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Problem realizmu w polskiej myśli politycznej na uchodźstwie po II wojnie światowej - pytania i tezy

100%
Kornat M.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
|
2013
|
issue 3(25)
113-146
EN
The study is devoted on the problem of political realism in Polish political thought in exile after World War II (1945‑1989). The author concludes that the categories of “political realism” and “political idealism” are generally inadequate to the history of Polish political thought. There is rather difficult to find the “political realism” or “political idealism” in a clear substantial phenomenon. Very often, political ideas incorporate idealism and realism. Realist analysis of the realities could lead to a moral capitulation under the conviction that the change of the conditions is impossible. Sometimes it permit to keep the “idealist” aims but also avoiding the hopeless decisions (insurrections). Obviously, a future restoration of Polish independence after Yalta required a great geopolitical revolution in Europe. Poles had no means to achieve this aim acting in isolation. They also had no idea to reconcile themselves with the realities of Soviet domination. Polish political thought after Yalta was an exercise in resolving the impossible questions. The most prominent Polish political writer in exile Juliusz Mieroszewski argued that the categories of “realism” and “idealism” are changing in history. Their real sense depends on geopolitical constellation of a given nation in a given time. A perfect policy is idealist in the sphere of aims and realist in the domain of methods as Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski thought. Political thinkers of Polish emigration tried to reconsider the lesson of the past – especially from the tragedy of Warsaw Uprising of 1944 – and not to permit for a new insurrection in 1956. Significant internal autonomy of the Polish People’s Republic after 1956 was considered not as a final achievement but only an “stage” on the rather long way to future independence. Mieroszewski’s „evolutionism” was not a sort of reconciliation with the communist order and the dependence on the USSR but a conception based on the conviction that only the internal changes inside the communist regime could bring the real progress in the fight for independence.
2

Realism, Idealism, Diplomacy: In Defence of President Woodrow Wilson

100%
Kornat M.
The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs
|
2017
|
issue 4
108-124
EN
The study is devoted to Woodrow Wilson’s conceptions of international peace. The author rejects the popular perception of the American president as a political idealist, who contributed to the highly unstable peace of Versailles. Geopolitical revolution in East Central Europe was unavoidable and the restoration of international equilibrium seemed impossible, while the League of Nations without the U.S. was ineffective. Wilson’s tried to modernise international relations and the Versailles order offered many stateless nations between Russia and Germany an opportunity for development and modernisation.
3

Realizm, idealizm, dyplomacja. W obronie Wilsona

100%
Kornat M.
Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny
|
2018
|
issue 1
40-56
EN
A leading Polish scholar offers a new look at the legendary U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and his more than realistic vision of the future of Europe.
4

POPE PIUS XII AND HIS CONCEPT OF THE HOLY SEE'S 'ABSOLUTE NEUTRALITY' IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1939-1945). POLAND'S CASE (Polish title -below)

100%
Kornat M.
Zaglada Zydów. Studia i Materialy (Holocaust. Studies and Materials)
|
2009
|
vol. 5
104-127
EN
(Title in Polish - 'Papiez Pius XII i jego koncepcja 'neutralnosci absolutnej' Stolicy Apostolskiej w stosunkach miedzynarodowych (1939-1945). Przypadek Polski'). The article discusses the policy of Pope Pius XII on the international arena during World War II. Historians have extensively studied and discussed this policy. These problems always arouse many controversies, which are still intense although many years passed after the war's end and despite the Pope's death fifty years ago. The author of the article expresses the view that the main motive of the Vatican's policy during War World II times was neither the anti-Communism of Pius XII or his pro-German views, but most of all - the doctrine of 'absolute neutrality' in international relations. It was the key priority for the Vatican. The attitude towards Poland remains a clear example of limitations of this doctrine imposed by practice.
5

Akt 5 listopada a umiędzynarodowienie sprawy polskiej podczas Wielkiej Wojny. Uwagi historyka dyplomacji

100%
Kornat M.
Historia Slavorum Occidentis
|
2017
|
issue 2 (13)
11-28
EN
The author analyses the international importance of the Act of 5th November from the point of view of the future of Poland in the post-WWI international deal. The declaration of two emperors represented an “important step towards Poland’s reconstruction” (as Szymon Askenazy, a Polish historian, observed). However, the declaration failed to ultimately internationalize the Polish cause and determined itself the existence of the Polish state. The document was a product of special circumstances resulting from the fact that Germany was running out of human resources indispensable to continue the war. It was also possible because of the abortive attempts at securing peace with Russia on the basis of a territorial status quo. The declaration represented Berlin’s grand-scale political move, connecting with the history of the German political thought with assumptions originated by Bismarck and general Waldersee and revolving around the idea of establishing a small Polish state when it is necessary in the course of a war with Russia. Despite the proclaimed establishment of the Polish state by the governments in Berlin and Vienna, the Western powers (France and Great Britain) were not able to force Russia to acknowledge Poland’s independence. They assigned the government in Petrograd the right to deal with the Polish cause at its discretion i.e. to delineate the Western border of the empire according to its will once the acts of war were over. The historian therefore concludes that it was not before the February Revolution in Russia when actual possibilities opened up for the Western powers to support the Polish cause. In their policies, they did not include willingness to make the world a better place by principles of international justice but rather, they intended to maintain Russia as an allied force in the anti-German coalition at all cost.
6
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Jakiej Polski pragnęli Polacy? Koniunktura międzynarodowa i aspiracje narodu

