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  1. 3 Filozofia (Philosophy)

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  1. 3 Azeri S.

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1

KANT'S REJECTION OF THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION

100%
Azeri S.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 6
592-603
EN
Kant's denial of right of revolution has bewildered many Kant's scholars. Kant sympathizes with French, American, and Irish revolutionaries. But in his 'Metaphysics of Morals' he rejects the right of revolution. Apparently, his stance represents a tension or a contradiction. Kant believes that a legitimate government should be based on the consent of the citizens. Thus, logically he is expected to affirm the right of citizens to disobedience. However, he also holds the view that citizens' moral obligation to obey the law is absolute. The author believes that Kant's rejection of the right of revolution does not represent a contradiction. Rather, it is the necessary consequence of Kant's metaphysics of subject and the notion of transcendental subjectivity.
2

TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT VS. EMPIRICAL SELF: ON KANT'S ACCOUNT OF SUBJECTIVITY

100%
Azeri S.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 3
269-283
EN
Kant's view of subjectivity implies a twofold consideration of the idea of subject. On one hand, there is the empirical self, and on the other hand, there stands the transcendental subject as the principle of the unity of experience, and therefore, as the principle of the existence of the empirical self. Kant's transcendental subject is an effort to suggest a theory of subjectivity, which is impersonal and non-atomistic, that is to say a model that intends to exclude individualism. Yet, this model fails to constitute the factually existing person as subject. Kant's theory of transcendental subject is rooted in his subjectivist idealist philosophy; the transcendental subject appears to be another type of the idea of absolute.
3

LOCKE ON PERSONAL IDENTITY: THE FORM OF THE SELF

100%
Azeri S.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
|
vol. 66
|
issue 3
222-239
EN
In line with the empiricist project, Locke tries to describe how unconscious encounters with environment yield to the emergence of consciousness. For Locke the self is identical with consciousness and consciousness is accessible empirically. As far as the identity of human is concerned, identity of the self depends on the consciousness of the person. The person is identical to himself to the extent that he is aware of his own perceptions and thinking. The range of the person's memory sets the limits of consciousness. According to Locke, consciousness is an element that accompanies all acts of thinking including act of recollection. Such accompanying consciousness constitutes the form of the identity of the self, whereas memory-ideas may be considered the content of consciousness. Therefore, it is this formal constitutive element that provides constancy of the idea of the self. If so, then it can be claimed that Locke's approach to the question of the self results in admitting the truth of what he intends to reject and it is self-defeating; this is to say that, Locke's methodology pushes him to adopt a Platonic-Aristotelian formal theory of identity in general and of personal identity in particular.
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