wing active on Russian soil invariably supported a neutral stand towards the global conflict. In practice, however, they consistently supported the activist option, which initially denoted backing the Austro-Polish solution, and then was replaced by an analogous Polish-German option. Another consequence of basing the solution of the Polish question on the evolving activist conception was the acceptance of the fact that the First Polish Corps went over to the German side and recognized the supremacy of the Regency Council. The liberal democrats welcomed this step with enthusiasm, and immediately defended General Jozef Dowbor-Musnicki against the charges of treason formulated by the Polish Council. The liberal-democratic activists regarded the decision made by the commander of the Corps as the only way to shield the soldiers from Bolshevik agitation. The propagation of such views by the liberal democrats denoted in practice the elimination of all chances for a campaign conducted jointly with the national democrats and supporting the Polish corps set up in Ukraine and Bessarabia. The only domain, which still managed to preserve the cooperation initiated at the convention of 9 November 1917, was the united front against the agitators from the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania and the Polish Socialist Party-Leftwing Faction. The Second Congress of the Military Left Wing, which took place on 11-19 December 1917 in Petrograd, became the scene of a battle for predominance among the Polish military under the Chief Committee of the Military Unions of the Polish Left Wing. The military adherents of the liberal democratic groups as well as the leaders of this milieu, present at the convention among the members of assorted political groups, tried to steer the debates at all cost in such a way so that the resolutions passed in their course would not determine the decisions of the Polish soldiers to choose the revolutionary side of the barricade. This objective, however, was not attained. The new leaders, recruited from the activists of the Polish Revolutionary Soldiers' Club, headed by Roman Lagwa, initiated their activity with closer cooperation with the Commissariat for Polish Affairs and the accompanying Council for Revolutionary-Democratic Organisations. The outcome of this decision entailed the establishment of collaboration with the central and local organisations of the Soviet authorities. The ensuing situation predicted the independence of the newly elected Chief Committee from the impact of the liberal democrats. The final blow to the latter's military policies was dealt by the Bolsheviks, who impeded the activity of the Representation of the Regency Council, headed by Aleksander Lednicki.

12

„Robotnica”, „Włościanka” i „Kobieta Sowiecka” – główne tytuły masowej sowieckiej prasy kobiecej szczebla centralnego (przed II wojną i po II wojnie światowej)

100%

Miodowski A.

Czasopismo Naukowe Instytutu Studiów Kobiecych

|

2021

|

issue 1(10)

97-125

PL

W Polsce odczuwalny jest deficyt wiedzy na temat masowej sowieckiej prasy kobiecej. A przecież to ona przez dekady kształtowała poglądy i postawy milionów Rosjanek, Ukrainek, Białorusinek i pozostałych mieszkanek Związku Sowieckiego. Takie periodyki, jak „Robotnica”, „Włościanka”, „Kobieta Sowiecka”, będąc na szczeblu centralnym częścią potężnej machiny propagandowej, ułatwiały partii komunistycznej „pierekowkę dusz” kobiecych w duchu marksistowskiego feminizmu. A takie jego propagatorki, jak Nadieżda Krupska, Anna Uljanowa-Jelizarowa, Inessa Armand, Aleksandra Kołłontaj i wiele im podobnych, tyle że mniej znanych współpracownic Włodzimierza Lenina i jego następców, łączyły aktywność polityczną i dziennikarską. Konsekwencją tego była nie tylko instrumentalizacja upolitycznionej przez partię komunistyczną prasy kobiecej, ale też ograniczenie jej sprawczości.

EN

In Poland, there is a noticeable deficit of knowledge about the mass Soviet women’s press. After all, it for decades shaped the views and attitudes of millions of Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian women and other residents of the Soviet Union. Such periodicals as “Robotnica”, “Włościanka”, “Kobieta Sowiecka”, being at the central level a part of a powerful propaganda machine, facilitated the Communist Party’s ‘piecemeal’ of women’s souls in the spirit of Marxist feminism. And its promoters, such as Nadezhda Krupska, Anna Ulyanova-Yelizarova, Inessa Armand, Aleksandra Kołłontaj and many others like them, so much that less known associates of Vladimir Lenin and his successors combined political and journalistic activity. The consequence of this situation was not only the instrumentalization of the women’s press politicized by the communist party, but also the limitation of its agency.