100%
Kornat M.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
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2018
|
issue 31
39-60
7

ATTEMPTING TO SEARCH TO THE VERSAILLES SYSTEM. ON THE GENESIS OF WORLD WAR TWO (Zrozumiec system wersalski czyli o genezie II wojny swiatowej)

100%
Kornat M.
Dzieje Najnowsze
|
2009
|
issue 3
5-32
EN
The Versailles Order, created after the World War I is still in the center of controversial problems of the history of the 20th–century. In the interwar years (1919-1939) it was regarded as the 'Clemenceau peace' (la Paix de Clemencau) signifying the French attempt for European domination which was contested by the British Government. In his famous The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) John Maynard Keynes wrote on 'the Carthaginian Peace'. German propaganda operated with the term 'Versailler Diktat' repeating the thesis on 'imposed' and unjust peace. For many historians this international system could have not survive due to its internal contradictions and too rigorous conditions introduced against Germany. American political scientist Arnold Wolfers considered that any solid peace foundations could not have been based because of 'conflicting strategies' of France and the United Kingdom. In historiography there are many contradictory interpretations of the origins of World War II. For the dominant current of post–war German historiography there is no doubts that the war was precipitated by Hitler. In Germany The formula of 'die Entfesselung des zweiten Welkrieg' is in use from 1945. The most controversial problem is connected with Stalin's foreign policy. Many historians argued that Stalin's role in the genesis of War was decisive. The works of Phillip Fabry, Andreas Hillgruber and Ernst Topitsch exposed this point of view. The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939 was always considered by them as a 'conditio sine qua non' of starting of World War II. Visibly different view was proposed by British historian Alan J. P. Taylor, who in his Origins of the Second World War argued that the war was provoked by the British 'guarantees policy' and especially by the guarantee offer to Poland of March 31, 1939. For the Soviet historiography there are two major causes of the war. First of them was the Western Powers appeasement policy and the second one: Hitler's policy of aggressions. The Soviet historiography condemned the Polish Government for it's anti–Soviet policy which decided on the impossibility of 'the Great Coalition' against the Third Reich in 1939. Poland refused to permit the Soviet Army to across Polish territory in case of war. As we know this motive was used by the Soviet Government to break the Moscow negotiations with the Western Powers in August 1939. In the present Russian post–Soviet historiography these motives are still functioning because there was no consequent breaking off with the Soviet past in Russian historiography.
8
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Historiografia wobec Action Francaise

100%
Kornat M.
Historia i Polityka
|
2009
|
issue 1(8)
82-98
EN
French radical right movement, Action Franęaise belongs to those political phe- nomenon in history which are differently interpreted by historiography. Principally we have eight interpretations. First ofthem is Action Franęaise own image and identity as royalist and anti-liberal "party of order”. One of the most important historical interpretation of this movement is French historian Rene Remond’s one. In his Les Droites aujourdhui Remond argued that Action Franęaise was model example of anti-liberal Right in France and in Europe of the first half of the XX century. The most popular interpretation of Action Franęaise are two: (1) Action Franęaise as an incarnation of conservative revolution (Carl Schmitt) and (2) as the ideology of "integral nationalism” (Hans Konh, Carlton Hayes). Very original concept was developed by well known German historian Ernst Nolte, who considered Action Franęaise as pro- to-fascistmovement. British thinker Isaiah Berlin and Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell interpreted Action Franęaise as revolution of "anti-Enlightment” (les anti-Lumieres). Polish philosopher Stanisław Brzozowski argued that Action Franęaise was a con- seąuence of conflict between romanticism and positivism and was sure that Action Franęaise inherited much from positivistphilosophy. Non less controversial problem is forthehistorians the excommunication of Action Franęaise by Pope Pius XI in 1926. To our days there are many opposite attempts to reconstruct of this event and its origins. For many historians Pius XI tried to defend the doctrine of the Church which seemed to him intoxicated by the "nationalist and racialist heresy”. For some other writers the Vatican policy was under German influence and this caused papai action. In 1939 another Pope Pius XII decided to abolish the condemnation from 1926.
9
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Autorytaryzm

88%
Kornat M.
Historia i Polityka
|
2010
|
issue 2/3(9/10)
11-15
XX
ankieta
10

Będziesz pierwszym niewłoskim papieżem. Prymas Polski, kardynał August Hlond a opinia międzynarodowa (1932–1939)

75%
Kornat M.
Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny
|
2016
|
issue 1
103-127
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