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Powszechniki kontratakują. Uwagi o tezie wielorakiej realizacji życia Krzysztofa Chodasewicza

100%
Miłkowski M.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2017
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vol. 12
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issue 4
81-95
EN
In this paper, I argue against the use of the notion of multiple realization to defend a unified account of life, as proposed by Krzysztof Chodasewicz. I show that the notion of multiple realization is itself highly problematic but, most im­portantly, it cannot warrant antireductionist claims traditionally associated with it. In particular, it is unable to block both traditional reduction and mechanistic causal reduction. To make matters worse, multiple realization is theoretically lad­en, which makes it very dif f icult to defend the claim that life is irreducible because there may, at least in principle, be theoretical contexts, in which it is construed of in a fashion that would even require reduction to its molecular bases. I argue that the appeal to the notion of an abstract type (or universal) can, and should, replace appeals to multiply realized types.
2
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Madness Rather Than Method. Remarks on Paweł Gładziejewski’s „Wyjaśnianie za pomocą reprezentacji mentalnych” („Explaining with Mental Representations”)

100%
Miłkowski M.
Filozofia Nauki
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2017
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vol. 25
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issue 3
57-67
PL
In this paper, I argue that, in his account of representational mechanisms, Paweł Gładziejewski should not defend the strong claim that only structural representations are genuinely representational. In particular, his reliance on Ramsey’s typology of representations has led him astray. Moreover, one of the conditions that representational mechanisms are supposed to fulfill is, in its original formulation, too strong and excludes biologically plausible scenarios. Instead, a more pluralist account is suggested.
3

On the Social Nature of Linguistic Prescriptions

100%
Miłkowski M.
Psychology of Language and Communication
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2013
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vol. 17
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issue 2
175-187
EN
The paper proposes an empirical method to investigate linguistic prescriptions as inherent corrective behaviors. The behaviors in question may but need not necessarily be supported by any explicit knowledge of rules. It is possible to gain insight into them, for example by extracting information about corrections from revision histories of texts (or by analyzing speech corpora where users correct themselves or one another). One easily available source of such information is the revision history of Wikipedia. As is shown, the most frequent and short corrections are limited to linguistic errors such as typos (and editorial conventions adopted in Wikipedia). By perusing an automatically generated revision corpus, one gains insight into the prescriptive nature of language empirically. At the same time, the prescriptions offered are not reducible to descriptions of the most frequent linguistic use.
4

Evaluating Artificial Models of Cognition

100%
Miłkowski M.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2015
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vol. 40
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issue 1
43-62
EN
Artificial models of cognition serve different purposes, and their use determines the way they should be evaluated. There are also models that do not represent any particular biological agents, and there is controversy as to how they should be assessed. At the same time, modelers do evaluate such models as better or worse. There is also a widespread tendency to call for publicly available standards of replicability and benchmarking for such models. In this paper, I argue that proper evaluation of models does not depend on whether they target real biological agents or not; instead, the standards of evaluation depend on the use of models rather than on the reality of their targets. I discuss how models are validated depending on their use and argue that all-encompassing benchmarks for models may be well beyond reach.
5

The Hard Problem Of Content: Solved (Long Ago)

100%
Miłkowski M.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2015
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vol. 41
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issue 1
73-88
EN
In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in naturalized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic minds, they would either have to embrace representationalism or turn to semantic nihilism, which is, as I argue, an unstable and unattractive position. Hence, I conclude, their book does not offer an alternative to representationalism. At the same time, it reminds us that representational talk in cognitive science cannot be taken for granted and that information is different from mental representation. Although this claim is not new, Hutto and Myin defend it forcefully and elegantly.
6
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Integrating cognitive (neuro)science using mechanisms

100%
Miłkowski M.
Avant
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2016
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vol. 7
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issue 2
EN
In this paper, an account of theoretical integration in cognitive (neuro)science from the mechanistic perspective is defended. It is argued that mechanistic patterns of integration can be better understood in terms of constraints on representations of mechanisms, not just on the space of possible mechanisms, as previous accounts of integration had it. This way, integration can be analyzed in more detail with the help of constraint- satisfaction account of coherence between scientific represen-tations. In particular, the account has resources to talk of idealizations and research heuristics employed by researchers to combine separate results and theoretical frameworks. The account is subsequently applied to an example of successful integration in the research on hippocampus and memory, and to a failure of integration in the research on mirror neurons as purportedly explanatory of sexual orientation.
7
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Integrating cognitive (neuro)science using mechanisms

100%
Miłkowski M.
Avant
|
2016
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vol. 7
|
issue 2
EN
In this paper, an account of theoretical integration in cognitive (neuro)science from the mechanistic perspective is defended. It is argued that mechanistic patterns of integration can be better understood in terms of constraints on representations of mechanisms, not just on the space of possible mechanisms, as previous accounts of integration had it. This way, integration can be analyzed in more detail with the help of constraint- satisfaction account of coherence between scientific represen-tations. In particular, the account has resources to talk of idealizations and research heuristics employed by researchers to combine separate results and theoretical frameworks. The account is subsequently applied to an example of successful integration in the research on hippocampus and memory, and to a failure of integration in the research on mirror neurons as purportedly explanatory of sexual orientation.
8
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O rzekomym zmierzchu filozofii analitycznej

88%
Miłkowski M.
Diametros
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2005
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issue 6
249-254
PL
Głos w dyskusji: Czy zmierzch filozofii analitycznej?
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Czym jest i jak istnieje umysł?

