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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POST-CONTRACTUAL BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTS: THE CZECH CASE AS A SECONDARY COMPARISON WITH THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

100%
Schmidt M., Ochrana F., Plaček M., Půček M.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
|
2016
|
vol. 64
|
issue 6
501 – 518
EN
The article analyses post-contractual behaviour on a sample of 200 randomly selected public works contracts, awarded in 2013, where it was possible to trace information about the final price. The study looks for factors, which have a statistically significant effect on the ratio between the actually paid price and tendered price. The findings are compared with similar studies in Slovakia. The model identifies a number of bids for a statistically significant indicator having a positive effect on the relationship between the actually paid price and the tendered price. Conversely, the ratio between the estimated and actual tendered amounts, as well as the use of subcontractors is seen as the factors with a negative impact.
2

AVOIDANCE OF RISK FROM THE CONTRACTING AUTHORITIES: PUBLIC PROCUREMENT CASE STUDY

88%
Plaček M., Ochrana F., Schmidt M., Křápek M., Půček M.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
|
2017
|
vol. 65
|
issue 7
587 – 601
EN
The article deals with an empiric analysis of behaviour of contracting authorities when tendering public contracts. In the context of theories dealing with rational, imperfectly rational and rationally inattentive behaviour of agents, it tries to describe the problem of avoiding risk by the contracting authorities in further detail. Theories observing behaviour of bureaucracy – no matter how well they are reasoned – mostly meet the problem of empiric verifiability. In this case, the authors try to fill the gap using an empiric analysis where it is worked with real data of public contracts from 2010 – 2014. We can consider the main findings to be the fact that public contracting authorities prefer strategies that are based on a reduction of risk of conflicts with the regulator. These strategies are chosen mainly based on signals of behaviour of central authorities, rather than based on the effort of gaining the most informative strategy. However, the final result is the same. In the authors’ opinion, the aversion to risk by the contracting authorities, which is enforced by the public policy in this field, plays the major role.
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