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Husserl a otázka tělesnosti jako jádra subjektivity

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The question of the relation of embodiment and subjectivity in Husserl might be posed, for example, by asking what role and in what form and to what extent is embodiment basic for the subjective character of experience in the narrower, most elementary sense of the term “inner consciousness” or inwardness, which Husserl initially analyses independently of embodiment, in the framework of inner temporal consciousness. It would seem that in the later genetico phenomenological reflections which treat temporal con¬sciousness in the context of affectivity in the broad sense of the word and ki¬naesthetic experiencing (at least according to the interpretation of L. Land grebe, which is the basis of the presentation of this topic) bodily inward nessand “mineful” inward experiencing are two closely connected, yet different, fundamental characteristics of the life of consciousness, and that the ques¬tion of their mutual relation in Husserl remains open.
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Vtělení: subjekt a tělo v díle Emmanuela Levinase

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In his late philosophy, Levinas finds that the human being, along with his body, is constituted by “sensibility as proximity, as signification, as one-for-the-other, which signifies in giving”; otherwise he or she is not human. For Levinas, therefore, it is also an affectivity, which, in its bind to the Other, opens up as a sensitivity to the Other. The Other is what animates affectivity. In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, “the passage to the physico-chemico-physiological meanings of the body”, that is prepared by “sensibility as proximity, as signification, as one-for-the-other”, as the materialization of the body, is now exclusively reabsorbed in ethical signification. Nevertheless, the article shows some other figures of incarnation in the earlier works of Levinas as well: the position and the enjoyment.
EN
„The body as a subject – this paradox which is a phenomenon at the same time,“ writes Patočka in the article entitled „Phenomenology and Metaphysics of Movement“. In this article, Patočka develops the given paradox on the phenomenological basis, presenting the theses concerning the non-objectifiable foundation of the constitution of the world and its givenness. According to Patočka, the world conforms, in a certain sense, to the intentions of subjective movement. Thus, the subjective movement of the body and the movement of the apparition of the world, i.e. the entry of the invisible to the realm of the apparition, correspond to each other. In different contexts, Patočka goes even further and interprets the subjective movement of the body from the perspective of vital structures. The primary „feeling“ of finitude takes place in the instinctive-affective motricity of the body, in the so-called first movement of existence. It is here, in the sensory perception and affectivity, below the threshold of consciousness and understanding of being that the resonance with the world takes place, as well as the perception of this world as a strange and destructive power. In this sense, it is already the body and its anxiety rather than the anticipation of death in the understanding of being that represents the basis of our feeling of finitude.
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Husserlova fenomenologie z realistického hlediska

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The aim of the article is to attempt to present Husserl’s phenomenology as it is understood in the books of Ivan Blecha, especially in Proměny fenomenologie (Transformations of Phenomenology). Husserl’s phenomenology is, in these books, described from a standpoint which treats it as a philosophy enabling a certain kind of realism. Blecha’s position is thus characterised as a transformation of Husserl’s phenomenology, stressing a certain realist perspective. A critical analysis of several moments in this conception is completed first by an excursion into the work of one of the first interpreters of the “other”, non-classical, Husserl, that of Ludwig Landgrebe, and then by an excursion into the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which is no longer a mere interpretation of Husserl, but a step beyond in the direction of a specific understanding of phenomenology. The author of the article finds a similar tendency in the work of Ivan Blecha.
EN
The recently published manuscript studies and fragments by Jan Patočka, dating from the first half of the 1940’s, amount to an attempt at grasping the deeper living correlation, rather than the correlation of consciousness and its objects at the level of the subject- or of dwelling-centred strata of experiencing or understanding. The turn to the identity of “the double indifference of subject and object”, whose evidence is the sensory harmony between the feeling and the felt, which is interpreted as a mutual communication of the interiority of life by means of its expressions, confronts Patočka with the question of the origin of their differentiation. Patočka founds the identity and difference enabling the deeper living correlation on his metaphysical concep­tion of nature which is not, now, just one of the horizons which experiencing creates around itself, nor is it just the basis on which the harmony of experiencing and its environment must develop, but nature also has an aspect which is closed and alien to subjectivity. This is a step beyond the bounds of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s schemes of a correlation of life and world, understanding and being – a step that throws a certain amount of light on Patočka’s later work.
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