13

Radykalny feminizm Aleksandry Kołłontaj i próby urzeczywistnienia jego pryncypiów w przestrzeni społeczno-obyczajowej Rosji Sowieckiej (1917–1922)

100%

Miodowski A.

Czasopismo Naukowe Instytutu Studiów Kobiecych

|

2016

|

issue 1(1)

24-44

EN

Alexandra Domontowicz was born on 31stof March, 1872 in St. Petersburg. In 1893, at the age of 21, she married Michal Kollontaj. Thanks to her husband she came to know about the revolutionary idea of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and George Plekhanov. After separating from her husband, A. Kollontaj left for Switzerland in 1898, where she studied economics. During her stay in Western Europe, she established number of contacts with revolutionary environment. At the beginning 20thcentury, she returned to Russia as a leftist activist, in order to take over position of Secretary of St. Petersburg Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Since then, in her dealings, she characterized situation of women in her country with special sensitivity. This was the starting point for her gradual approach to the radical trend of Marxist feminism. After Bolshevik Revolution that took place in 1917, she was appointed to the position of Folk Commissioner for social welfare, becoming the first woman in the world acting as a minister. During that time, she organized numerous conferences and meetings of communists from all over Europe. At the end of 1918, along with Inessa Armand, A. Kollontaj created the world's first office of women’s affairs.

PL

Aleksandra Domontowicz urodziła się 31 marca 1872 r. w Petersburgu. W 1893 r. w wieku 21 lat wyszła za mąż za Michała Kołłontaja. Dzięki mężowi poznała rewolucyjną myśl Karola Marksa, Fryderyka Engelsa i Jerzego Plechanowa. Po rozstaniu z mężem A. Kołłontaj wyjechała w 1898 r. do Szwajcarii, gdzie podjęła studia ekonomiczne. Podczas pobytu w zachodniej Europie nawiązała wiele kontaktów ze środowiskami rewolucyjnymi. Z początkiem XX w. powróciła do Rosji już jako lewicowa aktywistka, by objąć stanowisko sekretarza petersburskiego komitetu partii bolszewickiej. Od tego czasu w swoich poczynaniach odznaczać się zaczęła szczególną wrażliwością na położenie kobiet w swoim kraju. Był to punkt wyjścia do stopniowego zbliżania się przez nią do radykalnego nurtu marksistowskiego feminizmu. Po przewrocie bolszewickim w 1917 r. powołana została na stanowisko komisarz ludowej do spraw opieki społecznej, stając się pierwszą kobietą na świecie pełniącą funkcję ministra. W tym czasie organizowała liczne konferencje i spotkania komunistek z całej Europy. Pod koniec 1918 r. A. Kołłontaj utworzyła wespół z Inessą Armand pierwszy na świecie urząd do spraw kobiet.

14

Anna Marcinkiewicz-Kaczmarczyk, Kobiety w obronie Warszawy. Ochotnicza Legia Kobiet (1918–1922) i Wojskowa Służba Kobiet ZWZ-AK (1939–1945), (seria „Monografie”, t. 116), Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warszawa 2016, ss.432, ISBN 978-83-7629-980-8

100%

Miodowski A.

Czasopismo Naukowe Instytutu Studiów Kobiecych

|

2017

|

issue 1(2)

175-188

PL

Recenzja książki

EN

Book-Review

15

Działalność zagranicznych ruchów kobiecych w świetle publikacji „Naszej Pracy” – organu prasowego Społeczno-Obywatelskiej Ligi Kobiet (1947–1949)

100%

Miodowski A.