63%
Miłkowski M., Poczobut R.
Diametros
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2005
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issue 3
27-55
PL
Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że wszechstronnej odpowiedzi na tytułowe pytanie można udzielić tylko w kontekście nauki. Za najbardziej wiarygodne źródło wiedzy na temat procesów umysłowo-poznawczych uznajemy grupę nauk kognitywnych. Korzystając z ich dorobku wskazujemy na szereg kryteriów posiadania umysłu. Wyróżniamy wiele rodzajów umysłów (w szczególności umysły osobowe). Staramy się naszkicować warunki, jakie powinien spełniać adekwatny model umysłu. Naszym zdaniem musi on wykorzystywać wszelkie dostępne dane empiryczne oraz budowane na ich bazie teorie naukowe. Z punktu widzenia filozofii szczególnie ważne są ontologiczne zobowiązania takich teorii. Ich rekonstrukcja może stanowić prolegomena do przyszłej zintegrowanej ontologii umysłu. Podkreślamy, że umysł nie jest samodzielną rzeczą (substancją). Mówiąc o umyśle mamy na uwadze stany, zdarzenia, procesy, funkcje i dyspozycje pochodne (genetycznie, ewolucyjnie, rozwojowo) względem procesów niższych rzędów. Zakładamy, że adekwatny model umysłu jest modelem wielowymiarowym, uwzględniającym kilka sprzężonych poziomów organizacji (fizykochemiczny, neurobiologiczny, obliczeniowy, reprezentacyjny, środowiskowo-adaptacyjny i świadomościowy). Problem psychofizyczny interpretujemy jako problem relacji między poziomami organizacji konstytutywnymi dla realizacji stanów umysłowych. Relacje psychofizyczne okazują się szczególnym przypadkiem szerszego zagadnienia relacji międzypoziomowych. Dokonując ich wstępnej konceptualizacji wykorzystujemy pojęcie emergencji, dlatego nasze stanowisko – głównie w opozycji do dualizmu substancji – można określić mianem monizmu lub/i naturalizmu emergencyjnego.
EN
The goal of the article is to show that a complete answer to the title question can be given only in the context of the natural sciences. We believe that the group of cognitive sciences are the most reliable source of information about cognitive mental processes is. Making use of their achievements we present a series of criteria for possessing a mind. We distinguish between many kinds of minds (in particular personal minds). We attempt to outline the conditions that must be fulfilled by an adequate model of the mind. In our opinion such a model must make use of all available empirical data and of scientific theories constructed on the basis of such data. From the point of view of philosophy the requirements placed upon such theories by ontology are especially important. Their reconstruction can be a prolegomena to a future integrated ontology of the mind. We emphasize that the mind is not an independent thing (a substance). In speaking about the mind we have in mind states, events, processes, functions, and dispositions that are derivative (genetically, evolutionarily, and developmentally) with respect to processes of a lower order. We assume that an adequate model of the mind is multi-dimensional, taking into account several mutually interacting levels of organization (physico-chemical, neurobiological, calculational, representational, environmentally adaptational, and conscious). We interpret the psychophysical problem as one of the relation between levels of organization, a relation that is constitutive for the actualization of mental states. Psychophysical relations turn out to be a particular case of the broader issue of relations between levels. In carrying out a preliminary conceptualization we make use of the notion of emergence; this is why our position, which is mainly in opposition to substantial dualism, may be termed emergent monism or naturalism.
10
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Hutchins w obronie interdyscyplinarnych badań nad poznaniem

63%
Miłkowski M., Wachowski W.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2022
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issue 72
127-165
EN
The article presents the interdisciplinary approach of Edwin Hutchins, analyzing his conception of distributed cognition as probably the most important and lasting contribution of anthropology to the repertoire of theoretical tools in cognitive science. At the same time, this conception resulted in one of the most interesting relationships between cognitive science and social sciences. These relationships are made possible by the assumptions of Hutchins’ conception, which directly contribute to interdisciplinary collaboration. His account of distributed cognition has enormous potential, allowing the integration of research into cognitive and social processes. This is also because it breaks with methodological individualism.
11
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Remarks on Ontological Status of Future

51%
Podkański J., Miłkowski M.
Filozofia Nauki
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1997
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vol. 5
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issue 3
123-130
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