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Z działalności ambasadora Waltera Bedell Smitha w okresie pierwszego kryzysu berlińskiego (1948-1949)

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Wasiewicz M.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
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2005
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issue 79
99-110
EN
The article presents the activity US Ambassador to Soviet Union W. B. Smith during the First Berlin Crisis, which was one of the reasons why the Cold War began. On June 24, 1948 Soviet forces implemented a blockade of Berlin halting all railroad traffic, the major means of transporting food and fuel into the city. The blockade was a response to the Western currency reform announced on June 22, the decisions taken at the London conference earlier in the month that established the foundation for West Germany, and the Soviet desire to drive the three Western powers out of Berlin. At the end of June the United States announced that an expanded airlift would begin to carry food and supplies into Berlin. The negotiations held by Allies in Berlin did not lead to the solution to the dangerous situation. They were moved to Moscow, when the ambassadors of the US, France and the representative of United Kingdom were to talk to USRR leaders. The representatives of the West were to make Stalin abolish the blockade getting a give-and-take in return. During the first meeting the ambassadors with Joseph Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov (August 3), Smith told that the three Western powers were in Berlin by right, and they intended to remain there. He said the Western Big Three were eager to resolve differences with the Soviet Union, but no negotiations could take place while the blockade remained in effect. The next meeting with Molotov Ambassador Smith consistently emphasized two points. Firstly that the Western powers were in Berlin by right and not at the sufferance of the Soviet Union, and secondly that the decision taken at the London conference would not be suspended or delayed. Ambassador Smith, along with the British and French ambassadors, met Joseph Stalin again to discuss Berlin issues (August 23). A tentative agreement between the two sides was reached regarding the currency issue, but the arrangements for its implementation were to be worked out by the military governors in Berlin. In September the four military governors in Berlin announced they could not reach an agreement based on the Moscow directive. In the end or September France, the United Kingdom, and the United States sent identical letters to the secretary general of the United Nations informing him that the Berlin situation constituted a threat to world peace as defined in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Ihe Western powers requested that the Berlin issue be taken up by the Security Council as quickly as possible. The negotiation in Moscow in which Walter Bedell Smith participated ended unsuccessfully and the blockade of Berlin was not suspended by Russians until 1949.
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Udział delegacji Stanów Zjednoczonych w moskiewskiej konferencji Rady Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych w 1947 roku

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Wasiewicz M.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
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2007
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issue 81
147-156
EN
This article presents the activity of US Delegation during the Moscow Conference in the spring 1947. The Ambassador of the US in Moscow General Walter Bedell Smith had installed the American Delegation in an improvised office in the Embassy residence, Spaso House. All of the members of the Delegation had difficulty adjusting to Moscow habits of work through the night. The East-West negotiations in 1947 primarily concerned the future of Germany. The United Slates tried unsuccessfully to advance the prospects of Germany’s reunification and demilitarization. The Soviets were extremely negative and would agree to nothing. Therefore the US Secretary of State General Marshall met Stalin on April 15, 1947. The meeting took eighty-eight minutes. Stalin listened while Marshall gave a situation report on the afflictions of the world and the need for peace. But Stalin expressed the view that present disagreements resembled a family quarrel. The impression made by Stalin on General Marshall was certainly one of the main causes of The Marshall Plan. Moreover in Moscow neither the Americans nor the Soviets had any intentions of working towards a Peace Treaty with Germany and German reunification. Moscow was the end of a road, the finish of a grand attempt by American democracy to get along with Russian communism.
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Polityczne konsekwencje spotkań ambasadora Waltera B. Smitha z Wiaczesławem Mołotowem 4 i 9 maja 1948 roku

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Wasiewicz M.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
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2008
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issue 82
135-148
EN
The article presents the activity of the US Ambassador to Soviet Union W. B. Smith during the international tensions of 1948. The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia was the first and most consequential of the chain of events that occurred in the early months of 1948. The Czech coup catalyzed diplomatic developments in western Europe. On 17 March Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact. The Truman administration was much more concerned about developments in Eastern Europe. Secretary of State Marshall instructed Ambassador Smith to arrange a meeting with Foreign Minister Molotov to inform him about American foreign policy objectives. Smith was instructed to warn the Soviet minister against any acts of agression and to assure him the United States had no hostile intension against the Soviet Union. On 4 May Ambassador Smith met with Molotov to discuss Soviet-Amcrican relations. Ambassador Smith said American policies were basically defensive, were supported by American people, and did not threaten the Soviet Union. On 9 May Foreign Minister Molotov responded to the 4 May statesment of Ambassador Smith. Molotov denied the charges made by American Ambassador. He accused the United States of being responsible for Soviet-Amcrican tensions. 11 May, Soviet radio and press published the exchange of views between Ambassador Smith and Molotov. American officials assumed the exchange of views would be considered confidental. The same day Henry Wallace, the former secretary of commerce in the Truman administration, wrote an open letter to Josef Stalin. Wallace was one of the leaders of the left-wing Democrats. In his letter Wallace called for an end of the cold war. State Department concluded that the actions of the Soviet Union to make public the record of the Smith-Molotov talks and Stalin’s reply to Wallace’s open letter, indicated it was more interested in scoring a propaganda victory than in seriously attempting to resolve Sovict-American differences. Secretary of State Marshall in his speech delivered in Portland, Oregon, criticized the Soviets for making the diplomatic exchange public, without consulting the United States. The Smith-Molotov notes and the Wallace-Stalin correspondence troubled government officials because they threatened to undermine public and congressional support for those policies.
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