Czasopismo Naukowe Instytutu Studiów Kobiecych

|

2020

|

issue 1(8)

140-157

PL

Społeczno-Obywatelska Liga Kobiet działała w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1945–1949. Jej pierwszy oficjalny organ prasowy, którym była „Praca Kobiet”, zaczął ukazywać się dopiero w 1946 r. Periodyk wydawał warszawski Zarząd Wojewódzki stowarzyszenia. Ogólnopolskie pismo „Nasza Praca”, będące organem Zarządu Głównego, trafiło do czytelniczek dopiero z początkiem 1947 r. Na jego łamach kontynuowano publikację informacji o działalności zagranicznych ruchów kobiecych i zrzeszających je organizacjach międzynarodowych takich, jak Światowa Demokratyczna Federacja Kobiet. Wartość poznawcza tych publikacji była zróżnicowana. Wpływ na to miał język przekazu dziennikarskiego (nowomowa) i propagandowy (pozamerytoryczny) dobór odnotowywanych i pomijanych faktów. Ich analiza pozwoliła jednak odkryć mechanizmy funkcjonowania (współdziałania) lewicowych ruchów kobiecych na forum międzynarodowym w drugiej połowie lat 40. XX w.

EN

The Social and Civic Women’s League has acted in Communist Poland in the years 1945–1949. Its first official press release, which was “Praca Kobiet”, started its publication only in 1946. Periodical publishing had been issued by Warsaw Regional Board of the association. The national magazine “Nasza Praca”, an organ of the General Board, has been received by the readers just before commencement of 1947. In texts published on its sites it was continued a publication of the information concerning the activity of foreign women’s movements and their international organizations such as the World Democrat Women Federation. Cognitive values of such publications varied a lot. This was significantly influenced by the journalist language used to transfer (newspeak) and propaganda (non-substantive) choice of recorded and disregarded facts. Their analysis however helped to discover mechanisms of functioning (interaction) of the leftist women’s movements on the international front in the second half of the 1940s.

16

Wielka wojna kobiet. Zaangażowanie sióstr Szwedzkiego Czerwonego Krzyża w niesienie pomocy jeńcom wojennym z armii państw centralnych w przedrewolucyjnej Rosji (1914–1917)

100%

Miodowski A.

Czasopismo Naukowe Instytutu Studiów Kobiecych

|

2018

|

issue 1(4)

47-74

PL

Kobiety już od starożytności angażowały się w opiekę nad chorymi i rannymi żołnierzami. Do połowy XIX w. pielęgnacja na zapleczu pola walki poszkodowanych wojskowych była dla markietanek jedynie dodatkowym zajęciem. Humanitarny aspekt ich służby zyskał na znaczeniu na przełomie XVIII i XIX w. wraz z intensyfikacją wojen napoleońskich. W okresie Wojny Krymskiej zachodnioeuropejska opinia publiczna wymusiła na elitach politycznych i wojskowych zgodę na włączenie do obsad szpitali polowych personelu kobiecego. Siostry miłosierdzia, jak i wspomagające je świeckie wolontariuszki współdziałając z lekarzami wojskowymi wspólnie zapoczątkowali w latach 1854-1855 proces rozwoju nowoczesnej medycyny pola walki. Wielka Wojna z racji swej powszechności i wykorzystywania nowoczesnego uzbrojenia przyniosła z sobą nie tylko więcej niż dotąd ofiar śmiertelnych, ale i niespotykaną wcześniej liczbę rannych i chorych żołnierzy. Globalny konflikt zbrojny lat 1914-1918 wymagał, więc zaangażowania kobiet już nie tylko przy ratowaniu rannych z pola walki i przy ich pielęgnacji w przyfrontowych szpitalach polowych, ale też wyznaczył im nową rolę, jaką stała się opieka nad będącymi w złej kondycji milionami jeńców wojennych.

EN

Women have been involved in the care of sick and wounded soldiers since antiquity. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the care in the back of the battlefield of injured servicemen was only an additional occupation for the marquetes. The humanitarian aspect of their service gained importance at the turn of the XVIII and XIX centuries, along with the intensification of the Napoleonic wars. During the Crimean War, the Western European public opinion forced the political and military elites to agree to include the female staff in field hospitals. The Sisters of Mercy, as well as secular volunteers assisting them in cooperation with military doctors together initiated the process of development of modern martial arts medicine in the years 1854-1855. The Great War, due to its universality and use of modern arms, brought not only more deaths than ever, but also an unprecedented number of wounded and sick soldiers. The global armed conflict in the years 1914-1918 therefore required the involvement of women not only in rescuing the wounded from the battlefield and taking care of them in the front-line field hospitals, but also set a new role for them, which was taking care of the millions of prisoners of war in bad condition.

