The modern challenges of world economy and conditions in which the state exists provide the opportunity to emphasize that competitiveness of national economy in the world market is the key determinant in the state’s prosperity path. The research is focused on the performance of competitiveness of the Irish economy in global rankings (IMD and WEF). The obtained results allow demonstrating not only the rank of Ireland, but also determining the factors of its economic growth and those, which still should be improved. This study became a benchmark for recommendations to Irish economy in ensuring the long-term growth.
Many of the challenges facing humankind, such as climate change, water scarcity, inequality and hunger, can be resolved not only at a global level by promoting sustainable development but, first of all, at local level. Local communities in many countries have been seeking to improve sustainability. They are policy makers and catalysts of change that unify the global goals with their own local ones. In the light of the theoretical background it was made an attempt to extend the analysis of effective managing a commons proposed by Elinor Ostrom basically on the example of Ukraine by introducing the obstacles and opportunities for local communities functioning in the direction of sustainable development. Considering the experience of European states, the basis for the transformation in conditions of sustainable development is a citizen as an individual, guided by his own “taste to life” in accordance to the right guaranteed by the state and the community to choose its place in life. In the relevant conditions it is expedient to look for effective tools of influence on central and local governments and possibilities of the transformation the whole system of public administration by focusing on the role of community and its opportunities for the effective use of shared resources. The duplication of the process of consolidation without development of a social state only destroys the remnants of local self-governance and, as a consequence, all other branches of power in general.
The research performs an attempt to adapt accumulated approaches of the Institutional Economics to the application of the Coase theorem in public administration. Governance is mainly analyzed in the field of political science, while transactional costs definitely serve to the economic surveys. Solving the problem of social costs, Coase theorem revealed a conception of property rights as the outcome of mere contracting in independent exchanges. This conception is applicable for analyzing a wide range of issues, including externalities related to the use of assets and public goods. The article contains a brief characteristic of the self-governance in European states. The results of comparative analysis of the local governance in European region became a basis for proposing a series of transformation tools for Ukraine and neighboring states in this field. Obtained results of statistical modeling and payoff matrix of Nash equilibrium clearly confirm the validity of the Coase theorem for interpretation of the interaction between local self-governance and government institutions.
This article is an attempt to analyse the functioning of the institutional environment through the prism of institutional interaction and cooperation between actors in the shadow and official economy. The authors suggest somewhat unusual mechanisms for understanding the most problematic current issues of interinstitutional cooperation in Ukraine. The investigation is based on current game theory, in particular an approach to interactions in the context of such models as “loyal business – opposition business”, “IMF – Ukraine”, “Ukrainian society – oligarchic groups”, which allow the sources, causes and consequences of the defacto functioning command system to be demonstrated. The research, which combined approaches to the innovative economy, the institutional economy and the theory of games is a good basis for explaining why a positive outcome, known as institutional cooperation, has not been achieved in the interaction between oligarchic groups and Ukrainian society as a result of a repetitive “game” for two decades. It is proposed to use Nash disequilibrium to disturb an ineffective economical system for receiving the effect similar to Josef Schumpeter’s creative destruction approach in entrepreneur role identification. In this way a synergy between game theory and innovation economics was implemented.
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