Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

ABSOLUTNĚ UVAŽOVANÁ PŘIROZENOST. PETR FONSECA A JEHO VÝZNAMNÍ STŘEDOVĚCÍ PŘEDCHŮDCI

100%
Svoboda D.
Studia theologica
|
2012
|
vol. 14
|
issue 4
102–126
EN
The paper deals with the issue of absolutely considered nature in the work of the early Modern Portuguese scholar philosopher Pedro de Fonseca. His doctrine is set out within the context of three influential medieval concepts (Avicenna, Aquinas, Duns Scotus) and all the theories are compared with one another. Fonseca’s concept, in which nature of itself has an actual unity of precision and actual universality, is found to be ontologically less sober.
2
Content available remote

Tomáš Akvinský a vědecký status matematiky

63%
Svoboda D., Sousedík P.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2019
|
vol. 67
|
issue 4
521-539
EN
In our article, we attempt to show that in addition to Thomas’ official position, according to which mathematics is, along with physics and metaphysics, a real theoretical science, there also exists a whole series of indications that put this position in doubt. These as it were side standing lead us to the conclusion that in Thomas’ texts there is to be found the embryo of a distinct constructivist conception of mathematics. From the point of view of constructivism, we then attempt to create a conception of mathematics that would be in agreement with the fundamental suppositions of a Peripatetic conception.
CS
V našich úvahách ukazujeme, že u Tomáše sice převládá koncepce, podle níž je matematika společně s fyzikou a metafyzikou reálnou teoretickou vědou, ale vedle toho existuje i celá řada náznaků, které toto stanovisko zpochybňují. Tyto nepočetné a spíše marginální úvahy nás vedou k závěru, že v Tomášových textech je zárodek určité „konstruktivistické“ koncepce matematiky. Z hlediska konstruktivismu se pak pokoušíme vytvořit koncepci matematiky, která by byla ve shodě se základními předpoklady peripatetické tradice.
DE
In unseren Überlegungen versuchten wir nachzuweisen, dass es neben Thomas von Aquins offiziellem Standpunkt, demgemäß die Mathematik zusammen mit Physik und Metaphysik eine reale theoretische Wissenschaft darstellt, auch eine ganze Reihe von Andeutungen gibt, die diesen Standpunkt hinterfragen. Diese eher am Rande erscheinenden Anmerkungen führten uns zu dem Schluss, dass in den Texten Thomas von Aquins der Keim eines gewissen „konstruktivistischen“ Mathematikkonzepts ruht. Hinsichtlich des Konstruktivismus versuchen wir dann, ein Mathematikkonzept zu entwickeln, das im Einklang mit den Grundvoraussetzungen des peripatetischen Konzepts stünde.
3
Content available remote

Vznik formalismu a nové pojetí vědy

63%
Sousedík P., Svoboda D.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2015
|
vol. 63
|
issue 3, Special No: Sedmkrát z logiky a metodologie vědy
39-60
EN
According to formalism a mathematician is not concerned with mysterious meta-physical entities but with mathematical symbols themselves. Mathematical entities, on this view, become mere sensible signs. However, the price that has to be paid for this move looks to be too high. Mathematics, which is nowadays considered to be the queen of the sciences, thus turns out to be a content-less game. That is why it seems too absurd to regard numbers and all mathematical entities as mere symbols. T e aim of our paper is to show the reasons that have led some philosophers and mathemati¬cians to accept the view that mathematical terms in a proper sense do not refer to anything and mathematical propositions do not have any real content. At the same time we want to explain how formalism helped to overcome the traditional concept of science.
4

MILLOVO POJETÍ ČÍSLA

63%
Sousedík P., Svoboda D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 2
201 – 221
EN
According to the positivists, all our knowledge is based on experience which is the foundation not only of every empirical science, but also of those disciplines that are usually considered to be a priori. The paper consists of two main parts. Firstly, a positivist concept of number defended by J. S. Mill is presented; secondly, it is shown how this conception can settle some objections coming from apriori-oriented philosophers. Mill’s theory of number is interesting for at least two historical reasons. It is developed in connection with a relatively rich scholastic logic which is why its methodology is similar to the contemporary philosophy of language; it is indispensable for an appropriate comprehension of the concept of number that was proposed by Mill’s most famous opponent G. Frege.
5

JE ČÍSLO VLASTNOST VNĚJŠÍCH VĚCÍ? MILL – FREGE - KESSLER

63%
Sousedík P., Svoboda D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2014
|
vol. 21
|
issue 1
45 – 62
EN
In this paper we deal with the problem, whether number is a property of external things. It is divided into three parts. Firstly Mill’s empirical concept of natural numbers is summarized, then Frege’s arguments against this conception are put forth and finally viewpoints of some contemporary analytical philosophers (first of all G. Kessler), who reject Frege’s critique, are set out. Kessler and his followers in fact revive the abandoned theory of Mill.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.