Refine search results

6 Białostockie Teki Historyczne

5 Czasopismo Naukowe Instytutu Studiów Kobiecych

4 Studia Podlaskie

1 Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej

1 2021

1 2020

1 2018

1 2017

3 2016

2 2015

1 2014

2 2011

1 2010

2 2009

1 2008

16 Miodowski A.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITY OF POLISH PROACTIVE CIRCLES IN RUSSIA IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONS (MARCH - NOVEMBER 1917) (Dzialalnosc polityczno-wojskowa polskich kregow proaktywistycznych w Rosji w okresie miedzyrewolucyjnym (marzec-listo

Proces ewolucji polityki wojskowej Komunistycznej Partii Robotniczej Polski w okresie rokowań ryskich (październik 1920 – marzec 1921)

Dywersja polityczna KPRP przeciwko Wojsku Polskiemu na przełomie lat 1918/1919

Jeńcy austro-węgierscy w niewoli rosyjskiej w okresie przedrewolucyjnym (sierpień 1914 – luty 1917)

POLITICAL AND MILITARY INITIATIVES OF THE POLISH LEFT WING EMIGRANT CENTERS IN RUSSIA (MARCH-NOVEMBER 1917) (Inicjatywy polityczno-wojskowe wychodzczych osrodkow lewicy polskiej w Rosji (marzec-listopad 1917 r.)

PARTICIPATION OF THE RADICAL EMIGRANTS' LEFT IN THE PROCESS OF THE BOLSHEVIK INDOCTRINATION OF POLISH MILITARY MEN IN RUSSIA (Udzial radykalnej lewicy wychodzczej w procesie bolszewizacji wojskowych Polaków w Rosji)

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONDITIONINGS OF DEMOBILISATION PROCESS OF POLISH CORPSES IN RUSSIA IN 1918 (Uwarunkowania polityczno-wojskowe procesu demobilizacji korpusów polskich w Rosji w 1918r.)

Działania propagandowo-dezintegracyjne „Wojskówki” KPRP w Wojsku Polskim na przełomie lat 1919/1920

Lokalne uwarunkowania i efekty rosyjskiej polityki oświatowej na Białostocczyźnie u progu XX wieku

POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITY OF THE POLISH RADICAL LEFT DURING A DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE POLISH-SOVIET WAR (JULY - SEPTEMBER 1920) (Polish title below)

THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUPS IN RUSSIA AFTER THE BOLSHEVIK COUP (Polityka wojskowa srodowisk liberalno-demokratycznych na gruncie rosyjskim po przewrocie bolszewickim (listopad 1917 - listopad 1918))

„Robotnica”, „Włościanka” i „Kobieta Sowiecka” – główne tytuły masowej sowieckiej prasy kobiecej szczebla centralnego (przed II wojną i po II wojnie światowej)

Radykalny feminizm Aleksandry Kołłontaj i próby urzeczywistnienia jego pryncypiów w przestrzeni społeczno-obyczajowej Rosji Sowieckiej (1917–1922)

Anna Marcinkiewicz-Kaczmarczyk, Kobiety w obronie Warszawy. Ochotnicza Legia Kobiet (1918–1922) i Wojskowa Służba Kobiet ZWZ-AK (1939–1945), (seria „Monografie”, t. 116), Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warszawa 2016, ss.432, ISBN 978-83-7629-980-8

Działalność zagranicznych ruchów kobiecych w świetle publikacji „Naszej Pracy” – organu prasowego Społeczno-Obywatelskiej Ligi Kobiet (1947–1949)

Wielka wojna kobiet. Zaangażowanie sióstr Szwedzkiego Czerwonego Krzyża w niesienie pomocy jeńcom wojennym z armii państw centralnych w przedrewolucyjnej Rosji (1914–1917)