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DOES EPISTEMIC SUBJECTIVITY HAVE MORAL IMPORT?

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We start from the basics: there is a meaning of the notion of epistemic subject under which it is not an object at all. This statement does not lead to dualism of substance; it fits with any sort of non-reductionism. What follows is that we assume certain subjects that are not objects, hence entities that we can't build direct predicative statements about. Whatever we can say about them comes indirectly, from the influence subjects have on certain objects. Hence, loosely speaking, subjectivity can be viewed as a feature of certain ontological entities (objects), such as persons. But an ontology of pure subjects is possible, based on the indirect influences they have. Such ontology of subjects that are not objects allows us to have subjects consistently as a part, though a very specific one, of the ontological furniture of the world. The author also claims that subjectivity is what, prima facie, deserves a moral standing though only certain additional capacities make a being a moral patient.
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AMERICAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. AN UNFINISHED DEBATE

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The author begins by drawing a distinction between an earlier stage of contemporary American political philosophy, informed by the Rawls-Nozick-Walzer debate, and a later stage geared towards social issues such as multiculturalism. His point is that the earlier debate was incomplete because an important group of views went underrepresented. This becomes clear when one use two variables to classify the main political theories: higher taxes and more social services versus lower taxes and fewer social services (economic left and right) and the level of individualism versus collectivism (liberals and communitarians). This gives us four positions: left-wing liberalism, left-wing communitarianism, right-wing liberalism and right-wing communitarianism. The author claims that right-wing communitarianism is barely represented in the debate that grounded today's political philosophy. He sketches a version of conservatism, relying mostly on Nisbet and Kirk, to illustrate the missing position of right wing communitarianism. Although he does not endorse many aspects of conservatism as right-wing communitarianism, he argues that it is a theoretically viable option and suggest that sociological reasons may explain why it is underrepresented among professional philosophers. As a part of the argument he also outlines a position called equality without egalitarianism.
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MORALITY VERSUS PARTIALITY

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Patriotism is not a viable option for the traditional universalistic moral systems, including Kantian rationalism and especially for consequentialism. The author follows Sosa in claiming that not all forms of consequentialism have to lack 'deontic components'. He follows up with a stronger claim, that not all systems, deontic or consequentialist, have to accept strong universalism that precludes non-instrumental special moral concerns. He presents the main alternatives: (a) Dancy's moral particularism; (b) Nagel's idea of partiality based on the non-reducible difference between personal and impersonal view points; (c) Scheffler's concern with non-voluntary special duties; (d) a broad range of philosophies, from Aristotle's to the ethics of care that use non-homogenous models. The author closes by claiming that the non-homogenous models result in viable moral theories. Such theories treat ethics not as a source of moral recommendations to the effect of what should happen in a given situation, but rather as rules of a largely competitive game that adjudicate two things: (1) what each agent should do in a given situation; (2) what constraints should be imposed on the manner in which that moral competition is taking place.
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